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SUMMARY 
Disequilibrium analysis, particularly in the context of explicit 
dynamic economic models, is an area of considerable interest. 
Disequilibrium is important when markets fail to clear and dynamic 
adjustments are required. Three essential strands of the literature 
seem the most important: non market-clearing temporary equilibria; 
long term growth theory which allows for the possibility of 
unemployment of labour and underutilisation of capital stock; medium 
term dynamics where aggregate demand fails to match up to potential 
output. This thesis presents a number of theoretical and analytical 
models which analyse various aspects of the last two issues. Even 
though we use some concepts from short-run rationing models of 
temporary equilibria, the central focus is exclusively on long run 
growth and more shorter-term dynamic systems, where capital stock is 
exogenous. The work is also emphatically macroeconomic in nature, 
emphasising aggregative structures which conform to stylised facts 
and have interesting policy conclusions. 
The first part of the thesis discusses growth models. Given the 
lack of an unified theoretical structure in the area itself, we 
concentrate on specific issues: income-expenditure models with 
independent investment functions leading on to capital formation and 
(possible) movement towards steady states; unemployment of labour, 
and capital; monetary growth and asset structure; open economy 
considerations when markets may fail to clear. The second part 
analyses macrodynamics, assuming fixed capital, and is concerned with 
medium term adjustments of variables such as output, price and 
exchange rate under disequilibrium and rigidities. 
The purpose of the research is to present a diversity of concepts 
and conclusions. The objective is not to present a comprehensive 
'general' or 'meta' theory; it is not clear whether encompassing 
concepts will necessarily be more insightful; in any case the current 
state of the arts preclude such a schema. The chapters that follow 
deal with a wide range of possible topics; model specifications are 
adapted to tackle the specific problem at hand. 
The conclusions clearly demonstrate that specification of regime, 
Keynesian or Classical, is vital to the understanding of how the 
economy will behave under disequilibrium. Even if the steady state 
depends on exogenous parameters (such as the natural rate or 
potential output) the paths that approach it are essentially 
different in characteristics, depending on what sort of 
disequilibrium regime the economy is in. This, of course, has 
important policy relevance. Discretionary policies, as well as policy 
rules, must carefully study the underlying structural features of the 
economy if they are to have significance. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1 
Section ~ Disequilibrium economics. 
Disequilibrium models have a long and respected tradition in 
economics. Keynesian short run macro theory, analysing unemployment 
and the inability of investment demand to match up to full employment 
saving, emphasises the notion that markets may not clear and that 
disequilibrium is a more general state of the economy than 
equilibrium. Harrod's discussion of the knife-edge instability of 
growth paths in a capitalist economy, where independent decision 
makers determine saving and investment which therefore may not be 
equal ex ante, once again emphasise deviations from dynamic 
equilibrium. 
Formal analysis of short run disequilibrium models in 
macroeconomics has burgeoned recently with explicit treatments of non 
market-clearing temporary equilibria, optimum choice under rationing, 
spill-over effects consequent to agents failing to buy (sell) their 
desired demands (supplies) as well as sluggish prices which tend to 
perpetuate the initial cause of disequilibrium. These models are 
analytically powerful, but are essentially short run , static, single 
period (or sometimes two-period) systems. 
Growth theory, particularly in the neoclassical tradition, has 
generally eschewed disequilibrium methods and the vast literature in 
the field is usually concerned with equilibrium states. This is in 
spite of the early lead from the Harrodian model. However, the 
emphasis, on equilibrium, is understandable since even the simplest 
disequilibrium formulations lead to considerable complications and 
problems of interpretation. 
A third strand, following dynamic extensions of the IS/LM 
models, emphasise the discrepancy between aggregate demand and full 
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employment aggregate supply and therefore take on disequilibrium 
features right from the start. But capital stock behaviour is not 
often analysed nor is the interdependence of markets under 
disequilibrium (which is radically different from general equilibrium 
because of rationing constraints and spill-overs) given importance. 
The purpose of this thesis is to present several analytical 
models of growth and short/medium term dynamic theory, when markets 
do not clear and general disequilibrium prevails. It therefore 
concentrates on the second and third issues discussed in the 
preceeding paragraphs. Though it borrows concepts from temporary 
equilibrium rationing models, the thesis concentrates exclusively on 
long run growth theory, with capital accumulation considered 
endogenous, as well as more short run dynamic systems, where capital 
stock is taken to be exogenous. 
At this point it is probably counterproductive to go into a long 
and pedagogical discussion as to the exact definition of 
disequilibrium that we intend to use. The choice of a specific scheme 
will depend upon the particular application that will be analysed 
within the general framework. Therefore, what is necessary here is a 
brief description of some of the concepts we shall be using. 
In a sense equilibrium, as a concept, can be totally pervasive 
if properly defined. For example, the three criteria used by 
Malinvaud (1977) to delineate the characteristics of equilbrium are 
so broad that they can include almost any economic states. For the 
macroeconomy, in aggregate, these are: (i) trades balance or the 
amount (value) of purchase equals sales for each good; (ii) trades 
are voluntary, thus total purchase (sales) cannot exceed demand 
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(supply); (iii) a rationed buyer (seller) in a market implies that 
there does not exist a rationed seller (buyer). These are essentially 
consistency conditions and will hold under many possible situations. 
However, they do not rule out the discrepancy between ex ante demand 
and supply, the failure of prices to adjust quickly to clear markets, 
adjustments in response to rationing, unemployment with labour demand 
not being on the marginal productivity schedule, capital accumulation 
or decumu1ation consequent to capital shortage or excess capacity 
----- all important features of disequilibrium. 
The essence of disequilibrium is dynamic adjustments. Ma1invaud 
(1977) puts it clearly: "If one objects to thinking with equilibria, 
one must use a dynamic formulation in which the relevant variables 
will simultaneously move according to some properly specified rules". 
These adjustments are of two pure types; hybrids are of course 
possible. In the tatonnement models prices adjust rapidly to clear 
markets and make notional (desired) demands equal supply; 
transactions take place at market clearing temporary equilibrium 
prices. Further adjustments may take place with changes in state 
variables which are assumed to be given during the actual tatonnement 
process. Interest lies in the attainment of full equilibrium where 
even the underlying state variables are constant; this is the domain 
of stationary or steady state. Disequilibrium analysis can be 
meaningful here since the sequence of temporary equilibria and its 
time path may be related with the way prices actually adjusted during 
tatonnement. In non-tatonnement models, prices are rigid during the 
period of operation of temporary equilibrium; quantitites adjust to 
attain consistency; markets may 'clear' at the minimum of ex ante 
supply and demand or alternative, and more complicated, rationing 
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rules can be proposed. But the seeds of disequilibrium remain in the 
failure of some agents to achieve their optimum (unrationed) 
positions. Thus prices adjust and the sequence gravitates, if stable, 
towards full equilibrium. 
Specifications of adjustment rules and values of adjustment 
parameters are crucial. Some of these are 'natural': excess demand 
raises price, though in a competitive market with atomistic price-
taking agents it is not always easy to answer the question as to who 
actually changes price. Others are more controversial. Major 
criticism, from the new classical equilibrium theorists, centers 
around the value of the specific speed of adjustment parameter of 
relevant variables in non-clearing markets. In particular, any finite 
positive value of say the speed of adjustment of prices in response 
to a discrepancy between demand and supply, seems to be unacceptable. 
Yet it is not at all clear why speed of adjustment (of price and 
expectations) should be infinite (markets always clear) in every 
case; in a sense postulating infinite speed seems to be as ad hoc as 
to give finite values, including zero (where prices do not change). 
It is true that postulating dynamic adjustments of any variable, 
and giving arbitrary values to the speed of adjustment parameter, 
without explicit optimisation is ad hoc. Tobin (1981) puts it 
strongly: "-- the adjustment process itself has not in general been 
successfully described as optimizing behaviour, the only paradigm 
that carries theoretical conviction in our profession. This failure, 
neither surprising nor discreditable in view of the intrinsic 
difficulties of the task, is the root of the chronic crisis in 
macroeconomics." However, the current state of the arts makes it 
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imperative to use these concepts without too fine a discussion of the 
theoretical foundation. As mentioned earlier, these difficulties are 
not necessarily related to macro models; competitive general 
equilibrium theory also fails to answer the questions, why do price 
adjustments take place 'instantaneouly' to clear markets and who 
changes prices? 
Macroeconomic models can analyse disequilibrium in various 
stages. First, aggregate demand may not be equal to aggregate supply. 
This will manifest itself in ex ante or notional saving being unequal 
to ex ante or desired investment. Some form of price/quantity 
adjustments are required to equalise these two variables. Second, the 
level of actual output supplied, now equal to aggregate demand, may 
not be equal to the potential, full employment, full capacity output. 
A second level dynamic adjustment is now required. Third, actual 
saving or investment will determine capital accumulation. This in 
turn will have implications for long run growth. Full equilibrium 
will be reached, and all disequilibrium eliminated, when the capital 
stock reaches the stationary state level. Additional complications, 
at all these stages, are provided by the existence of labour market 
disequilibrium. 
The foregoing issues will be dealt with in a sequence of models 
that constitute Chapters 11 to X divided into two parts; Part A deals 
with growth theory while Part B analyses issues in short run dynamic 
modelling. At the current stage of our knowledge it is not possible 
to give a general model which can handle all the issues concurrently. 
The very nature of disequilibrium modelling forces us to analyse each 
problem at a time. Further, modelling techniques and assumptions made 
need to be adapted to the specific problem that we wish to emphasise 
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on. Model specifications change depending on the issue on which we 
focus. The analysis as a whole can, therefore, deal with a wide 
range of topics. Thus, the chapters that follow are therefore 
relatively independent. Each also has its own introduction and 
conclusion as well as a brief literature survey. 
For the purposes of integration we will discuss some of the 
major issues that need investigation in the area. The next Section 
deals briefly with short run rationing models. Though these are not 
elaborated in the thesis they do provide implicit microeconomic 
justification to our subsequent analysis; hence a review is 
essential. Section 3 analyses the sorts of questions that 
disequilibrium growth theory should answer; this overview sets the 
stage for much of the specifics in the main body of this work. 
Section 4 does the same but for medium run dynamic models with 
capital as exogenous. Since adjustment processes are so vital in what 
we do, Section 5 gives a succint review of methods. The final Section 
is important since it gives the structure of the thesis, how the 
chapters unfold, the links between them as well as their 
implications. 
It should be mentioned, right at the outset, that the work 
presented here is unflaggingly macroeconomic in nature. Even though 
many of the relations and concepts have implicit microfoundations 
their use is within aggregative structures which conform to stylised 
facts and have interesting policy implications. Analysing the concept 
of a 'metalanguage' Fitoussi (1983) defends the use of macro theory 
in the following way: (it is believed that) "macroeconomic relations 
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must have microeconomic foundations. This proposition establishes 
from the outset the subordination of the macro to the micro approach, 
and at the same time it ranks economic arguments in implicitly 
acknowledging that microeconomics is itself well founded. Yet it is 
not clear that macroeconomic relations can be derived in this fashion 
------ macroeconomic theory should set itself up as an autonomous 
discipline and seek also other foundations". This is not to say that 
macro and micro theory cannot cohabit; however they do have 
independent raison de'tre; one does not have to necessarily rely on 
the other. 
Section 2: Short ~ models of rationing. 
The rationing models, where quantity constraints are binding and 
agents cannot transact their desired amounts, started life formally 
in Patinkin's (1965) discussion of Keynesian unemployment. All the 
basic arguments had already been made in the General Theory and a 
major theoretical foundation had been established in the Hicksian fix 
price flex price distinction. But it lies to the credit of Patinkin 
to point out the issues so clearly. 
He considers the aggregate labour market alone where if the firm 
could sell all its output then labour demand would be on the marginal 
productivity schedule and wage rate would be equal to marginal 
product of labour. If now the firm faces a binding sales constraint 
(and there is no inventory) then this ration will change the firms 
behaviour. In particular it will produce the amount it can sell and 
hire the corresponding amount of labour, independent of the wage 
rate. The demand curve for labour implicitly becomes kinked and 
vertical at the point of the sales constraint. Compared to its 
8 
initial position the firm will now employ less labour and 
unemployment will appear. Given the kink, the marginal product of 
labour will be generally greater than wage at this level of labour 
demand. This unemployment is Keynesian since it occurs due to the 
firm's inability to sell its optimum output; hence there is deficient 
aggregate demand. A reduction in wage does not help since it is not 
the cost of labour that precludes the firm from hiring more people. 
Rather. lower wage may mean a further reduction in the demand for the 
output. On the other hand if the firm is actually on the 
unconstrained labour demand curve (and maximising profits with wage 
equals marginal product). and still there is unemployment then the 
wage rate must be too high to clear the labour market. This is the 
case of Classical unemployment where there is no problem of demand 
deficiency and the firm can sell whatever it wishes. 
C10wer (1965) laid even stronger and more formal micro-
foundations to the Keynesian short run model within this framework. 
He concentrates on the aggregate household which. in the absence of 
any other constraints. derives its labour supply and output demand 
from an optimisation process given the wage price configuration. Now 
if there is unemployment, and the household fails to sell its desired 
quantity of labour. it is rationed in its sales and has to take this 
binding constraint into account. This leads to the 'dual decision 
hypothesis' which shows that a second level decision needs to be 
taken by the agent in one market subject to a binding constraint in 
another market. There will also be a fundamental difference between 
notional demands (supplies) and effective demands (supplies); the 
latter takes into account all the binding or effective constraints 
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that the agent may be facing. 
Clearly, there will be interdependence among markets as these 
dual decisions are taken and consistent positions sought to be 
reached. In the firm's case the initial reduction in employment leads 
to a fall in wage income; hence there may be a further fall in 
effective demand emanating from the household. Similarly, the 
household faced with rationing in employment will reduce its demand 
for the output which in turn may lead to further cuts in labour 
demand. 
In an aggregate two good economy ---- commodity and labour ---
there are four possible configurations of rationed equilibria when 
the markets are brought together. We can have excess demand(supply) 
for commodity as well as for labour. These four situations have been 
termed: Keynesian Unemployment (excess supply of commodity, excess 
supply of labour); Classical Unemployment (excess demand for 
commodity, excess supply of labour); Repressed Inflation (excess 
demand for commodity; excess demand for labour); Underconsumption 
(excess supply of commodity, excess demand for labour). 
The implicit adjustment at the market level, that is presupposed 
to bring the economy into rationed equilibrium from an initial 
situation of disequilibrium, is the so called "min·· condition. Here 
markets clear on the short side so that actual transactions is the 
minimum of demands and supplies. Thus price adjustment is zero while 
speed of adjustment for quantity is infinite in the very short run. 
The ··min" condition may also give a criterion, beyond temporary 
equilibrium, for price adjustments to take place in response to 
excess effective demands. 
There have been significant extensions to the basic structure 
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fully formalised by Barro and Grossman (1976). Open economy 
considerations have been extensively studied in Dixit (1978) and 
Neary (1980). A major innovation in terms of our understanding of the 
micro foundations of these systems is provided in Neary and Roberts 
(1980) through the concept of "virtual prices"; an example of this is 
discussed a bit later. Another highly significant extension is to 
incorporate expectations and a sequence of temporary equilibria in a 
very rigorous fashion. This is done in a paper by Neary and Stiglitz 
(1983); though the analysis contains two periods and full equilibrium 
is not discussed, the paper incorporates all the complications that 
arise when microeconomic considerations are fully explored. 
Since the major purpose of the thesis is not to analyse these 
types of models per se, rather to borrow 'stylised results' for use. 
we do not go into much further details. It is probably better to give 
a simple illustrative example which will clarify the basic issues. 
Consider the aggregative household whose utility depends on 
consumption (C) and leisure (R). The total time available to the 
household is T, so that labour supply is L • T-R. It faces a real 
wage rate w in the labour market; thus its wage income is wL - w(T-
R). In this one period static optimisation model there are no 
savings. The household is also constrained by the maximum amount of 
labour time it can sell; this is given by L. 
The constrained optimisation problem can be written as 
Max U - U(C, R) (1) 
subject to 
C < w(T-R) (2) 
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(T-R) < L (3) 
We assume that all variables, C, R, L. T, L are non-negative 
The Lagrangian is: 
Z - U(C,R) - l[C - w(T-R») - m[(T-R) - L) (4) 
where 1 and m are the relevant Lagrange multipliers. 
For positive values of consumption and leisure, the Kuhn-Tucker 
(necessary) conditions for maximisation imply: 
Uc - 1 - 0 
UR - l[w - (m/I)] - 0 
1 [C - w(T- R») - 0 
m[ (T - R) - L) - 0 
1 > 0, m > 0 
-
When the constraints are binding then we have 
C - weT -R), 1 > 0 
(T - R) - L, m > 0 
From (5), (6), (10), (11) we get 
C - wL 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
The implications of (12) and (13) are clear. If the household is 
rationed in its labour supply, such that it Is forced to sell less 
labour (utilise more leisure) than it would actually do so under an 
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unconstrained regime, the constrained optimum labour sold is at the 
upper limit and the corresponding level of consumption is given by 
(13). Condition (12) tells us that if the real wage was actually w -
(m/l), rather than w, then the household would optimally choose L as 
its labour supply independent of the constraint given by (3). The 
shadow wage-price configuration w-(m/l) implies that the household 
does not perceive the ration on its supply of labour. Its "as if" 
optimum choice would be (C, R) • (wL, T - L). We note from Neary and 
Roberts (1980) that [w - (m/l)] is the "virtual price" of leisure 
time. 
For subsequent analysis we denote the optimal choice in the 
absence of rationing (on labour supply) as 
* * * (C, R, L) - (C , R , L ) 
and the rationed levels as 
(C, R, L) - (WL, T-L, L) 
(14) 
(15) 
To understand how (labour) rationing occurs we must turn to te 
behaviour of the aggregate firm. Assume initially that the firm faces 
no binding sales constraints; in other words it can sell whatever is 
produced (there are no inventories, for simplicity). Profit (rI), in 
real terms, is given by 
(16) 
where Y - F(Ld) is the output of the firm and wLd is the real wage 
cost. Profit maximisation implies 
(17) 
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(18) 
Let us assume henceforth that the firm can always buy the labour 
services it wants, thus the firm faces no rationing in its demand for 
labour. 
If the real wage rate is fixed at w, and transactions can take 
place at disequilibrium (demand not equal to supply), then one 
possibility might be that 
(19) 
Here the firms' demand for labour is less than the households optimum 
* unconstrained supply, L • Thus the household is faced with a ration 
in its labour sales to the firm. This necessitates a "dual decision" 
i.e. a second round optimisation, incorporating the upper limit that 
labour sales is L - Ld. The "minimum" condition 
(20) 
(La is actual labour services transacted) holds and the market for 
labour "clears" at La - Ld - i. The household's rationed optimisation 
is as discussed earlier and given by conditions (17), (13). This case 
assumes implicitly that the firm can sell all its output. Thus 
F(Ld) - F(L) - c - wL (21) 
We are in the region of classical unemployment where the household is 
forced to supply labour services less than its (unconstrained) 
optimum level. The firm however maximises profits (see (17» without 
additional constraints. 
The second possibility occurs where the firm faces a sales 
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ration such that its desired output (given by Ld from (17) and the 
production function) is greater than the amount that the market (or 
household) will demand. Let there be an effective sales ration for 
the firm such that output must be less than or equal to an exogenous 
limit Y. 
Then the firm's problem is, 
(22) 
(23) 
The Lagrangeian is 
(24) 
Optimality implies the following: 
(1 - n) F'(Ld)- w - 0 (25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
n > 0 (29) 
Note that here Ld represents the firm's demand for labour, when 
the sales constraint is operative. 
Given that the sales ration is binding, so that the firm would 
have liked to produce more than Y at the unconstrained profit 
maximisation level, we get 
15 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
1 > n > 0 (33) 
Figure 1.1 (adapted from Patinkin (1965» shows the constrained 
(rationed) optimisation of the firm. The current wage rate is given 
at w1• The unconstrained supply of output at the optimum is Y1• Faced 
with a binding sales ration, Y < Y1 the firm chooses its labour 
demand such that F(Ld) - Y. Once again, the firm obeys the dual 
decision hypothesis, and re-calculates its optimum with the 
additional constraint. Two points should be noted. First, that the 
marginal product of labour is greater than the real wage rate at the 
production level Y. Second, that the shadow real wage rate (w/1-n) is 
again the 'virtual price' of labour such that if the actual real wage 
was set at this "as if" level, the firm would have no sales 
constraint, de facto. 
It is clear how the household may be rationed in its sale of 
labour. If 
L - L - F-1 (Y) (34) 
(35) 
then the household cannot sell its unconstrained level of labour 
supply and is forced to accept the ration of ~ 
This is a situation of Keynesian unemployment where effective 
demand for output is less than what the firm desires to produce at 
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the going real wage. It is characterised by the fact that the virtual 
price of labour is greater than the actual real wage rate. 
If the aggregate household and firm are brought together we get 
a consistent characterisation of the general disequilibrium model. 
The following equations will give the solution to the relevant 
variables. 
F(L) - wL (36) 
F"'(L) • w/l-n (37) 
C - wL (38) 
Uc (C, T - L) - 1 (39) 
UR (C, T - L) - l[w - m/l] (40) 
(n, 1, m) ) 0 
Equation (36) simply states that supply of output is equal to demand, 
though not at the level required for unconstrained optimisation. If L 
is a binding labour supply constraint for the houehold, then we have 
* unemployment since desired L is greater than the actual L. Equations 
(37) to (40) we have met earlier, respectively equations (30), (13). 
(S) and (6) with actual labour transacted (L) as the argument for the 
various functions. The 5 equations solve for the endogenous variables 
L, C, n, 1, rn. given the exogenous level of w. 
The shadow (Lagrange) multipliers, showing whether the 
constraints are effective or not, have special implications. When rn, 
the multiplier associated with the labour supply ration of the 
household, is positive we have unemployment. For m • 0, the household 
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is on its desired labour supply function. Similiarly, given 
unemployment and m > 0, when n - 0 we get classical unemployment 
where the firm's sales ration is not binding. Alternaively, for n> 0 
and an effective sales constraint, we are in a situation of Keynesian 
unemployment. 
The general disequilibrium model postulated above, and depicted 
diagramatically in Figure 1.1, says nothing about dynamic adjustment 
per se. However, implicit in the discussion there lies a mechanism 
through which a dynamic story, over time, can be told. If the 
objective of the economy is to reach Walrasian equilibrium (WE), then 
it is important to see which form of adjustment can actually take the 
system towards WE. The real rate is exogenously fixed in the model 
specification. So it is natural to postulate a wage adjustment 
equation which will enable the economy, over time, to move towards 
WE. In Classical unemployment the wage rate is too high relative to 
WE; thus wage adjustment is a function of excess demand for labour 
i.e. the difference between actual demand and notional supply. This 
requires wages to fall under Classical unemployment. On the other 
hand, if the unemployment is Keynesian, the reduction in the wage 
rate will cause effective demand to fall reducing the firm's sales 
ration even further; this in turn will aggravate unemployment. The 
best way to reach WE in a state of Keynesian unemployment is to 
increase the wage rate. Thus, the adjustment equations tend to be 
fundamentally different depending on the type of regime we are in. 
This feature is crucial and will figure later on with regularity. 
Specifications of dynamic adjustments depend essentially on the 
system we have. 
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Section 3: Disequilibrium growth theory. 
Compared to the unified theoretical structure of equilibrium 
growth theory, as evidenced say in the neoclassical models, 
disequilibrium growth presents a bewildering variety of 
possibilities. At this stage of our knowledge and research potential 
it is impossible to analyse the most general theoretical framework 
and then see how the specific features fit in. The methodology cannot 
be from the general to the particular; rather it is expected that 
analyses of special problems will indicate how fundamental issues can 
be potentially modelled for a general theory. Nor is it possible, in 
the narrow confines of a thesis, to deal with all the major 
outstanding dificulties and we have to confine ourselves to some of 
the important concerns in the field. 
Dixit (1976) emphasises the difficulties clearly: "To set up a 
model of disequilibrium, we have to specify which markets fail to 
clear, how the actual transactions in these markets occur when this 
happens, and how the various plans, expectations and then the 
realizations of various prices and quantitites alter in response to 
it. There is a bewildering range of possibilities to choose from., 
and often a seemingly slight difference in assumptions can lead to a 
major diference in results. --- With such variety of approaches and 
lack of consensus, it is not possible to set down simple 
representative models." Given these limitations, we can in the thesis 
discuss specific models exemplifying issues which are either 
considered important or tractable; even here, given the size 
limitations of a thesis, the analysis can encompass some and not all 
the relevant features. 
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The approach we adopt overall is to link up disequilibrium 
behaviour with the underlying equilibrium growth process. In this we 
concur with Dixit: "On this question of compatibility with an 
underlying equilibrium model, there are two approaches evident in 
disequilibrium models. Some simply ignore the question --- I think 
that this is a mistaken argument of practicality ---- Other models 
attempt to study the outcome under hypothetical stationary 
circumstances, some finding compatibality and others, not~ We 
follow, in the analytical models discussed later on, the second 
method which seems to be the most fruitful. For example, suppose a 
neoclassical (Solow) steady state full equilibrium is disturbed by a 
parametric change. The interest rate is not fully flexible and does 
not equal the marginal product of capital. This implies that at the 
given capital stock profit is not being maximised and provides a 
rationale for capital accumulation (or decumulation); we can then 
postulate an independent investment function which can motivate 
capital formation, rather than relying exclusively on saving as in 
the standard growth model. If investment is not sufficient to absorb 
full employment saving then clearly firms will be rationed in their 
sale of potential, full employment output. Hence unemployment may 
occur. The question is whether this disequilibrium state will 
actually converge to the new steady state or if there is a possibilty 
of a vicous cycle developing. The analysis of stability, with full 
equilibrium as the final objective of convergence, will have 
overriding consideration in our analysis. In particular, we shall be 
careful to watch for saddle path (in)stabilty since this will clearly 
demonstrate the need for regulation and intervention. We will need, 
at least implicitly, an exogenous authority, to put the economy on 
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the stable manifold if it is to avoid cumulative divergence. 
In a masterly survey of the state of the arts in disequilibrium 
growth theory Dixit (1976) identifies three major areas, within the 
noe-classical/Keynesian growth paradigm, in which analysis should 
proceed. These are (a) Income-expenditure models leading on to the 
more formal temporary equilibrium theories of sequence economies; 
here the work of Bliss (1975, 1983) stands out in terms of rigour; 
(b) Monetary models and the explicit treatment of asset structures as 
well as expectations; this follows the seminal work by Tobin (1965); 
(c) returns to scale and monopolistic markets. He does not deal with 
open economy macro growth models, though this is an important area of 
investigation. 
Given the excellent and comprehensive survey already available 
in the last chapter of Dixit (1976) there seems to be little 
necessity in discussing the material once again. We take as a 
starting point the research agenda laid down in that book and 
continue from there. We emphasise income expenditure models with 
independent investment functions which can be built on profit 
maximising principles or be of the Keynesian marginal efficiency 
type. Our growth models here stress unemployment and underutilisaton 
of (capital) capacity. In addition some income distributional 
considerations, affecting saving, consumption and effective demand, 
are also analysed. One model is exclusively devoted to open economy 
considerations. This follows research topic (a) above. We then move 
on to a large and comprehensive chapter on money and growth (topic 
(b» which focusses on the neutrality proposition and builds a 
relatively general discussion on policy, asset structure, 
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transitional paths and disequilibrium. Unfortunately, space and time 
precludes the proper analysis of the third issue (c) mentioned above. 
The analysis of monetary models seems a natural place to leave growth 
theory and move on to short run dynamics (fixed capital) where the 
asset structure and concomitant expectations on rates of returns have 
more crucial influence. 
Section 4: Dynamics with exogenous capital. 
A third type of macroeconomic dynamic models, following from the 
IS/LM tradition, looks at short to medium term adjustment processes 
when markets do not clear. Models of this type do not consider the 
evolution of capital stock over time; thus capital accumulation is 
either assumed to be zero or exogenous. Commodity market balance is 
assured in the sense that saving and investment (desired and/or 
actual), based on realised income, are equalised; but this 
saving/investment decision does not carry over onto long run 
considerations of changes in capital stock. Disequilibrium is almost 
always introduced through the notion of an aggregate supply function; 
when aggregate demand emanating from the IS/LM equilibrium is not 
equal to supply of the national product we have disequilibrium. 
The analysis of the supply side can be done in alternative ways. 
Sachs (1980) starts with the labour market and derives the supply 
function as dependent on the real wage rate. However, wage/price 
movements are rapid enough to equate aggregate supply and demand; 
thus there is no rationale for disequilibrium. The Dornbusch type 
models treat supply as fixed (at a full employment level independent 
of nominal wage and price) but analyse fully adjustments under 
disequilibrium. Both approaches are partial. As we shall see later 
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(in Chapter IX) a more fruitful method of analysis is to integrate 
the two major desirable properties --- a proper supply function and 
slow price adjustment to allow for disequilibrium. 
Another problem with this class of models is that, even though 
supply and demand are not equal in the commodity market, spill over 
effects are not always properly integrated. If aggregate demand, 
derived from the commodity and money markets, cannot be met by 
suppliers then a further round of decision making on the demand side 
of the market (IS/LM) is necessary. Again, this will be a major focus 
of our attention in a later chapter. 
Many of the interesting theoretical developments in this area 
have come from open economy macroeconomics so we also emphasise this 
aspect (in the last two chapters). Money, exchange rates and 
expectations play quite important parts in the models and their 
implications are considered in some detail. The structure of the 
analysis can be considered briefly. For a given exchange rate and 
price level, the IS and LM functions determine aggregate demand and 
the interest rate. The supply function gives aggregate supply again 
dependent on the level of the 'state variables'. Demand, supply and 
the interest rate are used in turn in the adjustment equations for 
price and rate of exchange which then change to give the next period 
values. The transition path exhibits disequilibrium in the sense that 
aggregate demand and supply are not equal; the presence of this 'gap' 
gives rise to dynamics. 
The Dornbusch model places exclusive reliance on (sluggish) 
price adjustments to clear markets. Another method, familiar with 
early Keynesian economics, is to use inventory adjustments with 
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suitable (and major) extensions to take into account the open 
economy. Depending on the structural assumptions made, inventory 
dynamics can give some interesting results for the disequilibrium 
behaviour of the economy. 
The models that we will analyse all assume rational expectations 
or perfect (myopic) foresight. Thus expectational variables adjust 
rapidly (instantaneously); expectations are realised quickly except 
for the influence of pure uncertainty or white noise. The rapid speed 
of adjustment of expectationa1 variables, as contrasted with other 
alternative assumptions such as in adaptive expectations, creates 
problems for stability analysis. In a sense it may be necessary to 
have slow adjustments in some variables, and the formal presence of 
disequilibrium, to achieve at least saddle path stability; the 
alternative might mean that all characteristic roots are positive or 
lie outside the unit circle. In practice, we often have saddle point 
equilibrium. Only the stable manifold approaches long run equilibrium 
over time; all other paths diverge away from stationary (steady) 
state. In growth theory, this was appreciated early, in the model 
pioneered by Harrod where the equality of the actual and natural 
rates of growth defined the stable manifold; stability is therefore a 
'knife-edge~ problem since almost all paths exhibit instability. 
If we wish to guarantee convergence it is necessary to identify 
the unstable roots with ~jump~ variables while the stable roots are 
linked with predetermined variables, which cannot change in response 
to current information or shocks. This is akin to the distinction 
between control and state variables in dynamic optimisation. 
Heuristic descriptions akin to transversality conditions are used to 
motivate the economy to reach long run equilibrium. Though ad hoc, 
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the models have the great virtue of policy realism and the ability to 
explain quite complicated empirical phenomena such as business 
cycles. 
The choice of which variables should be predetermined or non-
predetermined is usually a matter of empirical judgement based on 
stylised facts; there are no clear cut rules. For example, short run, 
dynamic, open economy, macro models often assume that the price level 
(or rate of inflation) is predetermined and backward-looking while 
the exchange rate can jump. Closed economy models may assume that 
output falls into the former class while price variables constitute 
the latter group. This thesis makes an innovation in the last chapter 
by assuming that inventories can be regarded as a 'jump' variable for 
the small open economy. Since this may be controversial we will 
discuss it in some detail in the general framework being presented 
here. 
We are proposing the rather unusual assumption that an aggregate 
stock variable (level of inventory holding) can move discontinuously 
at the point of time when the economy experiences a shock. Yet a 
careful consideration will show why this may be possible. First, 
there are other areas, often discussed and considered plausible, 
where a stock variable is changed discontinuously. The obvious 
example is money 'stock'; policy discussions based on increased 
(decreased) money stock are common. The main point is that the agent 
handling the quantity transaction is able to change its level 
'quickly'. It is thought that the authorities can do so for money; 
hence the acceptability of discontinuity in the time path of stocks. 
Second, a single and small firm in a large competitive market can 
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change inventory stocks at will simply by ordering them without 
affecting prices (due to its 'smallness'). There are of course 
practical difficulties such as transportation constraints and 
transaction costs; but these are present even in 'instantaneous' 
price adjustments; the difference is one of degree not of kind. The 
third point to note is that a small open economy selling a 
homogeneous product in a large competitive world market can behave 
exactly like a single firm of the domestic economy. By virtue of its 
smallnes it can dispose of inventory stocks 'quickly' to the rest of 
the world exactly like a small firm; thus discontinuous movements of 
inventories are possible and this variable can in principle jump, 
even though in practice a distributed lag mechanism will work. 
Basically, it is a question of ranking speeds of adjustment. In the 
model of Chapter X it is assumed that the exchange rate and inventory 
stock have a much faster speed of adjustment ('infinit~) compared to 
the price level or rate of inflation as the case may be. 
Section ~Adjustment Process 
When markets do not clear and the system is in disequilibrium it 
is necessary to postulate adjustment equations which give the 
behaviour of the endogenous variables over time. Disequilibrium 
analysis, particularly with rationing and spill-overs, creates major 
problems for dynamic behaviour. Growth theory, where the time path of 
capital stock is crucial, adds additional difficulties. At the 
current state of the macroeconomist's art, it is only possible to be 
ad hoc and search for consistency, rather than trying to analyse a 
full blown optimising framework where adjustment equations and 
parameters come out as by-products of the analysis. We intend to give 
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some structure, at this stage, to the myriad viewpoints and 
specifications that are potentially available. 
One extreme point of view is the Wa1rasian tatonnement model 
where all transactions must take place at prices where notional or ex 
ante demands and supplies are equalised. Thus, dynamic adjusments, 
necessary to clear markets, take place before quantity transactions 
are actually made. In a sense the adjustments are hypothetical since 
they are done at "auction" prices; only when equilibrium is actually 
reached can trades occur. The opposite view point, given non-
tatonnement, assumes that transactions occur at the short side of the 
market so that in disequilibrium one of the agents 
(demander/supplier) is satisfied while the other is rationed. The 
spill over effects emanating from disequilibrium in various markets 
are then taken into account; agents reallocate their effective 
demands and supplies; price adjustments follow in response to excess 
effective demand. 
Both these paradigms have micro economic foundations and the 
results are derived from optimising models. The analysis gains from 
preciseness but is not always robust or subject to empirical 
evaluation or appropriate for institutional policy discussions. 
Macroeconomics tends to take the middle path, borrowing elements from 
both and using relatively ad hoc assumptions to construct dynamic 
models. 
In a recent paper, Heal (1986) has discussed some of the 
stability problems that are associated with macrodynamics. He 
postulates the following model which "could be thought of as an 
aggregative one-sector macroeconomic model, in the spirit of 
27 
neoclassical growth models and many subsequent macrodynamic models" 
(Heal (1986». 
We have 
• q - alp - c(q)] (41) 
• p - b[D(P) - q] (42) 
where q is output, P is its price, D is demand and c the average cost 
of production. A dot '.' over a variable always denotes a time 
derivative, i - dx/dt. If the price is above average cost then firms 
increase output; when demand is greater than supply price rises. 
I will now take this basic system and adapt it to a growth 
framework with capital accumulation. Ignore labour and the wage rate 
for the moment. Then we can have the following: 
• 
K • a [F'(K) - r] (43 ) 
• 
r - b[I(K,r) - s(r)F(K)] (44) 
where K is capital stock, r is the rate of interest, F is the 
production function (with standard properties) I is desired or ex 
ante investment so that I(K,r) is the investment function, s is the 
saving propensity and sF is total saving and (a, b) are speeds of 
adjustment, both positive. 
Equations (43) and (44) are essentially similiar to (41) and 
(42) except that we are now within the realm of a growth model. With 
the wage cost fixed, if the marginal product of capital is greater 
than the interest rate, then as capital stock increases so will 
profit. Thus, with F' > r, the firm increases capital and output over 
time to reap extra profitability and this rationalises equation (43). 
In the words of Walras, this can be described as 'le loi de la 
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revient'. On the other hand, equation (44) can be a description of 
the market for loanable funds, where capital is transacted. Here, 
excess demand for funds, given by ex ante investment greater than ex 
ante saving, generates a rise in its price i.e the rate of interest. 
The Walrasian statement would be 'le loi de l'offre et de la demande' 
(see Heal (1986». Excess demand (supply) raises (lowers) price. 
The model, of course, needs to be supplemented by other 
information. For example, the investment function needs to be 
specified. Equation (43) is one specification; there may be others. 
For example, a Harrodian investment function of the type 
• 
K • z[I(K,r) - S(K,r)] (45) 
may be appropriate. If desired investment (I) is greater than the 
amount of saving, investors try to increase capital stock since they 
perceive a capital "shortage". On the other hand when ex ante 
investment is low, specifically less than saving, then there exists 
excess capacity which leads to decumulation. (z is the speed of 
adjustment). 
It is useful to have a classifactory scheme for the various 
types of adjustments that can take place when markets do not clear 
and capital accumulation needs to be analysed at a macroeconomic 
level. A major distinction is between Classical and Keynesian Regimes 
(henceforth termed in this chapter CR and KR). These two regimes 
will generally have different equations for capital accumulation, as 
exemplified earlier by equation (43) and (45). Another distinction 
between them occurs when planned investment and saving are not equal 
and actual capital formation is assumed to be the lower of the two; 
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then, CR is the case where the saving constraint is binding and 
actual capital formation is equal to saving; KR would have binding 
investment and changes in capital stock are given by the investment 
function. Mixed features are also possible; for example, a 
behavioural function for investment like (43) which also happens to 
be binding and the main determinant of accumulation. Chapter 11 deals 
specifically with such a model. Chapter IV gives lot more attention 
to the Harrod-Keynes investment function (45). 
The other distinction is between nontatonnement and tatonnement 
type adjustments. If the minimum condition holds so that 
• 
Ka - min[I, S1 (46) 
• 
where Ka is actual capital investment, then we call it the non 
tatonnement dynamics of the capital stock. The alternative, where 
actual investment is set at a level depending on desired saving and 
investment (for example, averaging them), as well as taking account 
of price adjustment, may be termed a tatonnement type process (see 
Rose (1966) for an example). 
We now have four 'pure' cases. However J as mentioned earlier J 
some hybrid examples can also be constructed. The following table 
gives a clearer picture. 
Tatonnement Non-tatonnement 
Classical Regime Case I Case II 
Keynesian Regime Case III Case IV 
Models which analyse these cases will generally be tested for 
stability; some comparative dynamics excercises will also be carried 
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out. When the system obeys the Routhian conditions, and is at least 
locally stable, we have no major problems in analysing growth paths. 
Starting from any initial conditions, the variables will converge 
over time to long run equilibrium, either steady or stationary 
states. Difficulties arise when the equilibrium exhibits saddle point 
properties. Then almost all paths will gravitate towards the unstable 
manifold unless specific restrictions are placed on them. As 
discussed earlier, systems with explicit expectationa1 modelling, 
such as the short/medium term dynamics systems (with capital stock 
exogenous), usually impose restrictions on the nature of variables -
pre determined and "jump". Given that long run equilibrium, with 
positive values of all variables, is a desirable objective for all 
agents, the "jump" variables move discontinuously to attain the 
stable mainfo1d. We will make simi1iar assumptions for the growth 
models, in this thesis, when they exhibit saddle paths. The implicit 
assumption is that there is an infinite horizon optimal control model 
"supporting" these descriptive systems that we analyse. Suitable 
transversa1ity conditions can be imposed to make the system move 
towards long run equilibrium. Jump variables are then identified with 
controls which the "invisible" optimising agent can choose at will. 
Predetermined variables are state variables of control theory which 
cannot change at the time of shock. 
The following chapters will have examples of these various cases 
(I to IV) with dynamic paths and concomitant growth behaviour when 
markets may not clear. The examples are selected for their economic 
interest and ability to exemplify how the growing economy behaves in 
disequilibrium. The models deal not only with capital stock but also 
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labour dynamics, including unemployment. Together, they make up a 
relatively comprehensive picture of the disequilibrium process with 
capital formation. 
Section 6: Structure of the thesis. 
-- ---
The papers collected in the thesis follow the traditions of 
macro growth and dynamic models, with and without endogenous capital 
formation, as discussed earlier in Sections 3 and 4. The thesis does 
not deal with short run rationing models per se. Thus, the 
behavioural relations are not always derived explicitly from 
optimising foundations incorporating quantity constraints. However, 
the implications of rationing, particularly the fact that actual 
transactions take place on the short side so that quantity transacted 
is the minimum of notional supply and demand, are carefully noted and 
integrated in the analysis. We also stress adjustment processes, both 
of the tatonnement and the non-tatonnement types, clearly 
distinguishing Classical and Keynesian regimes. It will be seen, in 
the models that follow, that the latter distinction is of crucial 
importance in delineating specific growth paths for the stylised 
economy. 
Disequilibrium in the labour market is usually discussed in 
terms of unemployment; this is because unemployment is potentially 
the most important problem for an economy trying to achieve greater 
capital accumulation; the opposite case of over (full) employment, or 
even a dynamic version of repressed inflation, is given less 
importance though it is discussed occasionally in some of the 
following models. In addition, a great deal of emphasis is placed on 
the possibility that desired saving and investment may not be 
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equalised; the consequences of such a divergence and their 
implications are major issues in the analysis. 
The thesis naturally divides into two parts. The first part is 
concerned with long run capital formation and growth models in 
general. Here the behaviour of capital stock is endogenous, and an 
important area of investigation is to find out how investment and 
capital evolves over time when some markets fail to clear. This is 
the preserve of disequilibrium growth theory. The Second part shifts 
emphasis and implicitly assumes that capital stock is fixed 
exogenously. Our interest is primarily in the medium term where price 
adjustments and aggregate demand behaviour take on central roles, as 
in standard Keynesian short run macroeconomic models, while the 
supply side is given less prominence. Labour is also assumed to be 
fixed (from outside the model); thus the analysis of steady states 
and the convergence of actual to natural growth rate are unimportant 
here. The non-equalisation of aggregate demand and supply, which was 
interpreted as the divergence of investment and saving in the first 
part of the thesis, now causes price or inventory changes rather than 
influencing capital formation. 
Part A, on growth theory, starts off with the one sector (Solow) 
neoclassical model of growth. This is as expected, given the seminal 
importance of that work in the theory of equilibrium growth. The 
Solow model assumes continuous equality of saving and investment and 
this is the major mechanism by which markets are equilibrated. We 
show that, even in an one sector model, it is not easy to defend the 
assumption that desired saving must be equal to desired investment. 
Thus, using Bliss's terminology (1970), investment must be 
'accomodating'; in effect it adjusts to whatever level of saving 
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(derived via the inter-temporal optimising decisions of the aggregate 
household) is available. Alternatively, saving always determine the 
short side of the market so that it is equal to capital formation and 
hence actual investment. We criticise this lack of an investment 
'function', relating ex ante investment to other variables in the 
system, which can in principle be binding and hence determine capital 
accumulation. Chapter 11 then goes on to explore a model which 
implicitly analyses investment behaviour and shows how disequilibrium 
(in the sense of ex ante saving and investment not being equal) can 
be incorporated in the basic neoclassical model of growth. 
The one sector disequilibrium growth model with neoclassical 
features ignores the problem of unemployment; this omission needs to 
be rectified. Chapter III concentrates exclusively on unemployment 
and discusses the stability properties of a system with capital 
accumulation but where labour markets fail to clear. The analysis is 
set in an optimising framework using the well known overlapping 
generations model. The 'younger' generation earn wage income alone 
and save part of it. The 'older' generation consume all their profit 
income. This allows us to consider saving and investment decisions as 
synonymous; thus the previous chapter's major concern has no 
significance here. However, the explicit focus on labour market 
disequilibrium has interesting implications. 
An important missing feature of these two models, as well as 
others in the neoclassical vein, is the lack of an explicit 
investment function (though Chapter 11 does have some discussion of 
this). One of the earliest, and seminal, analysis in the context of 
growth theory was due to Harrod and his ideas are used formally in 
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the next chapter to analyse various regimes of dynamic 
disequilibrium. The Harrodian investment function assumes that 
intended investment (as a proportion of current capital stock) rises 
when there is capital shortage i.e. desired investment can not be 
fulfilled due to lack of saving. Alternatively, ex ante investment 
(as a ratio of capital) falls when there is excess capacity; which 
implies potential full employment saving is greater than investment 
demand. In Chapter IV, armed with an explicit behavioural equation 
for investment, we find that it is possible not only to derive 
dynamic properties of the growth system but also to identify and 
study various regimes of unemployment, such as Classical and 
Keynesian, as well as repressed inflation with general excess demand. 
Chapter V takes on board some distributional considerations 
through a two-class model of 'workers' and 'capitalists' who have 
different saving propensities. Here we are careful to take into 
account the implications of the dual decision hypothesis and the fact 
that unemployment will have implications for saving behaviour 
(through workers rationed income); hence capital formation, 
determined by the minimum of desired investment and saving, will also 
be affected. This chapter emphasises unemployment, again because of 
its overall macoeconomic importance. Classical and Keynesian 
(unemployment) regimes are distinguished, and dynamic behaviour on 
the long run growth path are analysed, separately for the two 
alternative systems. The implicit assumption is that if the economy 
finds itself in one of the two unemployment regimes then it will 
continue to do so in the long run. A more general disequilibrium 
model with regime switching and growth is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
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Uptil now the analysis is strictly concentrated on the closed 
economy. Chapter VI emphasises the open economy where a 
tradeables/nontradeables distinction is made, to characterise the 
major property of a small economy trading with the rest of the world. 
Once again we stress unemployment and analyse the disequilibrium of 
the labour market in the context of capital formation and trade. 
All models discussed thus far are 'real' in the sense that monetary 
assets play no explicit role. This follows the tradition of 
equilibrium growth theory where monetary models were latecomers in 
the overall analysis. As emphasised earlier, in the context of the 
Dixit research agenda, the very presence of money even in a world of 
certainty-equivalents create conditions for disequilibrium modelling. 
Chapter VII analyses certain issues in monetary growth within the 
framework of rational expectations, which in the absence of 
uncertainty implies perfect foresight. 
We are interested in two questions, in the context of money and 
growth, both of which have received a lot of attention in the recent 
literature. First, the conditions under which 'superneutrality' 
holds; would the steady (stationary) state value of real variables be 
invariant to changes in the rate of growth of money supply; what 
conditions would guarantee a positive role to discretionary monetary 
policy; alternatively, can the monetary authorities influence the 
long run values of real capital stock and output. These questions are 
analysed in some detail, using a survey of the literature as well as 
a model, in this chapter. 
The second set of issues are more intimately connected with 
disequilibrium behaviour; specifically, the motion of the economy in 
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its transition path (to the new long run equilibrium) consequent to a 
policy shock. To focus attention on disequilibrium dynamics we 
postulate superneutra1ity so that initial and final capital stock, 
corresponding to two levels of the exogenously specified money growth 
rate, are the same. This allows us to concentrate on the behaviour of 
real variables when the economy is out of equilibrium without 
bothering about stationary states. It is demonstrated that activist 
monetary policy, both anticipated and unanticipated, does indeed have 
real effects on the transition path when the economy has not reached 
its long run equilibrium. This is independent of any subsidiary 
assumptions regarding superneutrality. 
Chapter VIII begins the second part of the thesis where we 
eschew capital theory and focus on short and medium term issues. In a 
sense, this chapter and the preceeding one are linked for they both 
deal with (super)neutrality of money under rational expectations. 
Thus they form a formal bridge between the two parts of the work. 
In the postulated short run framework Chapter VIII analyses 
monetary neutrality given that markets may not clear. Lucasian models 
usually assume equilibrium and then demonstrate that money is neutral 
under rational expectations. Neutrality, under uncertainty, is 
defined as the invariance of real variables to changes in the 
anticipated component of money supply; only unanticipated shocks have 
real effects. We investigate these propositions under disequilibrium. 
The short run monetary framework continues into Chapter IX. A 
Dornbusch type open economy is considered with price and exchange 
rate dynamics; price movements depend on the difference between 
aggregate demand and supply; exchange rates obey covered interest 
parity under perfect foresight. Our innovation here is to model 
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disequilibrium (giving rise to price move~ents over time) much more 
formally, taking into account, carefully, the difference between 
notional and effective demand (supply) as well as the concomitant 
dual decision effects. It is demonstrated that if the implications of 
non market clearing behaviour are properly taken into account then 
'overshooting' type responses are exacerbated. This is not surprising 
since the pressure on the jump variable is enhanced by both the 
inertia of sluggish prices and the consequences of disequilibrium. 
The standard way to justify and tackle disequilibrium, aggregate 
demand not equal to supply, is to assume 'slow' price adjustments. 
Another way would be to use inventory fluctuations as an adjustment 
mechanism; thus flow disequilibrium is met by stock changes as well 
as by some price movements. The crucial question is to model 
inventory behaviour. This is done in Chapter X in a Buiter-Miller 
framework by analysing a short to medium term macro model of the open 
economy. It is demonstrated that the dynamic movements of inventory 
in the small open economy can exhibit some surprisingly different 
properties (from the standard textbook Keynesian models), depending, 
of course, on the assumptions made. In particular, if inventory is 
assumed to be a 'jump' variable, as it can rightly be in a small open 
economy which can buy or sell any amount of the given aggregate 
commodity in the world market (acting like a 'small' competitive firm 
in a 'large' industry), then inventory holding can actually fall 
consequent to a contractionary monetary policy induced reduction in 
aggregate demand. This in turn may aggravate the business cycle as 
discussed fully in Chapter X. 
The following chapters are relatively self-contained; each have 
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their own short introduction, brief literature survey and succint 
concluding remarks. The linkages between them lie principally in 
methodology and the type of issues discussed rather than in the 
evolution of a specific model. It is difficult, given the current 
state of the literature, to construct a general disequilibrium growth 
model which will take care of all the major features involved. Thus 
specific models emphasise and analyse specific or individual 
problems, with the integrating link being provided by the framework 
and the type of questions asked, rather than the answers given or the 
solutions provided. 
In general, the models discussed later stress the crucial 
importance of various adjustment processes, these in turn being 
dependent on the type of disequilibrium regime one has or one 
proposes to emphasise. The crucial distinction is that between 
'Classical' and iKeynesian' regimes. In the former, the real wage 
rate is usually equal to the marginal product of labour; thus 
unemployment is a product of too high a real wage rate and its 
sluggish adjustment. In addition, the capital (commodity) market 
clears only with a binding saving constraint; thus investment 
behaviour need not be analysed. The iKeynesian' world, on the other 
hand, has the real wage rate below the marginal product of labour as 
well as accomodating the important role of the investment function. 
Depending on the regimes postulated, the adjustment equations are 
appropriately specified, as mentioned earlier in Section 5, and this 
gives rise to the contrasting dynamics and growth stories of the 
various models we discuss later in the thesis. 
Finally it can be mentioned, given the brief discussions of the 
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chapters. how the evolution of the first part of this work fits in 
with the research agenda set forth in Section 3. These six chapters 
(11 to VII) monitor the major issues in disequilibrium growth theory 
identified in Dixit (1976). Together. they are expected to give a 
reasonably comprehensive picture of the field. However. as mentioned 
earlier. given the current literature. it is not possible to give an 
integrated and perfectly general model. But this may not be 
undesirable either, since a metatheory might not be sufficiently 
encompassing as to incorporate all the complications of the problem. 
At this stage it may even be preferable to analyse issues as they 
arise, with a loose interconnection (through the method and 
objectives) binding them informally together. 
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One Sector Neoclassical Growth Model with Disequilibrium 
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Section 1: Introduction 
Modern growth theory was pioneered by the work of Harrod (1939). 
Harrod was interested in two types of equilibrium (and therefore of 
disequilibrium), which were essentially difterent, though with 
interconnections. The first deals with the equality ot actual and 
warranted rates ot growth. The second investigates the equality of 
warranted (equal to actual) and natural growth rates, i.e. prooerties 
of steady states. In spite ot the fact that Harrod stressed the 
crucial importance of the former problem l , the neoclassical theory 
that followed concentrated exclusively on the latter issue. 
Actual and warranted rates of growth are not equal to each other 
when desired saving is not equal to desired investment. In an 
atomistic environment when savers and investors are usually different 
groups of people, saving investment equality ex ante is not a truism. 
Rather, we should expect ex ante saving not to be equal to ex ante 
investment and investsigate the consequences of the inequality. 
Unfortunately, this problem is completely ignored in the 
neoclassical theory of growth. It quickly passes on to the second 
problem concerning the equality of warranted and natural rates of 
growth. In other words the analysis of steady states become crucial 
in this theory. It also analyses the behaviour of the system when 
warranted (necessarily equal to actual) and natural growth rates are 
not equal and finds that the former converges to the latter by 
flexible capital output and capital labour ratios which in turn depend 
on the real prices of factors of production, labour and caoital. The 
marginal productivity theory is an essential adjunct to this analysis. 
The theory has been criticised on various points. The one asset 
structure of the model, the problem of valuation of caoital in a more 
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general model, the possibility of badly behaved production functions, 
indeed the very notion of analysing steady state equilibrium and 
stability have been attacked. We are not concerned with thes~. The 
essential problem trom our point of view is that the Dossibility of 
desired investment saving inequality is ignored. 
Harrod's knife edge growth equilibrium and related instability is 
based on an explicit investment demand function. However, 
neoclassical theory has generally ignored the analysis of investment 
behaviour in growth models. As Bliss (1975) states: "It is a most 
remarkable fact (that) ••• since Solow's pioneering paoer, there has 
been no subsequent discussion of this particular process of adjustment 
to e~uilibrium" (p. 312). An excellent paper by Nikaido (1975), 
highlights the issue of the knife edge problems as caused by 
investment behaviour of capitalists rather than rigid factor prices 
and inflexible factor substitution. Our oaper tries to analyse these 
issues in a more neoclassical framework but with a greater emphasis on 
independent investment behaviour and the possibility that desired (ex 
ante) saving and investment may be unequal. 
Though not always explicitly stated, three reasons can be found 
tor such a neglect. 2 Firstly, there may be a government which bridges 
the deficit or withdraws the surolus. Secondly, savin~s olans are 
always realised and investment Is an "accommodating" variable which 
adjusts automatically to the given level of saving. Thirdly, there 
exists a price mechanism in the capital market whereby the rate of 
interest adjusts to equate the desired demand for and supply of new 
capital (desired investment and saving respectively). The next 
section deals with these questions in more detail. It is shown that 
none of them are satistactory. 
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To sum up, we try to investigate within an exnlicit neoclassical 
growth tramework, the effects of investment behaviour, the diver~ence 
between desired investment and saving and the possible conver~ence of 
the model to a steady state equilibrium. The analysis emphasises 
disequilibrium behaviour as opposed to continuous saving investment 
equality, more appropriate to equilibrium theory. The latter view 
makes investment passive and accommodating, and neglects the 
consideration of "animal spirits" of the Keynesian investors. The 
alternative disequilibrium model, therefore, seems to be more 
interesting. 
Section 2 deals with the reasons for the apparent neglect 
of investment behaviour in neoclassical growth models. Section 3 sets 
out the basic disequilibrium model. Section 4 analyses local and 
global stabiiity of the system. Section 5 extends the model to 
include a variable saving income ratio. The last section concludes 
the chapter. 
Section 2: Investment Saving E9uality 
The basic one sector neoclassical growth model (Solow (1956» may 
be briefly summarised. All variables used here have a~gregate 
values. There exists a neoclassical production function (whose 
properties are well known) linking output Y, caoital stock K, and 
employment L (- total labour force available). 
Y - F(K,L) (1) 
By constant returns to scale we can write (1) in per capita form 
y - f(k) 
where y - Y/L, k - K/L. 
t'>O,t"<O ( 2) 
The intertemporal utility tunction of the aggregate household 
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determines a constant saving propensity (s) such that total saving (S) 
is: 
s - sY 
and ~ - sf (k) (3) 
Per capita investment is by definition 
I K i----L L 
(4) 
The growth of tull employment labour force is given by the natural 
rate ot growth 
L 
n 
--L 
Since k - K/L 
• 
k K 
- --k K 
L 
L 
and i I 
- - - k + nk L 
( 5) 
( 6) 
(7) 
Assuming continuous equality between saving and investment I/L • S/L 
we have 
or 
• 
k + nk - sf(k) 
• 
k - sf (k) - nk 
(8) 
(9) 
This is the basic differential equation that defines the path of 
* 
capital stock per capita. The steady state values of k - k is derived 
* by putting k - O. Under the Solow condition of stability sf(k) < n, 
steady state equilibrium can be proved globally stable. The real 
factor prices of the model are derived from warginal productivity 
theory 
r - PK - aY/oK - f '(k) (10) 
w • P L - a Y / 0 L - f ( k) - kf' ( k ) Cl 1) 
(r is rate of interest, PK is price of capital service, w is wage rate 
and PL the price of labour). 
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In this equilibrium growth model, investment is assumed equal to 
saving. The possibility ot disequilibrium between investment and 
saving may be rectified by three alternative methods, as suggested in 
Section 1. Consider each one in turn. In the given one asset model, 
the government can intervene to equalise investment and saving only 
through taxes (or transfers) of the given commodity. Suppose the rate 
ot tax (or subsidy) is t so that the per capita amount of tax is t • 
o 
t f(k) and net private saving is 8(I-t )f(k). The condition for 
o 0 
equilibrium Is 
i + g - s(l-t )f(k) 
o 
(12) 
where 1 - k + nk is net investment per capita and g - t t(k) is 
o 
government expenditure or withdrawal per capita. Therefore 
and 
t (f(k) + sf(k» • sf(k) - k - nk 
o 
t 
o -
sf(k) ,.. k - nk 
f (k) + sf (k) ( 13) 
Thus, the tax or subsidy rate must be continuously adjusted such 
that this equality holds. Unless the government is omniscient and 
omnipotent, such a continuous adjustment of tax (or subsidy) rates is 
virtually impossible and even as a "stylised fact" goes beyond 
credibility. Yet Burmeister and Dobell (1970) writes simoly: "It may, 
ot course, require some fiscal or monetary policy in the background to 
bring saving desires into line with investment intentions". 
An alternative neoclassical procedure of tackling the problems 
arising out ot an inequality of saving and investment is to make 
investment an "accommodating variable".3 An equilibrium system 
consisting of a set: of relations, gives Some value (or values, if the 
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solution is not unique) to the variables with which it deals. A 
variable may have a particular value either because of "uniquely 
determined decisions by the individual micro units of the model or it 
may b~ a consequence of aggregate balancing relations in the model" 
(see Bliss (1970». The latter class of variables may change without 
violating the equilibrium conditions related to the individual 
decision makers. Its main purpose is to "accommodate" to a value 
which satisties an aggregate balancing (equilibrium) condition, for 
example demand and supply have to be equal in a particular market. In 
the neoclassical growth model saving is a variable of the former type 
depending on the "decisions by the individual micro units of the 
model". On the other hand, investment is of the latter type because 
its value depends on savings, "a consequence of aggregate balancing 
relations", i.e. of the condition I • S. A variable like "investment" 
1n a neoclassical model is called an "accommodating variable". 
There are two ways in which the choice of investment as an 
"accommodating variable" can be defended. One can conceive the long 
run dynamic process as a sequence of short run temporary equilibrium, 
similar to a Hicksian "week". In any such short run "week", saving is 
determined by output (functionally dependent on given capital stock 
and labour force), and the saving propensity (determined by households 
intertemporal optimisation plan). Desired investment is equal to 
desired caoital stock minus the initial caoital stock. If at the 
given price set, desired capital stock 1s a correspondence rather than 
a function, the aggregate firm would willingly demand exactly the 
amount of capital stock supplied by household (savers). Thus desired 
investment passively accommodates to the given level of saving. If 
per chance, levei of saving was ditterent, investors would have been 
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equally willing to invest that new (different) amount. The level of 
investment demand is not determined by any ootimising behaviour of 
entrepreneurs, given the price vector. Whatever is saved is invested. 
This is equilibrium economics par excellence. The essence of 
disequilibrium where markets do not clear, transactions take place at 
non-market clearing prices and price adjusts with non-tatonnement, are 
ignored completely. The balancing relations hold automatically, 
without any mlcroeconomic incentive for change. 
An alternative justification for an accommodating variable is 
more interesting. Consider any short run Hicksian "week". Suppose 
the aggregate firm wishes to maximise output subject to resource 
constraints, i.e. Max Y • f(Kd, Ld ) (14) 
subject to Kd ( K + S 
Ld ( (1 + n)L 
where Kd, Ld are demand tor capital and labour. K is initial capital 
stock, S is the flow of saving. K + S is the total capital stock 
available and L is initial labour. 
Forming the Lagrangeian 
Z - F(Kd.Ld) + r(K + S - Kd ) + w(!:(1 + n) Ld ) (IS) 
where rand ware Lagrange multipliers and interpreted as shadow price 
of capital and labour resource. 
By Kuhn-Tucker condition we have 
Fl - r ( 0 
F2 - w ( 0 
K + S - Kd > 0 
L( 1 + n) - L d > 0 
(16) 
(where Fl • 3Y/3Kd • F2 • 3y/3Ld ). It we assume further that (Kd. Ld. 
w, r) > 0 then all the relations (16) hold as equalities. 
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Specifically we have the marginal productivity theory of factor 
pricing r • Fi, w • F2, tull employment Ld = L(l + n) and K + S = Kd. 
If theretore investment is defined as Kd - K, the desired change in 
capital stock, then we get I - Kd - K - S. 
If every single "week" obeys this equality, then the growth path 
conceived as a sequence of such weeks will always have investment 
savings equality. 
Once again this stylised optimisation is well suited to 
equilibrium economics. However, as investors attempt to acquire more 
capital goods, various adjustments are taking place in the economy 
even within the Hicksian "week". In an attempt to reach the . 
equilibrium position from an initial one, prices will change, and 
without an adjustment process in disequilibrium, we do not have an 
interesting analysis. A single firm under perfect competition can 
behave in the stylistic way set out, without causing changes in the 
underlying price vector (w,r). The aggregate firm in a macro model 
cannot do so and we must analyse the path of movement from the initial 
to the equilibrium points and any consequent disequilibrium 
adjustment. 
Finally, we consider the price mechanism which gives the most 
interesting method by which disequilibrium may be corrected and 
investment saving equality brought about. By far the most complete 
analysis of this method Is due to Solow (1956). He claims that in 
every period, a stock of capital (equal to saving plus existing stock) 
is thrown on the capital market inelastically and the real rental r(t) 
adjusts instantaneously to clear the market. In addition the marginal 
productivity condition must hold, i.e. real rental must equal marginal 
product ot capl.tal services. But prices never adjust: instantaneously, 
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disequilibrium can continue and Solow is aware of this problem. He 
says: "If saving and lnves tment decls ions are made indeoendently, 
however, some additional marginal-efflclency-of-capital conditions 
have to be satistied". But this enquiry is not followed up. There is 
a similar problem tor the labour market too. 
What does Solow's price mechanism, look like? Bliss (1975) has 
given an excellent tormal summary of such a system. It consists of 
the following differential equations which are self-explanatory. 
K - a[Fl(K,L) - rJ (17) 
L - a [F2 (K, L) - wJ (18) 
i 
- eS[K - KJ (19) 
. 
Y[L - LJ ( 20) w -
(a, a, eS, y) > 0 
(where L, K are supplies of capital and labour). Even though general 
conditions of stability for such a system are difficult to derive, 
Bliss gives examples to show that stability in general cannot be 
established. 
Neoclassicals may Object to the characterisation given by 
equation (17) to (20). After all, the equilIbrium model of Solow 
works on the basis of capital labour rati~ and wage rental ratio. 
rather than absolute value of K, L, w. r as in system (17) to (20). 
We can re-interpret the equilibrating mechanisms and the working of 
the price system in a Solow model in the following way. Once again at 
the start of the Hicksian "week", the stock of capital ::0 labour 
(k-K/L) is given Inelastically on the market. Let it be k-k. 
Similariy, the inItial wage rental ratio (Q-w/r) is given. It the 
demand tor k exceeds the supply I, wage rental ratIo falls. A 
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relative excess demand for capital w.r.t. labour raises the price of 
capital (r) w.r.t. price of labour (w). Further, if the wage rental 
ratio is greater than the ratio of marginal product of labour to 
capital, the capital labour ratio rises. The model is summarised as 
[ f -kf' ] k-aO-(-t-"-) (21 ) 
• 
o - e[k - k] (22) 
Forming the matrix 
A - [ '~/'k '~/.n ] 
30/ak ao/an 
• ~aff oH (f·)2 
-13 :1 
We can easily verify that the system is locally stable, since trace A 
< 0, det A > O. The phase diagram for the model is given by Figure 
2.1. and it is possible to have global stability. 
The "week" is in equilibrium when k-k, nZf(k) - kf '(k)/f '(k'>. 
When we attain such a temporary equilibrium in any "week", k is used 
to product output y - f(k), saving is generated and a new capital 
stock tor the next "week" is determined. The story continues until 
steady state. 
The particular process described is silent about a number of 
important issues. Firstly, adjustments taking place are obviously one 
ot tatonnement. No transactions take place until and unless caoital 
stock, labour and factor prices have reached their temoorary 
equilibrium values. This is not very satistactory. Secondly, the 
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Hicksian "week" must be short enough for all adjustments to be 
completed and temporary equilibrium reached. Alternatively. sDeed of 
adjustment of k and 0 to equilibrium must be fast. Thirdly. and most 
important. even the attainment of the right equilibrium value for the 
ratio k-k. does not guarantee full employment for the individual 
values of capital and labour. It is possible for the capital. labour 
demand ratio to equal the given supply k. but this may co-exist with 
unemployment and underutilisation of capital. Obviously. in such a 
situation. investment saving equality is not guaranteed. 
Enough has been said. we hope. to justify the statement that 
saving investment equality (or inequality) is a fundamental economic 
problem. The model that we propose tries to analyse these factors in 
an explicit neoclassIcal framework. 
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Section 3: A Disequilibrium Model 
This model concentrates exclusively on disequilibrium in the 
commodity market. Unemployment is not analysed explicitly but 
suitable extensions can be made to take this into account. It is 
similar to Bliss (1970). but is analysed in a much wider context. The 
following equations summarise the working of the system: 
k - a[f'(k) - r] p 
• 
t - ark + nk - sf(k)] p 
i
a
- minimum [kp + nk. sf(k)] 
(a, a > 0) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(where subscripts 'p' and 'a' denote planned and actual magnitudes and 
'i' is investment per capita). 
Equation (23) states that planned changes in capital labour 
ratios are made when marginal product of capital is different from the 
rate of interest. Thus the deterministic marginal productivity theory 
does not hold in general. On the other hand, the rate of interest 
equilibrates between desired investment and saving as given by 
equation (24). This is in true neoclassical tradition where price 
variable (rate of interest) adjusts to clear a market (that of 
loanable tunds). The third equation (25) follows the tradition of 
current disequilibrium literature, where actual investment is the 
minimum of desired investment and saving. i.e. market is cleared on 
~he shor~ side. 
In a Solow type model, i - sECk) and investment accommodates. 
a 
Let us make the opposite assumption in Keynesian fashion, that 
ia - kp + nk and saving accommodates. 
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given by k is crucial in the model. There are two ways In which the 
p 
workin~ of the model can be explained. Firstly, we have the forced 
consumption case. Given an initial vector (k,r) ou~pu~ y = f(k) is 
actually produced. Desired saving sf(k) is determined and happens to 
be greater than desired investment k + nk. Thus actual investment 
o 
(and actual saving) is k + nk. Desired consumption was f(k) - sf(k) 
p 
while actual consumption is f(k) - k - nk. Thus there is forced p 
• 
consumption 01' the order of (sf (k) - k - nk). The ex post saving p 
propensity (s) is no longe r the ex ante value t st. From the 
multiplier we have 
i 
y • 
s 
k + nk 
and p s -
t(k) 
An alternative version of the working of the model may be called 
the underutilisation case. Given the vector (k,r), planned investment 
ip is determined first. Savings accommodates and actual investment -
ip • k P 
+ nk. 
y • 
Output is now determined through the multiplier 
k + nk p 
s < 
sf (k) 
s 
• f (k) 
Thus the actual output produced y is less than the tull capacity 
output producible f(k). We have underutilisation of capital stock. 
Figure 2.2 shows the process. 
The ex ante saving function for tull capacity output generates 
the curve OG (sf(k». The full capacity production function gives 
curve OH (or t(k». Desired investment function k + nk, dependent on 
p 
(k,r) Is the dotted line ABC and it lies below the saving curve OG. 
Thus investment decisions are realised. Given the saving propensity 
57 
DAFAAB 
's', actual output produced is k + ok/s and is drawn as DEF. Full 
!' 
capacity output is never produced in disequilibrium. An index of 
excess capacity is given by kk1 • The steady state values of the model 
are similar to the neoclassical one with r - f'(k) and sf(k) -nk. k • 
o - r. 
The growth process may be briefly discussed. Consider an initial 
steady state point with s D s k - k and i - nk - s f(k). Now o· 0 0 0 0 0 
suppose the desired saving propensity rises to s > So such that 
desired investment i < sf(k). From (24). rate of interest will fall 
o 0 
to equilibrate the capital market. This will increase k from 
o 
equation (23) and planned (actual) investment will rise. The actual 
capital labour ratio will rise too and we may have a movement towards 
a new steady state st(k*) - nk*. Whether the economy will actually 
attain the new steady state equilibrium will have to be answered by 
stability analysis - the subject matter of the next section. To 
discuss the problems ot stability we shall assume that investment Is 
always realised k + nk - i - k + nk, therefore actual and planned p 
capital stock are equal. This is done to focus attention on 
investment behaviour and does not alter any conclusions. The opposite 
assumption that saving is realised brings us back firmly into the 
neoclassical fold. 
Section 4: Stabi~ 
Given the disequilibrium model 
k - a[f'(k) - r] a > 0 ( 26) 
i - ark + nk - sf(k)] 8 > 0 ( 27) 
we can now analyse the stability prooerties. To test for local 
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s:abllity we need to form the following matrix: 
Al - [ 3~/3k 3~/3rJ 
ai/elk eli/dr 
- [~f. -<l 
aat "+B n-B sf I -<la 
The matrix Al is evaluated at k-k and r-r, steady state values. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for local stability are 
(i) trace Al < 0 
(ii) det Al > 0 
In this case (i) trace Al - af" - ae < 0 
(given f" < 0, a > 0, B > 0) 
(ii) det Al - aBn - aB(st
'
) 
Thus tor local stability we need n-sfl{k) > 0 which is identical to 
the Solow (1956) condition. The disequilIbrium model is locally 
stable under similar condition as the equilibrium one. 
We can now derive a phase diagram to point out certain issues in 
global stability. Given the differential equation (26) for k we have 
dr 
- - at" 
'"dk k-O 
-f"{k)<O (28) 
This gives us the slope for k-O. Since elk/3k < 0, the ohase lines 
are as indicated in Figure 2.3. 
For k-O the capital labour ratio is constant, real ren~al of 
capital (r) is equal to marginal product of capital (f') and an 
increase in k will decrease r by diminishing margInal productivity 
theory. Thus dr/dk < 0 for k - O. The si~n of 3k/3k negative, can be 
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explained intuitively. An increase in caoital labour ratio (k), given 
the nature of the production function, implies a decline in the 
marginal product of capital as well as a decline in the outout caoital 
ratio. Both these factors tend to make capital accumulation take 
place at a lower rate, i.e. make k fall. A lower marginal product 
makes it less profitable to invest in capital goods while a lower 
output/capital ratio lowers savings per unit of capital, thus 
dampening the supply of new capital. 
The fact that 3k/3r is negative can be explained since in this 
model capital accumulation depends on the difter~nce between the 
return to factor capital (f '(k» and the rate of interest (interpreted 
as cost of hiring capital). A rise in r increases the cost of 
acquiring capital and thus has an inverse effect on k. 
The second equation (27) is given by 
r - a(k + nk - sf(k» 
3 r - B Cl k + B n - a sf '( k) 
dk di( 
- aaf" + B(n - sf ') 
and Cl r - a Cl k - - aB 
rr n 
drl dk. -
r-O 
• f" + n.- st' 
a ( 29) 
The sign of dr/dk tor r - 0 is not apparent. In the neighbourhood of 
k • 0, n - sf' < 0 (by Inada condition), fn is always < 0, therefore 
dr/dk < O. But as k increases n - sf' changes sign and it is 
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possible that dr/dk for r '"' 0 may change sign. 
By reasoning similar to previous case, at/ar < 0, therefore the 
phase diagrams are as shown in Figure 2.3. The sign of ar/3k is 
unknown since n-sf' changes sign (see equation (29». Intuitively 
note that a rise in capital labour ra:io causing k to fall reduces the 
rate of demand for capital and so reduces the rate of change of the 
price tor capital. i.e. r. On the other hand. the existing labour 
torce has to be supplIed with additional capital and this greater 
demand has an upward eftect on r. Unless the strengths of the two 
• 
effects are known. the final nature of sign of ar/ar is indeterminate 
since a rise in the rate of interest causes k to fall and as explained 
before, this will cause r to decline. 
The important point from stability point of view is the relative 
slopes of 
dr I dk'. 
k-O 
and dr 
dk 
i-O 
in the neighbourhood of steady state equilibrium. In that 
neighbourhood 
dr \ dk 
r-O 
• 
dr \ Cik. 
k=O 
+ n --st' 
a 
If 2!.1 is > 0 we have the case as depicted in Figure 2.3a. dk 
r-O 
On the other hand. 1f2..£\ <0 dk 
r-O 
then the absolute value of 
2..£\ dk 
Is less than drl Tk. 
k-O 
so that the curve k=O cuts the curve 
r-O 
r-O from above. This is shown in Figure 2.3b. 
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The phase diagrams give us an indication of the stability of 
steady state equilibrium. 
The analysis until now has not proved conclusively that the 
system we are considering is globally stable. Phase diagrams can only 
give an indication of the movements towards equilibrium starting from 
any arbitrary starting point. We turn to this point now. 
The steady state equilibrium of the foregoing model can be proved 
to be globally asymptotically stable (GAS), provided the movements 
towards equilibrium (if any) from any arbitrary point, is 
non-oscillatory. II the initial point is (k,r) and equilibrium is 
(k, r), then by assumption of non-oscillation, we have the following 
condition: 
if k - k > 0 (or < 0) always 
then r - r < 0 (or > 0) always 
Define 
(V' k,r) 
Next define a "distance" function 
We have (i) V t R+ 
(11) V ) 0 
(111) V - 0, iff 01 - 0 - n2 since n1 and n2 are of the 
same sign always. 
(iv) dV _ 1 V a (n1+n2)(n1+02) 
2 dt 2 
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- (rll -H12) [sf (k) - nk) 
- (rl 1tn2)[sf(rl1+k) - nrll - nk) 
< (rll+rl2)(sf(k) + rllsf'(k) - nrll - nk) 
(by concavity of f(k» 
,. 
- 012[sf'(k) - nJ + rl 1rl2 [sf '(k) - nJ 
< 0 
sf '(k) - n < 0 
rll > 0 - > rl2 < 0 
01 > 0 - > 02 > 0 
Hence by the standard theory of Liapunov, the equilibrium (k, r) is 
globally stable. 
Section 5: Saving Function 
The usual literature on growth theory assumes the saving-income 
ratio to be constant, independent of the rate of interest and the 
level of income. It has been shown that under certain assumptions 
(see Uzawa (1968», the average propensity to save (SlY) does not 
depend on income. But the propensity to save may still depend on the 
expected and actual rate of interest. Even though there may be a 
secular constancy of the saving income ratiO, it does fluctuate over 
the cycle and this fluctuation may be related to the rate of interest. 
The predominant concern of growth theory is long run behaviour but 
disequilibrium analysis cannot consistently neglect short run 
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tluctuations. 
In what tollows we assume that the saving income ratio (s=s/Y) is 
a function ot the current rate of interest (r). Really, 's' should be 
a function of a whole complex of interest rates, i.e. present-value 
prices Into the Indefinite future. But this line of reasoning will 
take uS away too far trom the central theme, so we assume 
s - s(r) {s'(r) > O} (31) 
The basic equations governing the time path of k and r are now 
k - a[f'(k) - r] (32) 
r - B[k + nk - s(r)f(k)] . (33) 
The equilibrium as steady state is similar to before and we have 
k - k and r - r when k - 0 - f. 
To analyse local stability, form the matrix 
A2 - 3k/3k 3k/or 
ai/ak '?Ji:/3 r 
. (Of" -<l 
aet" + e (n - sf') -<le - Bfs' 
Note trace A2 - af" • as - Bfs' < 0 
det A2 - as(n - sf ') - aSfs'f" > 0 
Given the Soiow stability condition n - sf' ~ O. Thus steady state 
equilibrium (k, r) is locally stable. 
We can derive phase diagrams (Figure 2.4) for this system as 
bef ore. 
64 
*lr -d • keO 
~l -ak 
r-O 
• f" < 0 
e~ + e[n-s(r)f '(k)] 
ok 
- - -::-:;-----"'='-:-"-:-:---:---~ _ St(k)s'(r) 
- af"(k) + n-s(r)f'(k) 
a + f(k)s'r 
- f " ( k ) + [ n -s ( r ) f '( k) ] / a 
1 + [f(k)s'(r)]/a 
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(34) 
(35) 
In the neighbourhood of equilibrium n-s(r)f'(k) > O. But f" always < 
o and therefore ~~l. may be positive or negative. But even if 
r-O dr 
it is negative its absolute value will be less than dk. and thus 
the phase diagrams show a tendency towards stability. 
The stability conditions are 
n-s(r)f '(k) > 0 (36) 
s'(r) > 0 
Section 6: Conclusion 
The analysis of investment behaviour and possible disequilibrium 
be~ween saving and investment decisions can be fruitfully incorporated 
in a neoclassical model of growth. The disequilibrium model is robust 
enough to be locally stable, the phase diagrams show that global 
stability is possible and formally global stability is proved under 
certain conditions. Thus It seems that neoclassical dynamic theory 
can be extended to include disequilibrium analysis. 
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Footnotes 
1) The major part of Harrod's paper (1939) deals with this problem 
while the other issue takes up only the last few sections of the 
articl~. 
2) An advanced textbook (Burmeister and Dobell (1970» deals with 
the issue in just one page though it mentions all the three 
following reasons. 
3) For reasons of space. the exoosition here is brief. But see 
Bliss (1975) for an excellent discussion of "accommodating 
variables" in economic theory. See also Sen (1976) for further 
analysis. 
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Chapter III 
Inter~enerational Model of Neoclassical Growth 
with Unemployment 
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No~el~ of temporary equilibrium with qu~ntity ratlonin~ have 
genrally empha~lserl transactions taking place at non-eouilihrium 
prices. Thl'~ in the ]Ahour market, When there is excess supoly and 
the wa~e rate is sticky, actual labour transacteti is the minimum of 
lahour demancl and ~lIpply. This results in unemployment and there may 
not exist an instAntaneous arl.1ustment in the wage rate to clear the 
market an~ consequently get full employment. Growth models on the 
other hand have generAlly assumerl instantaneous price/waqe adjustments 
anit market dearin". ',le '''ould like to present a mo<'el which emhocHes 
essentiRJ n1'.'"onertles of neoclassical growth hut. which may have short 
run Ti~i(Hties In the '",RPe rate causing unemplo"ment. Toll'! <'0 not argue 
for anY long lasting stickiness in the wa~e rate, rather a wage 
~d~ust1'1ent e~uation is formally integrated 1.n t'"le mo~el. Our interest 
is in temporary equilihrium "Then markets transact on the short sirle 
thu q leaitfng to unemploym~nt (or overemDloym@nt). We want to study 
how these seouences of temporary equilihrium tenc1 to a full 
eouilibriu~ steady state. 
The formal mo~el follows the structure of 1)iamond (1965) and Ito 
(l07~), with an overhpof.ng generation model, thus each period has two 
.2enerations. The younger generation In each period offer employment, 
earn wape income, consume a part of their income an~ save the rest. 
The olcier generation are entrepreneurs or employers, e~rn profit 
incomp Rlone Rn~ ~o not ~ave at all. For eRch periorl the wa~e rate 
'w' is '('R11p~' hv the auctioneer (or ~eterminecl hy the h~rp~jnin2 
oroce!;~) And a tE'mnOrATv eCluUtbril1m hat; to!-p c'eter111lneA 0'1 th~ hasis 
of pi"",n , .. ... . ThE' '''cH!P rate doe~ not aci.111st ,,·i thin this period to 
c1esr the ",~r'<et S0 t,·~ m~y h~vE' ~i~pold1ihr1um in the ~f'n~f' that 
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l~~our ~e~~n~ i~ not eQual to lahouT sunDly. Hut the ~uctioneer (or 
the w~~e r~te in su~~eQuent periods according to whet~er there Is 
pxce~!'I rte",~n~ or excp~s sllnpl V of lar-01Ho. 
Lpt the nm.,her of people tn the vounper. ~eneratlon he N. A 
conventf.('\n to he fol1o"'eel throuphout is that per canit~ value of 
varfahles X w(ll me~n x - X/N, f.e. in terms of the number in the 
youn~er ~en~ration rather than total population. Since only the 
younp,er p.eneration work and supply labour we may say that "'x'" is the 
value of X per worker. On the hasis of utiH.ty maximisatlon, the 
workers or younger peneratlon determine their lahour supDly LS=Ls(w). 
Ue assume that L!; IS - few), which gives us the per worker lahour 
N -
supply function. 
LahoUT demand is determinecl by capitalist employers. Given the 
canf.tal stock K or ~ - K/N, employers maximise profits and through 
marp.inal PToc'uctivitv con~itf.ons determ1.ne LO - LO(t",K). We assume 
that lit - Ld/~ - p'(w, 1<.). This may not be true In general, but for 
some pro<illcti.on functions If.1(e Cobb-DolI!lla!;, it will holel. 
YuU e",oloyment· occurs w,",en 1 et -I!;: 1. 
transactions t.!l1<.e place .!It the short side of the market sllch that 1 -
fmnljes overemployment. 
Consi~er now the c~se of full employmentiwe have 
few) - ~(w,k) (I) 
Solvin(' for f>oltflfhriu'" in w • w* in term~ of 1<. we ,""we 
• 
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w* - h (k) (2) 
or 
Thus h' > O. 
Fur.ther 
1 • f(w*) - p(w*, k) 
Thus 1 • lek), l' > 0 Rfnc~ w* is a function of k. 
Since investment and saving are ~one throu~h waQe income of 
worker~ alone we have 
or 
r • ~ • sw*L 
v • I· sw*l - sh(k)l(k) 
N 
• • o 
Since k - '<, k - K - N 
N k K N 
tIN - n 
m 
- v - n 
k 
(where n is th~ natural rate of ~rowth) • 
• 
k - v - nk 
• 
or ~ - ~h(k)l(k) - nk 
(3) 
(4) 
(5 ) 
• Ste~Av ~t~tP IJn~er full emp'ov~ent i~ given ~v k.- 0, f.~. ~h(k)l(~) -
nl( - O. Thi~ Nll1at1onQ'tve~ It!; the st:eaciv ~t;>te valllt"s 1( .. ~ .mci w -
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w - h(k). A~sume also the Solnw stphilitv con~itfon, 
- shl' + slh' - n < 0 
i.e. shl' + ~lh' < n (6) 
Pe thus know th~t flllJ P1'I1pJ oVl'Ilent s~eR~v st:.lte i~ cl",finerl snli is 
stab),.. 
TTnernol(,)V!TIent 
Let us now analyse the unemployment phase. t.,'e have w ) w*, L5 ) 
LIi , IS ) ld.(l) rl-te imp(')rtant point is that actual employment 1 _ ld -
~(w,~). Investment per worker is defined by 
v • I/~ • SIN • sw~(w,k) (7) 
• 
an(1 ~ • v - ok • sw~(w,k) - n~ (8) 
The wa~e a~1ustment equation is the usual one, 
• 
w • 
• 
or w - ar~(w, k) - f(w») (9) 
(a > /)) 
• 
Notp. that when w - w anrl correspondingly k - k, k - 0 in equation 
• nn since ~(w, k) • 1 (k) an(1 w • h(k). Th.ts ~ - 0 passes through 
w, k. Now consiclpr the phases when w > w Rnli w < w an~ let us analyse 
• 
the s i,lms of k. 
> A·) 
'J < .," + k < o. 
Pe intend to show that under certain conditions 
> A • < Altern~tivelv, it can he shown that w < w + k > O. 
(1) The eou~lftv si~ns are atta~hed for analytical conv~nieocp. 
St.rictlv unemployment + w > w*, IS > 1°. Rut I"e do not contratiict the 
hasie- tE'nE't of,lInemployment, i.e. supnlies of lahollr are rationed ancl 
traris~ctfons in thp lahour market take "l~cp on the short (deman~) 
c:icie. 
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C.ompelre the fol1m"jng eonations for two points (w, k) anrl (w, k). 
A A • 
SWg(w,k.) - nk .. 0 - k (stea~y state full employment) (10) 
• 
k (unemployment) (11 ) 
A A A 
For ~ > w, ~(~, k.) < g(w, k). If now the percentage change in 'w' is 
~reater that the percentage change in g(), then swg(w,k) > swg(w,k). 
• • Thi~ implies k > 0 in eauation (11). The con~ition which determines k 
A 
> 0 for w > w (when we are in the unemployment phase) is that the 
elasticity of per capita lahour nemand with resoect to the wage rate 
is less than unitv. 
> A 
If this condition is satisfied then w w + ( 
• > 
k. ( O. Alternatively, if elRsticitv of In with resoect to 'w' is 
~n'eateT than one (I'I~ in the Cohh noughs case) we have w ~ ;; + ~ ~ O. 
The wagp' ad.1ustme"t eauation can he studien more an<tIytically • 
• For w - 0, 2(w,k) - few) and we helve already solved for w* • h(k). 
This gives U!'I the phase line for ~ • 0. He also know that a~ It 
rw ¥7=0 
• 
'Je can now use the phase line for w .. 0 and couplect with our 
• previous analysis on k we pet Figure 3.2. 
, ') 
Let us stlldy the movements of 1t and w in some detail. Suppose 
A 
init:f.allV t1-)e economy is at k. < k. If the initial wap.e is lower than 
A 
the !'ItE'ac:'y state (w < ,,,) ;\On a state of unemployment ex! sts, 
t1-)e j ncome of '''ap:e earners is 1 OWe This is becau!'Ie of both low wages 
<tnt! the Cluantftv constraint (rAtioning) set hv unemplovment. T1-)I1!'1 
Mvinp. (investment) will he low anrl the ~rowth of canital will he less 
than the nAtural rAte of growth. 'PeT C'ROit::l c::loital I>: ... KIN w11'. 
f::ll1. 'f'I,fs If><H~s to fllTthf;'T unemployment, further re~l1C'ti.on in ''';H~e 
ann <t vfcfnl1~ cycle rp!wlts with f.<ll1fnp 'k' An<l , , w • Tf on tl,e other 
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hanri the initiaJ w;1ge ~et hv the A\lcti.oneer i!': w > , .... even thour.h 
there i 1'1 uJ1€'mnJ ovrnent, the level of "'age i~ hij?hp.r enou,t"h to offset 
the OU;:Intfty contraints of' low unemployment. Thus income is high 
enough to have invE"stlT'p.nt at such levels which increases k. 
r.on!':eQllently. WP. have clecre<lsing w (clue to unemployment) and 
incrE'a1'ling 1< (duE" to high investment), and a movement towarrls stE'ady 
state (for k < 1<). This accords with our intuitive ideas of Keynesian 
economies where unemployment persists and growth is hampered when 
w~,\les are too low while a hf.gh enough wa~p. is benefici I'll to growth and 
emoloyment. 
The alternative case of unelT'ployment hut with e: .. w cnd> 1 is 
-cl -1 3w 
,\liven by the diagram, Figure 3.1. WE' can again derive a lot of 
conclusions froIT' this fi.gure, but I will not ~o into details. 
Overemplovment 
Fiflallv, let us study the phase of overemployment when LS .. Ld, 
• 1 s .. ) cl, l,' .. w*. He naY' hRve v - r/N - SiN - sIJf(w) and k - swf(w) -
.. . 
fl1<. ~otp. that for w - w, k - k, k - O. 
passes through (w t 1<). Further taking 
• 
k - 0 - swf(w) - nk 
we pet n > 0 
sf + swfl 
;!Od 
.. - - n < O • 
k-O 
• 
Thus the phase line for k - 0 
Th1s infomatfnn heJps U~ to dra'''' the phase ~iagrams (see 
"J:'f,,'lrp ~.4) for the ovprempl('lvment C:ise. I,le (';1n cltstinguish two 
• • 
epses, one in which slope of w - 0 is htRher than slone of k - 0 (for 
overp'T'p'ovment) Anti th!" other where it 113 lower. The movement of \or 
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Rncl '< C:.ln he <'Inalvseci in the neiphhollrhoorl of stPaclv stRte as hefore. 
" "'fcie variety of casps are oossihle if "'e comhine the various 
altern~t{ve~ in the Ilnemolovment ancl overemplovment regi.mes. A stahle 
oossi~.lity (usin~ £ > 1) is shown in Figure 3.). 
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Footnotes. 
1. The equality signs are attached for analytical convenience. 
Strictly speaking, unemployment --) w > 
,., 
w , 
we do not contradict the basic tenets of unemployment, t.e. 
suppliers of labour are rationed and transactions in the labour 
market take place on the short (demand) side. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
The followin~ mo~el tries to investi~ate the nature of ~rowth 
equilibrium when desired investment and desired savin~ are not equal. 
It assumes a Rarrodian investment behaviour within the broad framework 
of a neoclassical 2rowth model and tries to investi~ate stability 
prooerties of the system. An important conclusion which follows is 
that Harrodian knife ed~e instability is just one of alternative 
possibilities for the model. Further, analysis of investment 
behaviour helps us to incorporate some Keynesian properties in a 
~rowth model. Introducing the labour market and coupled with the 
commodity market, we can get ~1alinvaud type classification of 
Keynesian unemployment, classical unemployment and repressed 
inflation. The last section deals with these regimes in some detail. 
Section 2: The Model 
We use the following notations: 
I + intended investment 
+ s propensity to save 
F(K,L) + potential full employment output 
Y + actual national output (income) 
• K + actual increase in capital stock 
Following the usual practice in macromodels with rationing, 
markets are cleared on the short side so that actual increase in 
capital stock is the minimum of desired saving and investment. This 
gives us equation (1) • 
• 
K - min(I, sF(K,L» (1) 
• 
Y - K - min ( !, F(K,L) ) 
s s 
(2) 
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• 
r.: .. 5Y 
1-0 F(K,L) - F(9K, eL) 
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(3) 
(4) 
Eauation (2) is the familiar multiplier mechanism and (3) follows 
from it. In (4) e indicates the current level of capital shortage or 
excess caoacity. If 9 > 1, desired investment (I) is greater than 
actual investment (- full employment investment), and there is capital 
shorta~e. If 9 < 1, desired investment is less than potential full 
employment investment and there is excess capacity. The former 
situation may be called the S'olow-neoc1assical case where full 
employment is maintained, actual capital formation is determined by 
full employment saving and investment is accommodating. The latter 
situation may be termed the Harrod-Keynes case where desired 
investment does not match up to the potential levels of a full 
employment economy. 
As stated before investment behaviour is Harrodian, i.e. 
d (IlK) - ~(e-l) 
dt 
(assume ~ > 0 constant, or ~'(O) > 0, e ~ 1 + H ).~ 0). 
(5) 
If e > 1, and there is capital shorta~e, investors increase desired 
investment as a proportion of current capital stock. If 9 < 1, there 
is excess capacity and investors reduce the ratio of investment to 
capital stock (d (IlK) < 0). 
dt 
Finally for lahour supply we assume 
• 
I. • n 
L 
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(6) 
From (2) we have 
; _ s minI I F(K,L)] 
s 
(7) 
From (5), 
• • • • K1 - 1K I I K 
d (IlK) • ---
dt K2 
• - • ~(6-I) 
K K K 
• • 
or I· I K + K ~(e-I) 
K 
• 
or I - sI m1n ( .!., F(K,L) ) + KH6-I) 
K s 
( 8) 
Equations (6), (7), (8) can be analysed further after a few 
simplications. Define per capita invest~ent: v - IlL. 
Given k • K/L 
• k - I - n 
K 'K 
• 
k • v - nk (9 ) 
• Consider now the case where K - I < sF(K,L); i.e. e < 1, the 
so-called Harrod-Keynes case. 
Since v - .!, 
L 
• • 
v I n 
- . - -
v I 
Fro~ (8), for this case 
• 
I • 12 + K He-I) 
K 
0 
or I I + K He-I) 
-
-- -I K I 
e 
Substitutin2 ~ in expression for vlv we get 
• v 1+K~(9-1)-n 
v·j( i 
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or 
- v + k ~(a-l) - n 
k V 
• v - v2+ k Ha-I) - nv 
k 
(l0) 
Alternatively we may consider the opposite when S > 1 and 
• K - sF(K.L) < I, the Solow-neoclassical case • 
• 
I - sI f(K.L) + K4> (a-1) 
K 
~ 
I - sF(K, L) + K 4>(9-1) 
I K I 
. . 
and finally substitutin~ 1n ~ expression we have 
v 
or 
• 
v -
v 
sF(K,L) + K ~(a-I) 
K I 
- n 
SF(K,L) 
- L 
K/L 
+ K H9-I) - n 
I 
- sF(k,l) + k ~(9-I) - n 
k v 
• v - V sF (k , l) + kH e -1) - n V 
k 
(11 ) 
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Equations (9) and (10) together describe the Keynes-Harrod type 
of model while equations (9) and (11) give us Solow-neoclassical type 
models. They can he now analysed for steady state equilibrium and 
• • 
stability. Steady state is defined as k - v - 0, 6 • 1, v - nk. 
• • 
L n 
---L 
The two models need furth~r simplification since we hav~ to 
derive 9 in terms of k, v. 
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Since o - 11 sF{K.L), therefore 
I) -
v (12) 
Substitutin~ in (IO) we ~et 
• v
2 
v • it + k~ (13) 
and in (11) we ~et 
• 
v -
v sF(k,l) + k 
k ~ - nv 
(14) 
( SF(~,l) -1 ) 
We will work with the two pairs equations (9), (13) and equations 
(9), (14). 
For stability analysis, let us take first equations (9) and (13), 
i. e. • 
k • v - nk 
• v
2 
v - it + k~ 
The followin~ matrix (evaluated at steady state) gives essential 
properties. 
A -
-n 
-kep' vF' 
sF2 
) 
Given that at steady state e - 1, 
-n 
A • -v
2 
-k<fl'vF' 
kZ sF2 
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1 
-2v + k~'-n 
k sF 
V m l' v 
-s=F"""( k-,-:l 5 k - n 
1 
n + kcj>' 
sF 
trace A -
det A 
k<jl' > 0 
SF 
k<jl'vF' 
-
-n 2 - nk<jl'+ v2 + 
-- k2 sF 
• nk~ , -1 + kF' 
sF- ( sF(k,1) ) 
• nk~' -1 + kF' 
sF ( sLF(K.l) ) 
• nk,' 
sF 
• nk4" 
sF 
L 
-1 + kF' 
( sF(K,L) ) 
( -1 + !. ) I 
sF2 
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(w is total profits in the economy F'K and sF(K,L) - I in steady 
state eQuilihrium). 
Thus the si~n of det A Is ambi~uous depending upon whether 
(w/I) > or < 1. 
Trace A > 0 makes us aware of saddle point equilibrium but 
unless we know that det A < 0, we cannot say that the model is 
unstable. Of course it is plausible to assume w < I and thus 
~et det A < 0 and Harrodian instability. Further this raises 
distributional questions and possibilities of working with a 2-class 
mode 1. 
To conclude, if total profit in the economy is less than total 
investment, then steady state equilibrium is a saddle point and Harrod 
type kn if e ed~e resul t s my follow. 
Let liS now turn ollr attention to the more neoclassical model 
usln~ eouatlons (q) and (14) 
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• k • v - nk 
• vsF 
v - k + k~ 
v ( - - 1) - nv sF 
To investivate stability properties form matrix 
A -
-n 
vs(kF'-F) ~ ( v -1) 
sF(k,l) 
-k~' vF' 
SF 
1 
sF(k,l) + k4>' -n 
k sF 
• 
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Since at steady state e - 1, v -1 and v ~ 0 + sF(k,l) - n 
we 5!;et 
-n 
A - vs(kF'-F) - k~'vF' 
trace A - -n + k~' 
SF 
- -n 
sF"{k,l) k 
1 
kc!>' 
sF 
Note that trace A < 0 can be guaranteed if ~' is small. Thus 
lIarrodian investment adjustment process must be slow. 
det A 
• 
-
• 
-nk~ + vs (F-kF') + k4>'vF' 
sF 
ns (F-kF' ) + 
k 
~~(F{K,L)-KF~) 
K 
k2 sF2 
nk~ , ( -1 
sF 
+ nk~' 
-sF(k,l) 
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+ kF' ) F 
( -1 + KF' ) F(K.L) 
+ nk~ , 
sF(k,l) 
-1 + 'If 
( -F -:-( K-,-L) ) 
where I., is total wage f.AlOd and F(K,L) '"' W + 'If. 
Therefore det A- nsW 
K 
- ns\-1 - ~' 
K 
(since nk - sF(k,I» 
+ nk<j>' W 
"SY(k,l) ( F(K,L» 
w 
( F(K,L) ) 
or det A - W r nsF(K,L) - ~'K 
. K F(K,L) 
- w 
kF(K,L) 
r nsF(k,l) - ~'k 
• (W IF) r n 2 - ~'l 
If ~' - n 2 < 0 and guarantees trace A < 0, then n2 - ~' > 0 
DAEAAC 
guarantees det A > O. Once again the same condition and the speed 
of adjustment is crucial • 
To sum up, the first model comprising of eQuations (9) and (13) 
may be called Keynesian hecause it reflects excess capacity and ex 
ante invest~ent is less than full employment capacity investment. 
Knife edge instahility may occur depending on total profits and 
investment in the economy. But even here the answer is not 
unambigUOus and distributional considerations may be important. 
The second model may be called neoclassical, where ex ante 
investment is above the capacity full employment level. Savers are 
satisfied At the short side of the market but investors are not. Even 
though the investmt>nt mechanism is Harrodian, stability can be 
~Iaranteed provided the adjustment process is slow and investors do 
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not react in a volatile fashion. 
Let us now study the adjustment paths with phase diagrams in the 
neoclassical case. From equation (9), 
• 
dk • -ak 
dv • av • - 1 > 0 k-O ilK -n 
ilk 
• 
and ~k • -n < O. 
lie 
k-O 
• To analyse the v stationary, consider v - O. From equation (14) 
we get 
• dV 
dk av 
. -dv ilk , 
vaO ilk v-=O 
• /)v av • sF(k,l) k~' k + sF(k,l) - n 
It is difficult to attach a sign to this expression. Let us assume 
o 
for simplicity that ~ is a constant so that ~' a~. Now when v - 0, 
we have 
vsF(k,l) +k~ f sf{-~~-i) -1l - nv" 0 
k 
or sF(k,l) + k41 - n + k4> 
-k-- sF(k,I) v 
or sF.ik.-tll + k4> - n - ~ 
k sF(k,l) v 
, 
Therefore (lv 
rv 
· !i > 0 
v 
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Now consider 
.) av 
rik • 
v=O -
vs(kF'-F(k,l) 
k2 
Take each term in turn. 
+ ~ 
( --Y- - I) 
sF(k,l) -
vs(kF' - F(k,l» 
k 2 
vs ( KF' - LF (k, I) ) 
L 
-----.-----
- vs ( kF' - F(K.L) 
L ) < 0 
(Since KF' - 1T < F(K,L) • Y). 
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k41vF' 
This neoclassical type model assumes e > 1, v - 1 > 0 and second term 
sF 
is > O. The third term is negative. The final sign of dkJ~S unknown. 
dv v=O 
Let us take a few possible cases. Suppose ~ is large, the 
• 
positive second term dominates the others, ~l? 0 and dkJ. < O. 
ak v=O dv v=O 
We have the following diagram showing saddle point eauilibrium (see 
Figure 4.1) 
Alternatively, q, is small, a~,. < 0 and dkl. > O. 
ak v=O dv v-a 
We then have the two following alternatives, given by Figures 4.2 and 
4.3. Once a~ain, there are saddle point eauilibria. 
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Sect ion 3 :~isequlli brium Regime~ 
It is possihle to extend this model ane do some more formal 
analysis. Rut let us now discuss more intuitively the different 
diseauilibrium phases in which the economy may find itself. Our 
analysis is a wider generalisation of the basic model due to Nikaido 
(1980) • 
• Suppose initially the economy is in a steady state with I - K -
• • 
sF(K,L) and K - L - n. Now suppose the capitalists or investors 
K L 
become more bearish (a change in marginal efficiency of investment 
perhaps). They decide to reduce their ex ante investment such that 
I < sF(K,L) or ! < F(K,L). Thus e < I and excess capacity appears 
s 
in the economy. Suppose simultaneously that the natural rate of 
• • 
growth rises due to exogenous shocks and K < L - n. Thus capital 
K L 
accumulation is not sufficient to absorb all of the growing labour 
force immediately and unemployment occurs. We therefore have excess 
supply of commodities (excess capacity) and excess supply of labour 
(unemployment). This may correspond to the Keynesian case. 
Consider now the difference between I and F(K,L) or more 
formally I and ~(K,L). 
Note: 
cl 
Tt 
sK K 
( 1- _ F( K,L) ) 
sK K 
s 
• 
L ( n-K 
K K ) 
(15) 
l.et uS try to determine the sign of this expression. From Harrod 
type investment behaviour, since 
o 
• 
e < 1, 1 d (I/K) < O. Since K - I, 
s dt 0 
this implies that K is fall1ng;. If initially ~ < n then it continues 
K oK 
to be so and n - K > O. Therefore the second term of (15) is negative 
K 
( .!. - F(I< ,~) ) 
sK K 
too. Thus declines over time. Excess supply or 
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• excess capacity increases over time. Simultaneously, n > K implies 
K 
that unemployment persists and its volume increases. We have a 
typical Keynesian case, where investors plan less and less investment 
due to increasin~ excess capacity and at the same time there is 
~rowing unemployment. 
We now move on to the second case of general excess demand or 
so-called repressed inflation. A~ain start from an initial steady 
• • • 
state with I - K - sF(K,L) and K 
- == K 
L > n. 
L 
Suppose due to exogenous 
change in expectations and demography I increases and n falls so that 
• 
we have I > sF(K,L) and K ) n. 
K 
, 
Since K • sF(K, L) we have sF(K, L) > n 
-- -K--
This initial movement away from equilibrium is therefore characterised 
by capital shortage in the goods market and labour shortage in the 
labour market. 
Once again consider equation (15). By investors behavioural 
• 
equation (5) we have ! ~_(I/K) > 0 and since by assumption n < K the 
5 dt K 
second term is positive. Therefore the whole expression is 
positive. This means the gap between I and sF(K,L) is increasing and 
there may be repressed inflation which is sustained. 
On the other hand, 
• d ( F(K,L) } - .!:(n-~) a F(l,L/K} < 0 dt K K K L a ( K ) 
or • d sl_(K? L) 
-
d K < o. 
dt ( K ) dt ( K ) 
• 
Therefore K/K is declining towards the given natural rate (n) and 
• 
,. 
ultimately ~ - L - nand sF(K,L) - nK, the Solow steady state 
K L 
eq ui11 hrium. This fits in with our ideas of represspd inflation. 
Even though the economy is apparently in Solow growth equilibrium, 
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investors bullishness can cause repressed inflation and apparent 
capital shortage. Firms whish to invest more than the amount of 
savings forthcoming and this causes implicit price levels to go up. 
The final case we consider is the case of classical unemployment 
characterised hy excess demand for commodities, but with excess supply 
of labour. We have I > sF(K,L) or I > F(K,L), hut Simultaneously 
, . 
K < L - n. 
K L 
s • 
Actual capital formation is K c sF(K,L). Since capital 
is growing slower than labour, either the capital labour ratio is 
declinin~ or there is unemployment. But this system will not persist 
in the long run. We know that 
d (~F(KK:t!» 
dt 
• 
• s 
o 
{ ~ ( n-~ ) 
Since n-K > 0 this expression Is > O. 
K 
• d ( K ) • d ( sF(Kt!) ) > O. dt K dt K 
• 
( a F(l, L/K) ) a(L/i<) 
Thus 
} . 
So K will rise until it catches up with the natural rate n and we have 
, i. • 
K • L • n in lonll; run equilibrium. \~e also have K - sF(K,L) and thus 
K L 
the two conditions give us the Solow steady state. 
The final question is the difference. between I and F(K, L), 
sK ----"K -
alternatively the difference between I and sF(K,L) intended and actual 
investment. The outcome is difficult to predict since the two 
expressions in equation (IS) have opposite signs. By (5) we have 
1 d (IlK) > O. On the other hand the second expression contains 
s~ 
(n-~) ) 0 and is thus negative. The final movement will depend on the 
K 
strength of the two expressions. If Harrodian adjustment speed 4>' (or 
~ if constant) is very low then the Quantitative effect of 1 d 
.! ) 
-- ( 
s dt K 
is sma 11 and thus d ( I F(K,L) ) - -. is negative. \\'e started with 
dt sK K 
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excess demand (! - F(K,L) ) , but it will decline. Ultimately, 
s 
I + F(K,~) and we have a full equilibrium where intended capital 
sK K 
formation is equal to the actual. Thus we have a Solow equilibrium 
couo1ed with an expectationa1 equilibrium. 
The moral of the story seems to be that the neoclassical model of 
2rowth is rather robust with respect to convergence towards steady 
state equilibrium. In spite of Harrorl type investment functions and 
non-market clearing assumptions, stable equilibrium can be found under 
different types of assumptions. 
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Chapter V 
Unemployment. Income Distribution and Disequilibrium Growth 
DAFAAC 
Sect 10n 1: Int rod1l5.t..!..~ 
The purpose ot this chapter is to study certaIn aspects of 
un~mployment in 8 disequilibrium neoclassical growth model. Fix price 
models with non-clearing markets have been extensively studied in the 
recent literature (see Clower (1969), Barro and Crossman (1976) and 
Malinvaud (1977». We propose to deal with sImilar issues connected 
with a disequilibrIum labour market (specifically with unemployment) 
in an explicit dynamIc framework. 
As shown by Solow and Stiglitz (1968) income distribution 
parameters become important In specifyIng adjustment processes when 
markets do not clear. Our work follows In that tradition. The basic 
tenets of the neoclassical paradigm - marginal productivIty theory 
and its role in the functional distrIbution of income are well known. 
Even though the theory in its basic form deals with market clearing 
and tull employment, it can be extended to accommodate unemployment 
and quantIty ratIoned temporary equilIbrium, without losing its 
essential signIfIcance. But most of these analyses, though 
sophisticated, rest on a static framework. An elegant static model 
has been given by Sruno (1979), which may be used as a starting 
point. We propose to extend the scope of such models and put them In 
the explicit dynamIc framework of neoclassical growth theory. 
As Is well known (Malinvaud (1977», in a macro model with two 
goodS (labour and com~)dity) and two transac~ors (households and 
f Irm!l), Involuntary unem\lloyment can be either classical or KeynesIan. 
Fur:her, the qualitatIve characteristics and the policy conclusions of 
these ~wo tynes of unemployment are essentially different. One of our 
.. 
~Jor alms Is to hi~hII~ht the impor~8nt distinction between different 
f arms of unt'lIll loYIl"'nt and to SE'e .I. ts (Of'f ects on the lon~ run ~['owth 
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pa~h of the economy. 
In the next section, the case of neoclassical full employment is 
considered. First we look at the static single period reoresentation 
and then consider the dynamic growth model. The same structure is 
repeated for the subsequent two sections, where we consider classical 
unemployment and Keynesian unemployment. Our main objective is to 
study the dynamic behaviour of the stylised growth economy when there 
is unemployment and when income distribution rules are fully 
specH ied. 
Section 2: .Nt'oclassical. Full-Employment 
Let us first analyse the static case. Given the neoclassical 
production function Y • F(K,L) (where Y,K,L are aggregate output, 
capital stock and labour), per capita income (outout), y • Y/L is 
distributed as 
y • f(k) • w + rk (1) 
Cw is wage rate, r is rate of interest and k • K/L is caoital labour 
ratio). In a one sector model (we assume away capital-theoretic 
prOblems), given k, (1) can be represented as a straight line on the 
w-r space, with slope -k and intercept w - f(k) when r-o. It Is also 
easy for any point on this curve to read off wlrk which is the ratio 
of relative shares d labour and capital in national product. 
Let the savings (S) function b~ of the Kaldor-classical type with 
~wo different propensitIes to save of two "classes", i.e. wage earners 
S • s wL + s rK w r 
or s s w + s rk 
-. w r I. 
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i - s w + s rk 
w r 
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(2) 
Once Again for a 8iven i and k, this equation can be depIcted as a 
straight line on w-r space with slope -ks /s and intercept ifs • 
r w w 
We make the plausible assumption that s >s and therefore given 
r w 
(1) and (2) 
i > s 
w y 
(3) 
GIven this condition, the intersection of the two straight lines (1) 
and (2) is guaranteed. 
In Figure 5.1, AB represents equation (1) for a given capital 
labour ratio kO and CD represents equation (2) for given investment 
per capIta 10 and kO. To determine all absolute magnitudes we need an 
additIonal scale varIable like size of labour force La. or caoital 
stock KO. 
The static model has two degrees of freedom and alternative 
specifications are needed to close them. Within the neoclassical 
paradIgm, one can use the marginal productivity theory of distribution 
as a firlt step towards closing these degrees of freedom. 
I: is well known (see Garegnani (1970), Burmeister and Dobell 
(1970) and Samlle!son (1962» that corresponding to the neoclassical 
production function (or a set of Samuelsonian blueprints), there 
exists a relationship between the marginal products of labour and 
c8pital. Given competitive assumptions and the marginal productivity 
theory of dist.riblltion, this relation becomes the factor price 
fron~ler (fpt in Figure 5.1). At every point on the fpf, the tangent 
line 1. represented by equation (1). Thus we have fpf ~iven by w -
~(r) ~nd dw/dr • -k. 
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~e can now analyse the case of full employmen: in this short run 
model. Civen ~he s:;ock of capitaL (KO) and the labour force (La). for 
full employm~n: we have kO - ~/LO. With all factor markets operating 
under pertect competition. the appropriate wage rate (wO) and profit 
rate (ro) are determIned by marginal productivity conditions. 
ro - f '(kO) 
wo • f (kO) - kO f '( kO ) 
In FIgure 5.1. this is represented by point Qf. Of all parallel lines 
representing equation (2). the one passing through Qf (in Fi~ure 5.1 
it is CD) will determine full employment investment per capita i - iO. 
The ratio QfB/QfA gIves the factor share of wage earnings to profit 
earnings. Thus. we have neoclassical full employment and all 
variables are determined. Many other comparative statics results can 
be derIved. ~lt let us turn our attention to the central issue of this 
paper. viz. growth models. 
The standard neoclassical growth model (Solow (1956» can be 
suitably adaoted to fit the foregoing structure. Since labour grows 
at it. natural rate (n) and is fully employed. L/L - n. 
Theret ore. 
k K L 
-- --k K L 
I n 
. - -K 
• 
+ s r - n 
r 
• I (f(k)-rk) + s rk - nk 
w r 
110 
(given (1» 
DAFAAC 
or 
k - s f(k) + (S -5 )f'(k)k - ok 
w r w 
(4) 
For s:eady s:ate k - 0 and 
s t(k) + (s -s )f'(k)k - ok 
w r w 
( 5) 
This can be solved for steady state value k - k*. 
To analyse stability, we first deal with local stability 
• 
properties of :he system. We oeed dk/dk < 0 in the nel~hbourhood of 
k - k*. • 
dk 
'IT 
s f' + (s -s )f' + (s -s )f-k - n 
- w r w r w 
_ sf' + (s -s )f-k - n < 0 
r r w 
Of 
$1 mp 11 f Y 1 ng (4) we get f 0 f k - k * 
or 
• f'k + [f-kt']s - ok 
r w 
• f' - n-
r 
ws 
w 
k 
From (6) and (7), the stability condition reduces to 
Of 
n -
ws 
w 
T < n - (s -s )f"k r w 
(11 -s )f"k -
r w 
ws 
w 
-k < 0 
which is always satisfied since (s -8 ) > 0, f- < O. 
r w 
( 6) 
(7) 
( 8) 
~~ need stron~ef assumotlons to prove global asymptotic stability 
(C~S). Neocl'Rsical production functions assume that f(k) is concave 
b\l~ m.1kes no aU\lmotlons re~.Hdl.ng the curvature of f '(k), we only 
knov :'h .. ~ itlt 1I1\)1)(! t"(k) < O. Assume lhat f' Is also a concave 
1 1 1 
func:Ion. le:: 
o • k - k* 
Form :Ohe l1apunov f unc:.1on 
V .102 
.a. 
Then 
V ( R+ 1 
V ) 0 
V 
• 0 Hf o • 0 
FIMlly, 
V • r.0 • r.k 
• 1\.[, f (k) + (. -s )f' ( k) k - n k ] 
w r w 
• O[s f(k*+O) + (s -5 )f'(k*+O) • (k*+O) - n(k*+O)] 
w r w 
< O[s f(k*) + s Of'(k*) + (s -8 ).(k*+n){f '(k*) 
_ w w r w 
+ f"(k*)O} - nk* - nO] 
• Or. f(k*) + (s -s )f '(k*)k* - nk. + s Of '(k*) 
w r w w 
+ (s -9 )Of'(k*) + (s - s )kf"(k*)O-nO] r w r w 
.02[, f '(k*) + (s -8 )f'(k*) + (S -5 )f"(k*)k - n] 
w r w r w 
• 0 2 [. f '(k*) - n + (s -8 )f"(k*)k] 
r r w 
< 0 
The l •• t expres.Ion Is negatIve for the following reasons: 
(1) 
(11 ) 
( 111) 
0 2 > 0 Y 0 -- 0 
(. -. )f"(k*)k < 0 tor f" < 0, k > 0 
r w 
• t '(k*) - n < 0 
r 
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This is because f' • r. thus srrK is the savings from profit income 
alone and must be less than total saving which In steady state is S • 
K • oK. 
• • 
+ 
s rK < nK 
r 
s t' < 0 r 
• 
We have proved that V < O. Thus by a standard theorem of Liapunov. 
the system Is globally asymototlcally stable. 
Section 3:. _CIAfi81cal.Uge~ployment 
Une~)loyment in the short run model takes place when the 
equilibrium level of labour employed (LI) is less than the given 
labour force. i.e. Ll < LO. Unemployment Is termed "classical" when 
it Is caused by the real wage rate being higher than the full 
employment level wo. Once again. in temporary equilibrium. investment 
Is equal to savings ex post. but the labour market does not clear. 
In Figure 5.2, the initial full employment equilibrium Is denoted 
by Qf. Suppose the wage rate rises to wI. At the given capital 
labour ratio kO, distribational parameters change and the rate of 
interest becomes r2. But point (wlr2) Is off the fpf and producers 
are not maximising profits. They will thus reduce k and move to Q • 
c 
The equilibrium wage rental values will be (WI q). The new capital 
labour ra:l0 kl Is given by slope of AlRl where kl > kO. This new 
kl • Ko/Ll and thus Ll < LO. Unemployment of the order of (Lo-Ll) 
appears In lhe model. 
Investment, in the classlcal unemployment model, has no important 
role to play. t-:llhef, we assume that investment is "accommodating" or 
~hA: some 50rt of Says' L8W ~)erates. Therefore, given (w,f,k) 
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savLn~ per capita is determined and this in turn determines 
investment. In figure 5.2, investment per capita i remains the same ~~ 
both Qc and Qf' but this is just a coincidence, it need not be the 
same. The major point is that both equations (1) and (2) are 
satisfied, and there is unemployment. 
We now intend to analyse the long run dynamics of the system. 
From the fActor price function or the unit cost function, given w we 
t iod r. Thus 
c(r,w) • r-g(w) 
The function g is decreasing and convex; 81 - (-c Ic ) 
w r 
(10) 
- ( - L/K)- - ~ Further the labour capital ratio is given by 
L/K - ~(w/r) (11) 
where ~ is decreasing and its elasticity is (-0). Note that L is 
the cost minimising optimum level of output that the firm wishes to 
employ, given capital stock. 
The wage adjustment equation depends on labour demand (L) and 
labour supply (N). Thus 
w - a (L/N) (I2) 
where a () is a function, a(l) - 0, 01 > O. L is determined by cost 
minimisation via (10) and (11), N is given by the supply of labour. 
Actual employment is the min ot labour demand (L) and supply (N). 
w. 0 meang tull employment. 
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From (12), (11) 
• a[ kt(w/g)] (13) 
where k is capital per head of labour force. The w - 0 or W stationary 
is given by 
a(kt(w/g» • 0 
TakIng total ditferentlals, 
or 
~ 
k + dt/t • 0 
(Whert:! 
~ • dk/k, etc.) 
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.. 
k - O[d(w/~)/w/~] - 0 
k - o[dw/w - dg/g] - 0 
k - o[ ~ - &ldw/g] - 0 
k - o[ w - (wgl dw/g ~ - 0 
.. .. ,.. 
k - o[ W + (w~/g)w] - 0 
k - o[ ~ + 
k - o[ W + (0/1-0) :] - 0 
.. 
k • 0/(1-0) W 
(where 0 Is labour's shAre In Income, 0 - wL/Y, (l-O)-rK/Y) 
Thus ~he slope of w-O 15 ~lven by 
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dk/dw • (0/1-0) (k/w) (14) 
Note for phase diagram, 
• 
(15) 
All this intormation is depicted in Figure 5.3 
Consider the regIon where there is unemoloyment such that L < N. 
Thus employment Is L. Then investment 
1 • K • S • (8 wL + s rK) - 6K w r 
• K[Sw wHw/g(w») + Br g(w)] - 6K 
(where 6 15 the rate of depreciation) 
• 
K/K • 8 ~(w/g) + 8 g - 6 
w r 
• • 
k/k • K/K - N/N • B ~(w/g) + s g - 6 - n w r (16) 
• 
Thus when (k/k):O and s ~ + s g - 6 - n - 0, then we get w r 
(17) 
~e a180 note, from (16) that 
. 
3(k/k)/3w. (8 ~ + 8 ~t + 5 ~') [a(w/~(w»/3w] _ 
w r w 
l17 
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- - (s - s )~ + S tA' [a(W/g(w»/3w] < 0 (18) 
r w w 
Thus will help uS to draw the phase line for the unemployment region. 
Consider now the region of over full emoloyment where labour 
demand is greater than supply. Thus L>N and employment must be N. The 
cost functions are not appropriate and we get 
K/K - S w(N/K) + s [F(K,N)/K - w(N/K)] - 6 
w r 
- s w/k + s [f(k)/k - elk] - 6 
w r 
• 
k/k - 8 w/k + 8 [f(k)/k - w/k] - 6 - n w r 
k - s w + s [f(k) -w] - (6+n)k 
w r 
• 
(19) 
We also note that the locus of k-O, can be calculated by 
( 8 - S ) d w + [8 f' - (6 +n ) ] d k - 0 
w r r 
( 20) 
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dw/dk -[(6+n) - s f']/(s -s ) (21) 
r w r 
Assuming, tor stability, that (6+n) > srt' 
dW/dk/. 
k-O 
• 
<0 
Also 3k/3k - s f' - (6+n) < 0 
r 
( 22) 
(23) 
Equa:lon (17), (18), (20) to (23) give the phase diagrams as 
depicted in figure 5.4, 
We observe that when unemployment is classical, there Is a 
s:rong poss1bility of real bus-iness cycles with caoital labour 
ratIo and wage rate fluctuating around steady state. 
1 19 
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S~ctlon 4: Keyneslan Unemployment 
A model ot classical unemployment emphasIses the value of the wage 
rate as the maIn determinant of the model. In a static framework, the 
real wage rate is "too hIgh" and thIs causes unemployment as producers 
reduce labour in an attempt to maximise profits. In a dynamIc 
framework, wage rate adjustments take place to clear the market for 
labour and this has consequential effects on labour demand ~rowth and 
capital labour ratio. 
On the other hand, Keynesian unemployment comes about through a 
lack ot effective demand, portrayed in this model by a change In 
investment. Thus, unlike full employment and classical unemployment, 
investment i. not ·accommodatin~". Investment behaviour must be 
postulated first, and it Is the lack of this investment which starts 
off the chain of unemployment. The other important point to note is 
that wa~e rate now changes to clear the commodity market. A short run 
temporary equiiibrium is reached through wages adjusting to bring the 
exogenously given (and non-accommodating) investment and the 
endogenously determined savings in line. This will be clear with the 
following analysis. 
Suppose the economy is at full employment equilibrium in the 
short run model. Civen the values of K • KO and L • LO, we have 
determln~d levels ot all variabl~s. Now consider investment I to be 
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determined by "animal sl,irlts" of entrepreneurs and it falls below the 
original level. Thus current investment 11 < 10. 
In Figure 5.5 Qt once again represents full employment 
equilibrIum AB is given by income distribution and value of k -
KO -kOs 
kO .- and CD 
LO 
iO 10 
OC· --
s LO' w w 
gives the investment line with slope 
iO 10 
and OD • -
s 
w 
r 
• 
Now suppose given k, aggregate investment demand falls to 11 and we 
have a new line represented by CIDl (parallel shift of CD leftwards). 
For the given kO, consumption per head must rise and savings fall to 
equilibrate the commodity market (since investment is now less then 
the previous level of savings). Wage rate w will rise and r fall to 
increase consumption per head (given s > s). This change in income 
r w 
distribution consistent with equation (1) will move the economy to 
(W1f2), the intersection of AB and ClDl. But the distributional 
variables (w1f2) are oft the tactor price frontier and profits are not 
maximised. Capital labouf ratio k will rise and this is done through 
a reduction in employment. A new equilibrium is reached at Qk' with 
11 
Note that OC1 -----the investment saving line shifting to C2 Dl. 
11 Losw 
(new employment L1 < full employment level Lo). 
Keyne. assigned a similar role to distributional parameters and 
savings propensities in his analysis of the "inflationary gap" In his 
book "How to Pay for the War". In his model, the opposite sequence is 
studied ~hen an excess of a~gregate demand over supply (investment 
greater than .... ving ex ante) CAuses an int lationary gap. 
Dlstrlbution41 chAn~eM take place such that real wage falls, rental 
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rate rises and extra saving is forthcoming to ma~ch up to surplus 
investment demand. As is clear the process in our model is jus~ the 
opposite and we have a deflationary gap with consequential 
unemployment. 
The dynamics of the temporary equilibrium analysed until now can 
be represented by the following differential equations: 
w • 0 I (s -s ) w + s Y - iJ 
w r r 
0)0 (24 ) 
k • 8 (w - f ( k) + kf '( k) ] 8)0 (25) 
Equa~ion (24) gives the change in wage rate to clear the commodity 
market. This is the essence of Keynesian unemployment and is quite 
d!fterent from the classical one where wage rate adjusts to clear the 
labour market (see, Solow and Stiglitz (1968». Equation (25) is 
derived from atandard marginal productivity assumptions. Note once 
again that k • k/Ld is capital employment ratio and ~ capital labour 
ratio even though the same notation is used. Note also, y - Y/Ld , 
To analyse stability, form the following matrix evaluated at 
w • 0 • k 
A • :!w dW rw TI 
ilk ilk 
-r; "dk 
• [a(a -s ) aB rf 'J w r 
a Bkf" 
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We need: 
t race A • a (8 -s ) + B kf" < 0 w r 
det A - a(s -s )Skt" - aSs f' > 0 
w r r 
(26) 
( 27) 
trace A 18 always negative, but det A may not be positive. Local 
stability condition becomes 
a(s -5 )Skf" - aSs t' > 0 
w r r 
( 28) 
DAFAAC 
Phase diagrams give a clearer picture of movements of variables out of 
equilibrium. Noting 
dW 
-8 t ' 
Tk r > 0 dw 
-
• 
dk a~ (s -8 ) 
w-o rw w r 
and 
dw I d"k. 
k-O 
• -kf" > 0 
• 
and also Cl W • a (s -5 ) < 0, 3 k • S kf" < 0 we ge t rw w r "IT 
Fig. ~.6 Fig. 5.7 
dw > dw dw < 
dw I dk dk . dk k. 
w-o k-O WaD k-O 
Fi~ur. ~.7 denotes the more stable case and follows from 
in~quallty (28). But as Figure 5.6 shows there Is a distinct 
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possibility ot saddle point equilIbrium in the short run case. In the 
absence ot plannin~, a competitive Keynesian unemployment economy 
mi~ht not even reach temporary equilIbrium in the short run. 
We can extend the analysIs of short run temporary equilibrium in 
the Keynesian unemployment case a bit further. Up till now, the focus 
has been on unemployment of labour alone; we have assumed that capital 
stock is fully utilIsed. But to be true to the soirit of 
Keynesianism, one must also consider the case of underutllisation of 
capital stock too. Keynesian unemployment should be characterIsed by 
unemployed labour ~ unutilised capital stock. 
This can be incorporated by notIng that changes in capital labour 
ratio can be brought about by changes In both capital and labour 
employed. Thus a rIse In capital labour ratio can be caused by a !!!! 
in both labour and capital, with the proviso that the fall in labour 
employed is proportionately higher than the fall in cacital used. 
This will be shown in Figure 5.8. 
Once again, 8S in Figure 5.5, Qt is full employment equilibrium 
10 
point, with investment saving line given by CD, OC -
10 LOS w 
, 
OD • 
KOs 
r 
, (it represents equation (2». 
A fall In investment to 11 < 10 shifts this line to ClOt. To 
restore effective demand, consumption must increase which leads to 
an increase in wage, and a fall in rate of profit given the capital 
labour ra~io. ThIs calls tor an increase in capital/labour from its 
KO 
inItIal value kO • -- to be consistent wIth firms' optimisation. 
La 
~o'" suppose producers In addition to laying off workers also 
close down plants and use less capital stock. As mentioned earlier, 
thls ~1y s~111 be conAlAl~n~ with an increase in capital labour ratio. 
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Starting from an ini~ial saving investment equilibrium, a reduction of 
K - Kl < KO, will increase investment per unit of caeital stock, 
11 11 
i.e. 
• 
> - • 
KO 
Faced with higher investment/capital 
ratio, savIng/capital ratio should rise to preserve equilibrium. 
This calls for a rLse in the rate of profit r. If this increase in r 
required to equiiibrate the commodity market (note there is a 
corresponding fall in w) is high enough, it may exceed the marginal 
product of capital. Then the capital labour ratio k will have to fall 
to accommodate this very high rental rate r. We may finally end up at 
the point Qk (Figure 5.8), the temporary equilibrium for Keynesian 
unemployment. It is characterised by lower investment. lower 
employment. lower capital utilised. lower wage rate and lower capital 
ratio. as compared to Qf. As a representation of "stylised facts" 
this position seems quite reasonable. 
The following equations summarise the analysis and are 
self-explanatory. Civen 
s w + s r 
'"k r (f rom (2» 
s f 
i w + (8 -8 )r (trom (l» 
- - k r w K 
we have 
s t 
o[ i w (s -s )r) r • 
- - - r w k k 
( 29) 
and • 
k-S[f'(k)-r) (30) 
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~qu8tlon (29) tells us how 'r' chanees to eQuilibrate between 
investment and savin~s ex ante. EQuation (30) states that capital 
lahour ratio increases (falls) 8S mar~inal product of capital f' is 
~reater (less) than a Riven r. 
To analyse stability form the matrix of partial derivatives 
We need 
A - -a(s -s ) r w 
-B 
-a [ 
trace A - -a(s -s ) + Bf" < 0 
r w 
i + 
K2 
5 kf'-s f 
w w 
Bf" 
) 
det A - (5 -s )k2 f" - i + s (f-kf') 
w r w 
In the neiRhbourhood of equilibrium f-kf' - w, thus -1 + s w < 0 (sum 
w 
of last two terms in expression for det A). 
therefore .1~ Is amblRUous. 
But (s -s )k 2f" > 0 and 
w r 
The phase dia~rams reflect the conditions needed for det A to be 
> 0 or < O. We ~et Fi~ure 5.9. 
The first phase dia~ram in Fi~. 5.9 is the stabler case and it 
can be 2enerated if inequality det A > 0 holds. Otherwise we have 
saddle point eQuilibrium once a~ain and In a coopetitive economy it 
will be difficult to achieve equilibrium. 
To sum up thu~ far, even without any dynamic movements in a 
ttrowth context, thf' basic t(>mporary eq.ull1briuo model of Keynesian 
unt'mploYlT'('nt runs into problt'ms. Independent of steady state 
Analysis, t"v('n thf' short run equiibrium !'lay'not be reached, consequent 
to dls(\laCf'm~nt. Thus )(t'yn('sian unemployment seems to create more 
prohlt"rM th"lI tht" otht.'r type's of models. 
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Th(' modt>ls d1sC"usst>ci thus far art> essentially static since the 
level of inv~stment (per capita) is ~iv(>n; labour supply is constant; 
and finally, th(' arl1ustment of tht> capital lahour ratio does not take 
Into account the dynamics imparted by investment and labour R;rowth. We 
now discuss the "proper" ~rowth model emphasisin~ the aforementioned 
adjustments. We choose the deal with the first model usin~ waR;e 
adjustments; the second ~ives essentially similiar results. 
Assume, for simplicity, that there is always unemployment. Thus 
we consider only the case where L<N and actual employment is equal to 
lahour demand. All per capita variables are now defined in terms of 
labour supply. For example the capital labour ratio is k - KIN, the 
capital stock per head of total labour availahle. Once a~ain N/N=n 
Desired savin~ is ~iven by 
S - s wL + s rF(K,L) - wL1 
w r 
SIN • I w(L/N) + s rF(K,L)/N) - w(L/N)l 
w r 
• (s - I )w(L/K)/(N/K) + s F(k, (L/K)/(N/K» 
w r r 
• (s - s )w~k + s F(k, ~k) 
w r r 
(31) 
where we have us~d the fact that (L/K) • ~(w/~(w» as In section 3. 
Th~ .ss~nce of the Keynesian ~~del is the investment function. We 
aS5U~ that investment per capita, i-l/N, depends on capital stock per 
head (k) snd the wa~e rate (w). Thus desired investment 
1 • l(k,w) 
It 19 exp('cted that 1 (0; thus increase in the rt>al wa~e, 
w 
.. , 
(32) 
cnrre5ronrlin~ to a fAll In th~ rate of profit r, would lower 
invf'lItmf'nt. t.: .. reflt'rv(' ,urlr.('m('nt on the st\lT1 of i k since a hhh 
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~Aott~l ~tnc~ m~v h~ nn lnc~nttve to invest more; altern~tively R 
dfmlnt~hfn~ ~1r~foal efft(iency may lower invp~tment. Therefor~ i k ) 0 
'.Ja$l~ arl.l\1stmt>nt follows the eouiUbril'III 8!';sumpt1ons made earlier 
for the Keyne~fan st.tic case. Vap,e rate rises (falls) when desired 
savin~ e~cet>d~ (is less than) desired investment. Firms wish to boost 
B~~re~ate demAnd (~onsumption) which can he done here thro\l~h an 
increase 1n wape rate since the consumption propensity of lah0ur Is 
hi~her than that of the capitalists. Thus using (31) and (32) 
(33) 
Notin~. from the previous section, the expression 
,.. 
• - ~t/. • (-0/1-0)~v/v 
hence 
~./tfv - - (0 /l-O)(~ /v) 
aw/3w • (s -5 >[tk - k~(a/l-e)l 
w r 
+ s F2k(-Co/I-O)(t/w) - i r v 
• C~ -5 )Ctk)(l - 0/1-0) - s F2kCo/1-0)(~/v) - 1 
v r r v 
• (s -~ )(~k)(l-O-a/l-O) - s F2k(0/1-0)(t/w) - 1 w r r w 
For Cohh-Ooualas function, 0 - 1 + 
dw/3w • -
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~2) w in K~vne~1an employment. (F 2 /w - 0) > 0; 0(1 
~w/cw • < 0; provid~d i Is small, as expected. 
w 
dw/~k - - (3w/3k)/(3w/3w) > 0 
P.KJAA~ 
Th~ stationary w-O, divides the (w,k) ohase into two se~ments 
deoend{n2 on wh~ther 5<I or 1<5. ~e now need to determine the 
hehaviour o( capital stoc\(. ~p.ain assume that the actual chan~e in the 
capital stoe\( 1s either d~sired investment or savin~ dependin~ on 
which con~tra1nt 1s hind1n~. 
For the case 5<I, we have 
• 
K - S • s w L + s [F (K , t ) - wL 1 
w r 
· K/K • s weL/K) + S [F(K,t)/K) - (wL/K)] 
w r 
• (s -5 )w~ + s r(I, t) 
w r r 
Thus, 
k/k • K/K - N/~ 
when k-O. rht!l eo\u,tfon dp(inps an \lnlC1Ue real wa"e rate 
• w • w • Further, 
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r:otln'l, a/dW < 0, (F2-w» (l, this expression is negative. The 
lnfor~atlon helps us to draw the phase line for (k/k)-O in the region 
K-S. 
We now come to the case where the investment constraint 1s 
)indinl{ so that 
K - I 
. 
(k/k) - (I/N)/(K/N) - n 
- i/k - n 
k • 1(k,w) - nk 
• 
ak/dw • i < 0 
w 
• 
3k/3k • (lk - n) § 0 
dependln~ on the sil{n and ma~nitude of i k • 
Consider the case of 'passive' investor, where l k <O. Thus 
(3k/3k)<O. Then 
dw/dk I. < 0 IK-O, 
The phase dla~ram is essentially similar to the classical case (see 
fhure 5.10). 
T~e more 1nterestin~ Keynesl.n model 1s that of active investors 
who!'lf' rf'.1Ction to hhher k is to increase investment sitro1flcantly. 
Thus '.11th t:-t, w(' m,lV 5!t't (;\k/Clk) >0. and 
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dw/dk !. > 0 \k-n 
K-I 
The phase dtalram is rather complicated and relatively unstable. 
as shown in Fl~ure 5.11. 
Conslrler initial capital stock (per head of labour force), 
kO<k*. Then low initial wa~e is stabillsin~ as w'o path demonstrates. 
On the other hand, a hi2h Wale, at w20 , may lead to oscillatory 
wale fluctuations away from equilibrium. Within the re~ion K-I<S, the 
more realistic Keyneslan case, wales either approach the steady state 
if startin~ from a low value; alternatively they oscillate and we have 
wales risinl and fallln~ as it crosses the boundary from K=S. 
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Section 5: Conclusion 
This chapter constitutes an early part of my research programme. 
In order to put the results in perspective, in this section, I am 
golng to analyse a major paper by Ito (1980) and show how one of my 
models, in the chapter, relates to his analysis of disequilibrium 
growth theory. Since the paper has important links with the contents 
of this particular chapter, I propose to analyse it here in some 
detail and make a comparative evaluation. There are also some links 
with Olapter III which will be mentioned in due course. 
Ito's model is "classical" in the sense that the two major 
characteristics of the classical unemployment regime (see the 
discussion in Section 3) are emphasised: desired saving is always 
realised so that no explicit role is given to the investment 
function; wage adjustment takes place according to whether there is 
excess supply or demand in the labour market. As regards the first 
feature, the possibility, of an independent investment function which 
can be binding, is ignored. There is no clear-cut discussion of why 
this is so. The implicit assumption being, as in a standard neo-
classical growth model, that investment is accommodating; whatever is 
saved must be equal to capital formation. Regarding wage adjustment, 
the assumption 1s that real wage falls (rises) if there is 
unemployment (overemployment). Outside of full employment, the model 
therefore encompasses two regimes: unemployment and overemployment. 
Actual employment is the minimum of labour demand and supply. An 
interesting, though not essential, assumption is that the speed of 
wage adjustment is asymmetric such that it is different for the two 
reglmes. A variant of the wage dynamics is to postulate that wage 
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changes over time according to capital accumulation, in addition to 
the presence of labour market disequilibrium. Thus, even when there 
is full employment (labour supply equals demand), the real wage rate 
may change with capital stock. If the marginal productivity theory 
holds then the full employment case becomes identical with the 
standard one sector neoclassical (Solow) growth model. We will return 
to this point later. 
The Ito model is therefore a perfect amalgamation of neoclassical 
growth theory with the basic ingredients of short run, quantity 
constrained, macroeconomic disequilibrium analysis. Rationing takes 
place on the short side of the market if desired demand and supply 
are not equal. Since the goods market is always in equilibrium 
(saving must equal investment, aggregate supply equal demand), the 
only quantity constraints are in the labour market which "clear~" 
through the "min" condition. This in turn has a spill-over effect and 
effective or actual saving (investment) depends on wage income 
actually earned in employment. 
Let us first briefly discuss the basic Ito model. Employment (L) 
is the minimum of labour demand (Ld) and supply (Ls). Thus 
(34) 
For a given real wage rate (w), the desired capital labour ratio is 
kd • K/Ld, which is given by the marginal productivity relation: 
w • (35) 
Using standdrd notation, y • fC.) is the output per capita. When 
employment equals labour demand, then equation (35) determines the 
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capital labour ratio for a given w. This is the case of unemployment 
where L • Ld < LS • Labour supply LS is equal to the population, N. 
Thus when there is overemployment, L • LS < Ld, the capital labour 
ratio is denoted by k • KIN. 
As regards capital formation, the Ito model assumes, as we have 
done in Section 3, that in a two class economy savings (equal to 
investment) is given by 
• 
S • K • swwL + sr (Y - wL) (36) 
nlerefore 
• • • (k/k) • (1</K) - (N/N) 
(37) 
• Remember that n is the natural rate of growth; thus n - N/N. 
The two state variables of the model are wand k. Their dynamic 
behaviour gives us the long run growth story as well as the stability 
of the system. The dynamic equation for k is already given by (37). 
We therefore need to discuss the time path of wages. 
As mentioned earlier, two possible wage adjustments are analysed 
in the Ito paper. We have either of the following: 
(38) 
(39) 
In equation (39). if there is full employment (Ld • LS ) then wages 
can rile with time when the capital labour ratio increases. This is 
the productivity factor emphasised in the full employment version of 
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the neoclassical growth model. Thus, when Ld • LS and equation (35) 
holds we get the standard equilibrium Solow model as a special case 
of Ito's disequilibrium theory. Even though this is an useful 
formulation, the essential formal propeties of the model are very 
similiar independent of the use of (38) or (39), In what follows we 
will confine our attention to the dynamics given by equation (38). 
The full employment part of the model is standard and needs no 
further discussion. Greater interest focuses on the two regimes 
where Ld r LS • 
Consider first the case of unemployment i.e. L - Ld. The firm is 
unrationed and thus can optimise; hence, marginal productivity given 
by (35) holds. Inverting this function we have 
z' >0 (40) 
Substituting (35) in (37), noting L - Ld and k d - K/Ld, 
we get 
• (k/k) - [sw f(kd)/kd J + [sr - Sw J f'(kd) - n (41) 
This gives us the time path of k. We note that, from (40), it depends 
wholly on the behaviour of w. Turning now to equation (38) we get 
• 
w - a[(k/z(w» - lJ (42) 
Equation (41) and (42) define the dynamics of the unemployment 
regime. 
For the overemployment regime, we have L - LS - N. Using equation 
(l7) and noting that L -N and k - KIN, the dynamic equation for k is 
given by 
135 
• k • sr f(k) + (sw - sr)w - nk (43) 
In addition, wage dynamics is still being motivated by equation (41). 
Equations (43) and (42) define the time paths in the overemployment 
regime. 
Ito makes two alternative assumptions for the relative values of 
the saving propensities: Sw > sr and sr > sw· The latter is the 
standard Kaldor assumption and we maintain it here; my own models in 
this chapter also make this assumption; it is quite easy to work out 
the dynamic properties of the first alternative. The analysis in 
Chapter 111, and Ito (1978), use Sw > sr since it is a natural 
corollary of the overlapping generation model. 
The phase diagrams of the composite system (both unemployment and 
overemployment) are given in Figures 1 and 2 of the Ito paper. The 
first diagram shows the case of Sw > sr' an assumption culled from 
the overlapping generation model. The next case, used throughout 
Olspter V, Is where sr > sw· The phase diagram now is exactly the 
same 8S my Figure 5.4 in the thesis. But this is not surprising since 
my classical unemployment regIme is essentially similiar to a 
neoclasstcal orientated disequilibrium growth model (of the Ito 
type). TIle two fundamental assumptions that both share are: (a) wage 
adjusts when ther~ is excess demand (supply) in the labour market and 
(b) capital accumulation is given by saving with no independent role 
for the lnvestment functlon. 
It 1. clear that my analysis of classical unemployment in Section 
3 m t rrors thAt of Ito (1980). This is not surprising since the basic 
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features of the classical regime are also culled from neoclassical 
growth models and disequilibrium macroeconomics. The former implies 
that savings are always realised so that capital formation must be 
equal to desired saving. The latter emphasises the role of 
disequilibrium in the labour market and consequent spill-over via 
income on to aggregate consumption (demand) and hence saving and 
investment. 
tnspite of the similarities, it is necessary to point out two 
relatively substantive issues whereby the model of section 3 differs 
from tto (1980). Firstly, the Ito model analyses all price dynamics 
. 
in terms of changes In the wage rate. We emphasise, on the other 
hand, both wage and the (real) interest rate, r (or the rental rate 
on capital stock). Given the factor price frontier (unit cost 
function), r is a function of w. Thus when the firm is unrationed and 
on the fpf (In the case of unemployment of labour) the dynamics of r 
mirrors that of w. Working with one factor price is sufficient to 
predlct the behaviour of the other factor price. However in the case 
of over full employment the firm is rationed. Thus the economy is not 
on the (optimum) factor price frontier. Then 
rK • F(K, N) - wN 
r· F(l, 1/k) - [w/k] 
(k • KIN) 
Now it i8 important to analyse the behaviour of capital stock also to 
predict how r wlll change over time. The models in this chapter 
emphaslse income distributional parameters precisely because these 
variables b~come crucial under disequilibrium and one can get 
asymm.trlc results d~pending on the nature of excess supply or demand 
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in various markets. 
The second dIfference in emphasis, within the (neo) classical 
framework), is that our model, in this chapter, can explain how the 
unemployed could receive a part of the national product without 
violating the basic macroeconomic identities of the system. I have 
shown in the Appendix that it is possible to evolve a tax subsidy 
mechanism, whereby we have the unemployed labour force getting a 
share of aggregate output, and yet maintaining the basic structure of 
the growth process. This is important because we do not need to worry 
about how the unemployed would survive in such a system. Ito's model 
does not have such a mechanism. 
Global stability has been explicitly analysed in the Ito paper by 
taking the whole system together, with discontinuities at the 
switching points and at the border of adjacent regimes. In that way, 
by using the Filippov solutions, his analysis becomes more precise 
and allows him to get analytic solutions; whereas this chapter has 
relied on phase diagrams, for specific regimes, to demonstrate the 
general tend~ncy towards long run equilibrium. 
One further poLnt should be noted. The analysis of Chapter Ill, 
similar to that of tto (1978), was constructed with the aid of an 
overlapping generation model. This implies that the younger 
generation ~arn wages and have a high saving propensity. The older 
g~neration earn profit (dividend) income and have a high propensity 
to consume. Thus sr < sw' The Kaldorian two class assumption is, of 
course, ju~t the opposite i.e. sr > sw' As pointed out earlier, we 
have used in Chapter V the latter assumption and derived our results. 
It would be a simple extension to accomodate the other case; but 
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nothing substantive depends on this. 
Uptil now the discussion has concentrated on what can be termed 
the classical regime. But I also have a model of Keynesian 
unemployment where capital accumulation is given by investment 
(rather than saving) and wage responds to disequilibrium in the 
commodity market ( when ex ante investment and saving are not equal). 
These issues are not tackled in the Ito model since he is concerned 
with only the classical framework. Conceptually therefore we move 
away considerably from standard neoclassical (disequilibrium) growth 
theory by analysing Keynesian unemployment regimes. This is the main 
contribution of the chapter. Though the vehicle of analysis is the 
basic Solow growth model, the issues discussed, the adjustment 
machanism postulated and the nature of rationing (inadequate 
aggregate demand with investment being less than saving) are all 
fundamentally different. 
It is instructive to quote the concluding remarks of lto (1980) 
describing his model: "The model is philosophically classical (or 
antl-Keyneslan) in the sense that the supply side determines output. 
The dIsequIlibrium labour market determines the actual employment at 
the minimum of demand and supply. This in turn determines actual 
output, which Is exactly absorbed either as consumption or capital 
accumulation. This story is clearly what Keynes and his "faithful" 
followers attack. TIlls may seem paradoxical because disequilibrium 
macroeconomic models are praised mainly because they claim to be the 
restoration of "Keynes"s economics" as opposed to "Keynesian 
economics". The present disequilibrium growth model is a hybrid of a 
neoclassical growth theory and a disequilibrium macroeconomic model, 
and the anti-Keynesian nature 1s inherited from neoclassical growth 
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theory". However, my analysis presented in section 4 shows how to 
combine short run macroeconomic features of effective demand theory 
with the postulates of long run growth theory to produce a 
-Keynesian" disequilIbrium growth model. 
Finally, a few brief words summarising the general findings of 
this chapter. The full employment model of growth integrates income 
distributional parameters with a standard neoclassical framework. As 
expected, under fairly general conditions, both local and global 
stability can be proved. Thus its dynamic characteristics are similar 
to usual one sector growth models. 
On the other hand models of unemployment have distinctly 
different characteristics depending on whether they are classical or 
Keynesian in nature. This accords with the view in the static 
literature (Ma1invaud (1977». The adjustment processes and 
consequently the conclusions are essentially different. 
In a world of classical unemployment wage rate is higher than 
market clearing equilibrium and this causes excess supply of labour. 
The dynamic model therefore postulates that wage adjustments take 
place to clear the labour market. Stability conditions crucially 
depend on adjustment of price variables and rapid changes usually 
stabilise the system. As Dixit (1976) says, "In all these models 
rapid adjustment of prices in response to disequilibria is 
s tab ill si ng " • 
Keyneslan unemployment is radically different. Even within the 
short run framework of temporary equilibrium, stability is not easily 
achievable. Rather stringent conditions are needed to get equilibrium 
1n the short term. Given that temporary equilibrium is attained, the 
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stability conditions of the growth model reveals interesting 
differences from classical unemployment depending on investor 
behaviour. 
Given the structural differences, we believe that different 
types of unemploment have to be modelled separately. Both theoretical 
results and policy conclusions will be radically different depending 
on the regime the economy is on. When there is regime switching from 
one form of unemployment to another (from classical to Keynesian for 
example) a general disequilibrium theory becomes necessary. This must 
be a subject of future research. 
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APPf],DIX 
It may seem necessary lo adjust our basic definitional equation 
(1) (2), determlnin~ distribution of income and saving investment 
equality (ex post), to take account of unemployment, when labour 
em~loyed is less than labour force. But there is no need to change 
equa~lons (1) (2) and we can readily demonstrate this. 
Suppose output is distributed among wage earners (employees) and 
rental earners. Thus 
(44) 
- w + r K • f (k) 
-d L 
(l ') 
where k • K Id 
Let there be a lump sum tax on wage income and profit income denoted 
by Tw and Tr • Suppose a fixed social security (unemployment) benefit 
i. paid out by the Government to unemployed workers. Let us call it 
c. We assu~ that this amount C is totally consumed. Then 
equilIbrium 1n national accounts implies 
y - c (wLd-T ) + C (rK-T ) + C + I + G w w r r (45) 
where (c c ) are the consumption propensities and (wLd-T ) and (rK-T ) 
w r w r 
are the disposable incomes of the two groups. 
Equating (44) and (45) we get 
I + G + C - c T - c T • s wLd + S rK w w r r w r 
- 5 • r 
If now ~overnment ex~enditure is fixed such that 
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then we have 
I • s wL + s rK w r 
I s w + s r K 
-d - w r 'Ld L 
(46) 
i • s w + s rk w r (2' ) 
for both unemploymen: models. Equations (1') (2') are exactly the 
same as (1) and (2). 
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Chapter VI 
Crowth in the Open Econo~y 
I S S 
DAGAAB 
Section 1: Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to study the behaviour of the real 
exchAnge rate And ~ndogenous capital formation in a macro-economic 
growth model of a small open economy. The analysis focuses on the 
dynamIc movement of the real exchange rate as growth takes place In 
the open economy. We are also concerned with the eftect of 
contractionary (or expansionary) monetary policy on steady state 
vaiueS of the exchange rate. Our major interest. however. is In the 
dIsequIlibrium behavIour of the economy as it moves from one long run 
equilibrium to another in response to policy shocks. We therefore 
analyse in detaIl the transition paths of investment and exchan~e 
rates as they respond to new values of policy parameters. 
In the Atandard "trade and ~rowth" literature (Kemo (1969). 
Chacoliades (1978). the real eXChange rate (identified with the 
terms of trade) Is ~enerally assumed fixed (given by internatIonal 
prices) and exogenous to the small economy. Its internal dynamics are 
thus neglected and problems related to Its appreciation or 
depreciation are not fully stud.led. Further. full employment of both 
capital and labour always prevails and this seemS to be a general 
weakness of the pure theories of international trade. However. 
capital growth Is taken to be endogenous. and this characteristic is 
an useful one. 
A second Important development in the area comes from the 
IMcroeconomic models of the open economy recently studied In great 
d~pth by Oorn~18ch (19768. 1976b). Branson (1979). Buiter and Miller 
(19!Jl) and m",ny olhl!Cs. These models are characterised by a rich 
analysl. of ~he monet.ry asset structure of the economy (both internal 
and ex~ern .. l) •• n .mnh.uis On the h .• lance of oayments oroblem and a 
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detalled R~lIdy of the short run "overshoot!n~" cl. the real exchange 
rate (wi~h respect to its equilibrium value), in response to policy 
shocks. Given the complexity of these models, it is understand~ble 
that considerations of economic growth are left out in the interests 
ot simpl1f icalion. 
A third important strand in the literature has been the 
"dlse'lllil1brium" models where non-market clearing behaviour, quantity 
rationing and spill-over effects are analysed carefully (see Dixit 
(1978) Neary (1980». By their very nature, these models can 
study unemployment in great detail and notice the full implications 
for the real exchan~e rate when markets fail to clear. They also 
bring out to the forefront the important distinction between 
tradeables and non-tradeables. EmPhasising the fix price approach, 
thls method of analysis does not deal with dynamics in a rigorous way. 
Kouri (1979)1 has recently proposed a model which brings together 
some of the important features of the different developments noted 
earlier. In his analysis, the real exchange rate Is endogenous and 
its dynamic movements have important bearing on capital formation, 
which itself is determined endogenously within a growth model. 
Our analysis extends the Kouri model and establishes a more 
general tramework to study the dynamics of real exchange rates and 
growth. It is characterised by three major features: 
(1) capital stock is endo~enously determined through the 
working of an investment function; 
(li) the ~ffectR of policy shocks on Investment and exchange rate 
are analysed, in particular their behaviour on the 
trAnsItional p~th prIor to reaching long run equl11br!u~; 
(111) \lnf'mrloytnt>llt lA exrllc1tly introduced and the impl1cII:.lon 
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ot quantIty rationing In varIous markets Is dIscussed. 
Thus we bring together important characteristics of the three 
approaches to the analysis of a small open economy. In this resoect 
we propose a partial synthesis of dIfferent aspects of the literature. 
It must be noted, however, that our primary concern (as in Kouri 
(1979» is to study the features of an open growth model. Thus 
relative price distortions, over-valuation (or under-valuation) of the 
exchange rate, etc., will be important insofar as it affects the 
carital stock (and the growth rate) of the economy. The balance of 
payments problem which has been extensively studIed elsewhere, is 
relegated to a secondary issue in this Daper. 
In Section 2 we present the basic growth model and show the 
dynamic behaviour of capital stock and real exchange rate. A steady 
state equILIbrium Is defined and shown to be both locally and globally 
stable. In the next section adjustments to policy parameters are 
considered and comparative dynamics as well as transition paths of 
different variables are analysed. Section 4 concludes with ideas for 
further research. 
Section 2: The Model 
There are two aggregative sectors in the economy, one producin~ a 
tradeable good XT and the other producing a non-tradeable ~ood XN• To 
focus attention on the real exchange rate, we assume that the price of 
tradeable good (PT) is fixed in the world market in terms of an 
international currency. say the dollar. Then the domestic currency 
price of tradeable! is (PT' where t Is the exchange rate (t e~ressed 
as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. e.~. I./S). This is 
a reasonable assumption to make in the contex:; of a small open 
! 
158 
DAGAAB 
economy, which does not have the power to intluence world prices2 • 
The following notations will be used from now on: 
£: the exchange rate 1./$, the number d i' s per unit of foreign 
currency 
9 XT: supply of tradeable good 
X~: demand for tradeable good 
PTooE:PT: price of tradeable in domestic currency (t.) 
W: wa~e rate in domestic currency 
KT: capital stock used in the production of tradeabies 
L~: demand for labour in production of tradeables 
X~: supply of non-tradeable good 
x~: demand for non-tradeable good 
PN: price of non-tradeable good in domestic currency 
L~: demand for labour in non-tradeables sector 
c: total consumotion measured in units of non-tradeables 
L8 _Loe
nt : total labour supply changing at the exogenously 
soecif led natural rAte of growth, n 
r T: rate of profit in tradeable goods sector 
Note: for quantity variables XN XT LT LN, a suoerscriot 'd' imolies 
demand, 's' implies supply and no superscript implies ac:ual quan:lty 
transacted. 
The tradeable goods sector has a constant returns to scale 
production function where capital and labour are both required to 
produce output. Thus 
(I) 
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By constan: returns to scale, 
( 2) 
Under competitive assump:ions, the minimum unit cost function ~ is 
given by 
By homogeneity 
Inverting this function we get the factor price frontier 
r T • w(PT/W) 
(w' > 0) 
Substituting 1n (4) 
P 
1 • ~ (~ , W ( 2: » 
PT W 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
(6) 
By "Shepherds Lemma", we can differentiate the cost function + to 
get the ootimal factor/outout ratio. Thus 
~ 
• +l(l/PT!W, w(PT/W» 
XS T 
(7) 
and 
KT 
• ~2(1!PT!W, W(PT!W» 
Xl 
T 
(8) 
(where~l is the Ithparthl derivative of ~). 
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Using (7). (8) in (2) we ~et 
X; - x(PT/W)1C.r 
From (7). (9). 
It is easy to derive the signs of 
x' - 3x/3(PT/W) > 0 
l' - 3t/3(PT/W) > 0 
nAGAAB 
(9) 
(IO) 
We assume that the economy Is "small" In the sense that all its 
tradeable output can be sold (either at home or abroad). Further the 
tradeable sector has no constraint in getting labour from the 
homogenous labour force. Thus. in case of excess demand for labour 
(over full employment), it is the non-tradeables sector which has to 
be rationed in its requirement for labour. Armed with these two 
assumptions, we can now drop the superscripts (d,s) and note 
x -T x(PT/W)KT 
l(PT/W)KT 
(9)' 
(10)' 
Given the value of PT (alternatively £ and PT) and W, the tradeable 
sector determines its output/capItal and outout/labour ra:i09 through 
( 9)· a od (1 0) , • 
We now ~\lrn our 8ttention to the non-tradeabie sector. Assume 
~h3t capital is used ~ in the tradeable sector. Further, caoltal 
accumulation 1s achieved by using tradeable goods alone or imoortin~ 
from abroAd. Given labour lA the only fact.or 0{ oroductlon for 
noo-~r8deables. we have a homO~l!n01l6 of de~ree 1 product10n funct (on. 
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Labour productivity XN/LN - F(l) is a constant. Inverting (11) we get 
GI > 0 (12) 
Note that 
(13) 
The supply ~ output in the non-tradeable sector is determined by 
its eftective demand. Thus we may have X~ • ~ • ~, where XN is the 
actual amount transactd. It should be clear that thIs 15 only 
consistent in an equilibrium situation. For a disequilibrium system, 
there may be excess effective demand or excess effective suoply or 
goods. We would then need obviously a rationing rule, for examole 
d s X • min(X X). However, as we shall show later, the model will ~ N' N 
take care of disequilibrium in the goods market and we need not worry 
about the problem. The Important disequilibrium that we shall face 
will be in the labour market where unemployment and over full 
employment will have to be analysed In detail. 
The analysis of the model henceforth will be conducted In two 
stages. Flrstly, we shall assume market clearing equilibrium and 
derive dynamic equations consistent with that equilibrium. At the 
second stage we relax this condItion and study the implIcations of 
disequilibrium. 
Assume 8 classical saving function such that all wage income is 
consumt!d and all profIt income saved. Then 
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Further, le~ us SUllpose that h Is the propor~Ion of total consumptIon 
C spen:: on non-tradeables. ObvIously h • h(PT/P~). Theretore, 
The system is completed by the unIt cost function of the non-tradeable 
(16) 
Civen the nominal wage W, the firm sets price at PN• 
The folLowing results whIch follow from the properties of the 
production and cost functions will be useful later on. 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
( 20) 
The implications of the relative price variables must be spelt 
ou: • By vi rtue of the simple cost function (16) , the real wage in 
terms of non-tradeables W/PN is a constant. However, real wage in 
terms of tradeables W/PT is a crucial variable whose analysis Is the 
focal point of this paper. For a given PT' the ual exc:bacll8 rat. 
On terms of unitl of non-tradeables) is given by PT/PN • EPT/PN• 
Alternlltively, we can 8ay that the real exchan~e rate is equal to E/PN 
(1n terms ot non-tradeables) or t/W (1n terms of labour). ~ote that 
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by equa:ion (19). the index of real exchange rate PT/PN Is 
pr~)or:ional to the real wage rate. Further. the real wage rate In 
terms of tradeables 18 itself Inversely related to the real eXChange 
rate. Thus a rise in PT/W implies a decline in real wage as well as 
an appreciation of the real exchange. 
Using (14). (15). (17). (18). (19). we ge t 
x • N PT. 1 
nO)(l-h( 
W no) 
(where X' > 0) 
The total demand for labour is then 
(,' > 0) 
) ] 
(21) 
( 22) 
Labour supply Is assumed to be LS • Loent • Therefore. for equilibrium 
In the labour market 
or 
L' • '" ( P TI W) KT 
KT 
kT • - • L8 H PT/W) 
( 23) 
( 24) 
Since tradeables alone use capital. ~ Is the total capital stock 
in the economy per head of la bour force. To slmo Ilf y notat Ion. write 
k - k T a od r • P T/ W • The n from (2 4 >. k • 1/ 'P ( p ). (d kid P < 0). 
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Inverting this function ~ can get 
p-t(k) (t' < 0) (25) 
The f relation shows full elllployment of labour and is depicted in 
Figure 6.1. 
Let u8 turn our attention now to disequilibrium behaviour. 
DACAAB 
First, the labour market. It Is easy to demonstrate that below f(k), 
the economy has excess supply of labour and above it has excess 
demand. The dynamic behaviour of p when the economy is not 1n full 
employment equilibrium is given by the following differential equation 
p • A(f(k)-pJ (26) 
~~en there is excess supply of labour, f(k) > p and real wage rate 
W/PT falls, thus p • PT/W rises (0 > 0). The opposite happens for 
excess demand. 
Turning to the goods markets, we can show that the possibility of 
disequiUbrium is ruled out by the structure of the model. Note that 
the tradeable sector faces no constraints since It can sell its output 
to the world market and has a first preference in the market for 
non-market clearing regimes and we have to look at the different 
alternatIves. 
First consider the case of excess supply of labour such that t d < 
LS • Th~n by • slmole rationIng rule (Malinvaud (1977» actual labour 
In both 8~c:ors are gIven by labour demand, i.e. 
L • mln (Ld , L8 ) • Ld and LN • L~. 
Equation (21) determineR the demand for non-:;radeables. Since 
there L~ no r.tlonln~ In firms r~qulremen: for labour and labour Ls 
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the only factor of production, any demand for output can be met. Thus 
Xl _ Xd and from (11), (12) we can determine the output of N N 
non-tradeables. The relevant dia~ram is self-explanatory, see Figure 
6.2. 
The problem Is more complicated when there is excess demand for 
labour. SInce L - mln(Ld , LS ) - LS and the tradeable sector is not 
rationed, it is clear that the non-tradeable sector will face quantity 
constraints in its demand for labour. ~e have 
( 27) 
Thus the maximum output that can be supplied Is from (11), 
(28) 
By homogeneity 
(29) 
Since employment is equal to labour supply, the amount of 
consumption 
From (15), 
usln)( (30), 
x~ • h(PT!P N){ W )L8 PN 
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( 30) 
(31 ) 
(32) 
F com (14). (1 5). (17) 
SInce FN(l).CN(l) - 1 from (13), 
hL.s - (Ls -Lr)F(1) 
GN(l) 
FrOt1l (20), (29), (32), (35) 
lJAGAAB 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
ThuR In the case of over full employment (excess demand for labour) 
the goods market is in equilibrium :00. 
We have demonstrated that only the labour marke: can be in 
dIsequilibrium. The non-tradeable goods sector will always have 
effective demand equal to effective supoly. Thus -Keyneslan-
·ClassIcal" cases of MalInvaud (1977) need not be distinguished in 
thls model. 
We now turn mlr attention to capital accumulation and growth. 
Followln~ conventIon, labour supply is assumed to grow exogenously at 
ra~e n 
L" - L e"l o (37) 
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The per C~01tA investment function is given by 
(38) 
Inves~ment or capital accumulation in the economy) is dependent on the 
rate of profit r T and the rate of interest r*. The rate of profit 
represents the internal rate of return .... hHe rate of interest is a 
proxy for the ~ cl borrowing funds. Clearly the amount of 
inves~ment is negatively related to the rate of interest. 1t 
The m4jor policy variable in our model is the rate of interest 
r*. Government monetary policy determInes r* and the dynamics of the 
model are analysed on the basis of this given policy parameter. 
Obviously • contractionary monetary policy increases r* and an 
expansionary monetary polIcy reduces it. 
Since k 
- K-r/L8 
• 
• KT La 
k --
k KT L8 
From (37), (38) 
• 
k • I(rT, r*) - nk (39) 
Using (5) 
k - 1(11(0), r*) - nk (40) 
The o~her dynamic equation can be re-written now 
p .A[f(k) -pI (41) 
tqu;,:lonll (40), (41) to~et.her give the behaviour of our growth model 
and the! dynamic m()vemen~. ot canital stock (k) and the real exchange 
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rate (p). 
It can be easily verified tha: 
3k • I 'If' > 0 a le. • -n < 0 
dp ~ 
• op • 
->. < 0 ao • >'t' < 0 (42) 
ap ~ 
~ \. • n do I' a f' < 0 dk. k-o l'W' > 0 dk p.O 
Using information In (42), the phase diagram 15 given in Figure 
6.3. 
Local stability at steady state equilibrium (p. Ie.*) 15 easily 
verified by forming the Jacobean 
J • 
[
_n 
>. f • 
( 43) 
and noting that 
trace J - -).-n < 0 
de t J • ). n-Af • I 'w' > 0 
(evaluated at steady state). 
However, an even stronger stability result can be proved. Using 
Olech's Theorem we can show that our model is globally stable. 
Olech'. Theorem states that for ~ points in the (P.Ie.) plane, the 
tollowing three conditions are suffident for .&..!.~ stabillty: 
(1) tract! J < 0 
(11) det J > 0 
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~1ther the product of diagonal or off d!a~onal terms must 
be non-zero. 
(~ote tha~ these condItions must hold for ~ p, k and not only for 
p*, k*). 
Looking at the Jacobean 1: is seen that for all values of the 
var!ables 
trace J - -n-A > 0 
de: J - A n-Af '1 '.' > 0 
and product of diagonal terms An > O. 
Thus, by Olech, global stabllity is assured. 
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S~ctlon 3: ComnArAtive Dynamics and Transitional Paths 
In the previous section we have analysed a grow~h model of an 
open economy, whlch tries to explain the behaviour of caoital stock 
and real exchange rate over time. The major policy variable in the 
model Is the rate of Interest r*. We would now like to consider the 
ettects ot chan~lng r* by monetary authorities. and study comparative 
dynamics properties as well as transitional paths when the economy 
moves trom one steady state equIlibrium to another. The model is not 
suited for a proper analysis of demand management through fiscal 
policy since the goods markets always clear. However, government 
policy on the "supply side" which stimulates capital formation can 
easily be Incorporated. 
FIrstly. consIder the effect of a contractionary monetary policy 
which Increase~ rate of interest r*. From (40). keeping p at any 
predetermined level and for k - O. taking total differentials, 
12dr*-ndk - 0 
or 
-- < 0 
k-O n 
Theretore, the curve k - 0 shifts leftwards as in FIgure 6.4. 
Comp.rln~ the two steady sta~e equilIbrla El and E2 it Is clear 
thAt there Is an increase in real exchange rate p, a decrease In the 
real w~~e rate W/PT (In terms ot tradeables). a decrease In the 
realtive price ot non-tradeables PH/PT and a decrease in capitAL stock 
per capita in the tradeables sector and thus In the whole economy. 
Even though competitiveness rises In the lon~ run, the economy Is 
unAbl~ to tAk~ 8dvAntA~e of a cheaper domest1c currency and gener~l 
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det 14:ion. Thus its capital stock per head of labour declines. ThIs 
may be likened to a case of de-industrialisation. where contractlonary 
poUcy reduces caoital and productivity In export goods In soite of an 
improvement In int.ernational competItiveness. Signalled by a rising 
real exchange rate. One possible transitional path is given by the 
dotted line in the previous diagram. moving from El to E2. 
Let us now turn to government parametrIc changes emanating from 
the supply side. which has the effect of encouraging capital formation 
In the tradeables sector. These may take various forms - creation of 
enterprise tones. help from the Export Credit Guarantee Department. 
reduction of export duties. openIng up new IMrkets. etc. If It 
affects the form of the investment function IC.). then KK will shift 
rIghtwards and steady state equIlibrium value of caoital stock k will 
rise whIle the exchange rate falls. It is more likely. however. that 
~overnment policy will affect the structure ot production per se so 
that capital lnt.ensity of output will rise. An increase in the 
capital output ratIo will move the LL curve rightwards. For any given 
r. more capital intensive methods are encouraged and this increases k 
on the k • 0 line. (see Figure 6.5). 
It IR clear that In the new steady state E3. both the caoital per 
capita and real exchan~e rate are high compared to El. Thus the 
economy has hl~h profitability and can take full advantage of an 
improvement in international competitiveness to produce more tradeable 
output as well AS have more investment. 
\"I., wouLd now Hke to study the movement of variables alon~ the 
trAnsItion oath from one equilibrium to another more formally. To set 
the frHmework. consider a simultaneous oPeration of a con:ractionary 
monetary polIcy (IncreaRe In r*) and 8 suppLy side ~tImulus 
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(encoura~ln~ capital torma:lon). SUDPose KK moves leftwards and Lt 
moves rightward~ so that p unambiguously rIses. Let us assume that 
the eq,d l1br!um capital stock k* remains unchan~ed so that government 
roUcy is nt'lItral in the long run (this is not strIctly necessary but 
is a u~etul device to concentrate only on the transition path and not 
to worry about the position of equilibrium). The next diagram below 
(Figure 6.~) shows theAe changes. Note that the transitional oath may 
tollow the dotted line E1DE2. Specifically, it is important to see 
that along this path k(t) < k*. 
From the expression of Jacobean, (43) we derive the 
characteristic equation 
0 2 - o(~+nJ + (~n-H 'Iln) - 0 (44) 
where 0 is the ch3racteristlc root. We can write (44) as 
A(a,r*) - 02-a(~+n] + (~n-).f 'Iln'] - 0 (45) 
Fro~ stability conditions we know that there are two values of 0 and 
both are negative. We consider the dominant characteristIc root, i.e. 
the one with the hi~her .• b801ute value. 
The dynamic path of the variables will be determined by the 
behaviour of Q. Thus if we wish to study the effects of r* on the 
transitional path of k(t) as it approaches equilibrium, we need to 
find the sign of da/dr*. From (45) 
-dA 
da 'd7* 
Tr* - ah 
~ 
Ohserve thnt when Q • 
-- • 
A(--. r*) - +-. 
(46) 
ThUS, for a given r*, A can 
~ rc.'pr"IC","ted hy the curve! shown in Flr,ure 6.7. 
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a1 and a2 Are the vAlues ot char~cteristic root, i.e. the solution of 
A(a,r*) • O. Note that at the dominant root a - al, 3A/3a < O. Thus 
the si~n ot da/dr* is the same as the sign of 3A/3r*. 
To get specific results at this point we have to give some 
additIonal structure to the most general form of the investment 
function used up t111 now. We assume that IT/Ls - l(rT, r*) (see 
equation (3~» can he written as 
where 
l(r -r*) T 
a I > 0, 
rr-; al < 0, thus I' > O. Further IN < O. ~ 
(This form has been rationalised in Kouri (1979». 
Then (45) becomes: 
A(a,r*) -a2-a[).+nJ + [).n-).f"I'fl'J 
and aA - ~t'I"n' > 0 
'dr* 
Therefore do > 0 
d"'r* 
(47) 
( 48) 
(49) 
Inequality (49) implies that as r* rises, a rises, I.e. (-a) falls. 
We know that 
k(t) - k* - (ko-k*)ea : 
DIfferenLlatln~ w.r.t. time 
- a(k(t)-k*) 
• (-<l)(k*-k(t» (50) 
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I:; has already been shown thAt k* > k(t). Theretore as r* rises and 
(-a) taIls, k falls. Thus investment falls along the time oath of 
transitIon as (k,p) approach the new s:;eady state equilibrium. 
We have demonstrated a rather strong result. Contractionary 
monetary polIcy reduces the equilibrium capital labour ratio of a 
growIng open economy. However, even if expansionary "real" Dolicies 
are used to counteract the e~fects of contraction and ultImately there 
is lon~ run neutrality (equilibrium k* remains the same). the economy 
will .:ill sufter. Along the whole transition patb from one steady 
state to another, Investment will be lower if the interest rate is 
raised. 
Section 4:·Conclu.lon 
To conclude brIefly, the foregoing analysis has allowed us to 
understand the dynamics of real exchange rate movements In a Simple 
growth model with endogenous CApital formation. The fundamental 
objectives of the paper have been threefold. Firstly, to integrate 
some of the important issues in a study of macro open economies. 
namely unemployment (or over full employment), growth and exchange 
rates. Secondly, we have shown explicitly the disequilIbrium 
behaviour of the economy as it moves along the traverse from one 
steady state equilibrium to another. Thirdly, the ettects of economic 
policy on the equilibrium values of varIables as well as their 
transition paths have been analysed. In particular, we have seen the 
ef f ect ot "S\lpP ly sIde" changes In the form of ~overnments trying to 
Increase the capital stock of the economy. 
It: may b~ e~ha~ised lhA~ contractlonary monetary Dolicy has a 
unHormly h4lrmtul ettect on inves~men!: alon~ the whole transi:'10n pa:.h 
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even ~hou~h steady state capitAl stock may be h!~her due to 
au~horltLest efforts ln caoltal formation. Thus the time Deriod taken 
~o move from one eqllillbrIum to another is longer when the interest 
rate is pushed upwards. The model clearly demonstrates that a 
~overnmen: dedicated to a contractionary monetary polIcy will reduce 
~he grow~h rate of capital even though it may try to help directly to 
stimulate investment. 
Footnot~8 
The reterence for Kouri Is 
PENTTI KOURI (1979), "ProfitabIlity and growth in a small 
ooen economy" in A Llndbeck (ed), Inflation-and. emDloyment 
1n Open EcoQomies, North-Holland 
2 Alternatively one can assume an exogenously soeclfied growth rate 
of PT such that Pr - Peeti Without loss of generality we aSSume 
8 • O. 
3 Rememb~r that only the trRdeabl~ sector uses capital in the 
production process. 
4 For further justlflcations, See Kourl (1979) 
• 
17~ 
l' 
Ex C4'i ~ ~~frl'f 
c { , o-bt)~ ..... 
~ )( CA.. ~ So c.l" ""t"'-v-A 
{......... I C:O-h 0 ""-r 
177 
k 
'vJ Ip 
I N 
I 
I 'L~ , ,... 
178 
~(\..r:J' ",cd p ru,l....J-
:: r~ .... c-jct. ~~ 
L • ~:o 
K. 
r 
.. ~ p 
t., 
L 
.. 
k. k 
179 
K 
K 
L 
• k. • • k 
~o "4 
180 
L 
L 
k 
181 
I 
L. 
L 
.,. 
r loo - - - - -
182 
, 
K 
K 
L 
-g() o 
183 
ReferE'ncE'S 
Branson, W.". (1979), "Exchange rate dynamics and monetary policy", 
In A. Lindbeck, (ed) Inflation and Employment in Open Economies 
(Sorth Holland, Amsterdam). 
Bulter, w.n. And M1l1er, M. (1981), "Monetary policy and 
lntern~tlonal competitiveness", Oxford Economic Papers. 
018coliadc8, M. (1978), International Trade Theory and Policy, 
(!'tcCraw-II111 Kogakusha, Tokyo) 
Dixit, A.K. (1978), "The balance of trade in a model of temporary 
equilibrium", Review of Economic Studies. 
Dornbu8ch, R. (1976a), "Expectations and exchange rate dynamics". 
Dornbusch, R. (l976b), "Exchange rate expectations and monetary 
policy", Journal of Jnternational Economics. 
Kemp, M.C. (1969), The Pure !heory of International Trade, (Prentice 
Hall, Englewood, N.J.). 
Kouri, P. (1979), "Profitability and growth in a 8mall open economy", 
In A. Llndbeck (ed), Inflation and Employment ~ Open 
~conomie8, (North Holland, Amsterdam). 
Neary, J.P. (1980), "Non-traded goods and the balance of trade in a 
n~o-Keyne8ian temporary equilibrium", ~terly 
Journal of Economics. 
-----
184 
Chapter VII 
A Monetary Crowth Model 
185 
DAFAAF 
!\ .. ("~1on I: Introdll("~1on 
The proposl~lon ~h ... ~ money i~ neu~r<ll has a long and respec~able 
h!!it.ory 1n m;icr(wconomlcs. raUnkln (1965) showed :;ha: monetary 
policy h,u no red dtec~H In a st,atic equilibrium model. S1drauski 
(1967) prov~d, In th~ context of a perfect foresl~ht growth model with 
lIIoney, that. money is superncutral, 1n the sense that a change in the 
~row:'h rAte ot mon~y wIll not aftect steady state values of real 
varlabl"'R. The ratIonal expectation literature (hereafter called RE) 
clalm~ once "~Aln thAt systematic and oerfectly an~1cipated monetary 
polcy has no effect. on output provided expectations are held 
ration.,lly. 
1l00000cver, monct.ary ~row~h models (hereat ~er called MG) of Tobin 
(1965) And others, do not ~et strong superneutrality results. in 
y,eneral. MAny ot these models assume perfec: foresight. which In the 
absence ot unc~rtalnty or in steady state, Is equivalent to RE. It is 
a ~:.ter of consIderable theoretical interest why RE and MG models 
make 8lmllar 8ssumot1ons reRardin~ the formation of expectations. yet 
come ou:. wIth radically ditterent conclusions regarding neutrality. 
H .• hn (1980) hu recent ly pointed out that t.he fundamental 
dHterence he:'wel'n R~:-8:'ruct\lral neutrality propositions and others 
may be t.he nlSture of eqlllUbrlum analysed and the possible existence 
of "'ll~lrle equI11brh. Ehl'where I have shown (Sen (1980» tha: 
neutullty prol1os1:10n!4 derend no: on the assumll:ions of RE per se 
bll:' on ~he type ot non-W.llrAshn equlllbrium one postulates. However, 
even wIthIn the limIted score of mArket clearIng equilIbrium models, 
tha:' bo:.h R~: and Mr. theories share In common, they have diametrically 
opPolll:'e conc1U!lil1IlS r~~ .. r<11")-~ t.he effectiveness ot perfectly 
alltlcLra~t'd IIkllletary po Hey, whIle ITktklnr, slm1 1.1 r assump:: ions 
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In a recen~ raper Be~~ (1980) has ra!sed this imoortant issue by 
an lntere .. t.!n~ comllarison of these two theorIes. He claims that the 
essential difterence between RE and MG models and their neutrality 
conclusion~ lIes in the absence (or presence) of real balance effects. 
Rational expectat10nR mod~ls typically ignore the role of real money 
b~lance in a~~reR8te demAnd and ~et neutrality. Growth models with 
money stress this role and get non-neutrality. 
It is difficult to accept that a fundamental division in the 
pollcy lllerature is based on a relatively minor issue, such as the 
exi!'ltence ot real b",lance effects. Moreover, there are important 
models of neu::ral1ly Which do assume real balance effects and perfect: 
toresl~ht - yet ~et neutrai money. Consider Patinkin (1965) where 
real balance effects are crucial in analysing existence and stability 
of non-ne~at1ve solutions. There is no explicit expectations 
~eneratin~ Itl?chanism bllt the dynamics of the model imply that 
8~ent9 have perfect foresi~ht. In spite of the crucial role of real 
ha lances, money 18 neut ral. In S1d rauski (1967), a~grega te households 
m~ximlse an intertemporal utility function 
J • J 
o 
- " •. e ~u(c, m)dt 
where c 18 per capIta consumption and m per capita real balance) 
subject to 8 b\ld~et cl)nstralnt. I:: is assumed that u12 ~ 0, u21 ~ o. 
Thus the s:ock of real bAlance does atteet consumption decisions. 
Civen pertect toresl~h~ and the existence of real b~lance effects. 
money is proved t.o he supernellt.ral. 
Tht'l4e two tn<..,de ls in the nl:'u:; r ... U ty 11 teraturl! alert uS to the 
t act thAt pxlRt.t'llct' ot rt'111 b:tlance In ar.~re~a:;e E'Xflenditure functions 
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In.JY no~ tlc a .. crue!:,l .1S Bt'~~~ sug~ests. l.'e oropose that the 
dlrtert'IH'(O bt':'wel'n r,,:.10nal expec:,a:.ions models and ~row:.h models wi:.h 
mont'y are more tund.lmental. The tin;: major difference is that models 
ot neu:.r"l1ty use suitable assumptions to make equilibrium ou:'put: 
indt'oen<i('nt of t.he eXf\t'cted rllte ot Inf latlon. In the first Instance. 
oil chanp,e In the IIn:.lclpated growth rate of money affects the expected 
Inf h:.1on ra:.e which in turn inf luences output. By severing the link 
In this chain. it is easy to derive neutrality propositions. On the 
other hand, models or non-neutrality stress the link in every sIngle 
case. Secondly, R~ models deny portfolio allocatIon by which changes 
1n money cause 1nfla:lon and thereby affect real caoital formation 
::hrou!th the wa1th constraint. MG models on the other hand rely 
heavily on t.he role of int1ation in determinIng optimal choice of real 
balance and capital in a Riven port.tolio (see Dixit (1976». In the 
next stction we show, by takin~ a lar~e number of examples from the 
literature, t.hat. these are the t.wo crucial difterences between 
alternative policy conclusIons. Real balance effects play a minor 
role in the st.ory. 
In the thIrd section we use a monetary growth model to get exact 
anAlytIc 5011l:1on5 to the behavIour of the economy out of steady 
8:'8:.e, cons~qllen:. ::0 chan~~es In money stock. It is shown tha: ~,!f 
money III flullerneut.ral, ra:.e of investment wIll be different for 
different v:tlues of ~row:'h rate of money. Thus even supernell:'ral and 
tll1ly 8ntlclp8t~d money ha~ real etfects In disequilibrium. The exact 
nature of thls chttll~e iR fleen to depend on real f actors. Section 4 
dlI1CIl!'l!H~!'l ... monetAry dllH'qullIbrium model where markets may not clear. 
The f1n ... 1 sec:.1on conclud~s. 
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2. R~tlon~l Exn~cLRtlon~ And Monetary Growth. Models Comoared 
A sl1)thtly modit led version ot the RE-neuLrallty model by SargenL 
and ~~llacc (1975) is t,ivcn by 
yS • y • a1k_ 1 + a2(p-pe) + Ul 
yd • Y • blk_1 + b2X + b3Q + U2 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(y, k, m, p, pe are lo~arlthms of output, real capital, nominal money 
stock, orlc~ level ~nd expected prIce level; x is the real rate of 
Interest; Q 18 an exo~en~ls vector and u1 are whIte noise terms). 
~qu.tlon (I) Is the "surprise" supply function of Lucas (1973). 
Equation (2) gives the IS relation. equation (3) corresponds to the LM 
schedule and equAtion (4) gives the path ot capital stock over time. 
Note that (P: I - pe) Is an index of the expected rate of Inf lation, ... 
Sar~ent and Wallace have the nominal interest rate 'r' as an 
ar~lIl'!lt!nt. ~e have simply used the relation r - x + (P: 1- pe). 
impllcl: In theIr p"I)er, lo rewrite the func::1ons in terms of x. It 
iill easy now to show that a deterministic money supoly rule is neutral 
provld~d RE hQlds. 
B~RR clAims thAt real balance effects are absent from the 
1I~~r~).! .. te dt>m.1nd curve (2), and it is this assumption whIch ultimately 
p,!vell neutul1ly. In other word~ rewritIng (2) as 
(2' ) 
(b .. > 0), then r~.1l b.11all('es IHe incorporated In the eXllt>ndlture 
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t lInc':.loll ""11.1 money is no lon)(er neutral. However. we must be careful 
':.0 d!s~in~1I1sh be~ween two separa~e (though rela~ed) propositions: 
(1) Weak neutrality - output in the current period is 
independent of changes in money supply; 
(li) Strong neutrality - output in all future periods 
Is independent of current changes in money supply. 
Note that proposition (1) still holds even if real balance effects are 
present And the system to be analysed Is (1). (2'). (3). (4). Given 
RE, (p - pe) is a function of random terms and exogenous processes 
alone. Thus current output is unlnfluenced by changes In the money 
supply, from equation (1). This satisfies weak neutrality. However. 
from (2') real rate of interest x is dependent on money stock 'm'. 
From (4), current capital stock is affected by x and therefore by 'm'. 
Thus output in the next period is int luenced by current capital 
formation. hence by current money supply. 
Cl' ) 
There is a lag In the effectiveness of monetary policy. The strong 
neutrality proposition ceases to hold as soon as (2) is modified to 
incorporate the role of real money balance in aggregate demand. 
Beg~ compares the standard RE model with a simpHf ied monetary 
growth model where 
K· Y(K) - C(Y(K),K,Z) -4>K ( 5) 
Z • HIp • L(Y(K),x(K) + IT) ( 6) 
• 
Z/Z • MIM - pIp - a-IT (7) 
K is capHal stock, Y Is output, C consu~tlon, Z the stock of real 
money t).llance, x the real rate of interest, M is stock of nominal 
money and P the price level. Given perfect foresight actual price 
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1nl lA:. inll I'/r. L" (>'111 .. 1 :'0 expec:'ed price inf la~ion 11. The ra~e of 
~r()w:'h ut mont-'Y "IIPl'ly 19 0. and Is perfectly an::icipa:ed. 
lIl're. ("onsump:lon C dt'pends on real balance Z ~iven C3 t O. 
CO,",1IIrln)t he:,wt'en s:'elldy stAtes. it is shown that a chan~e In 6 wIll 
have r~41 ettec:s In the sense that steady state values of K will be 
afl~c:,ed provldt'd Cl - 0 and l2 t O. If real balance effects do not 
exist (C) • 0) then ~)ney Is superneutral. 
1:. if& diff 1clllt to accept t.he contentIon t.hat t.he basIc 
ditference be:,ween t.hese two s:.rands In the theoretical literature 
deoendli on what IIfter all is an e~l1rlcal mAtter. l-fonetarists have 
OCCAsionally clALmed tha: the divldin~ lIne between their models and 
KeyneslAn ones is An e~llrIcal one dependent 00 values of relevant 
elag:.Iclt1es. In thIs case. tor example. if C3 • O. then monetary 
polIcy is relAtIvely Im(lotent. However. as Hahn (1980) states on the 
effectiveness of interventionist policy. "the dIfference of opinIon is 
really ••••• on a grand scale concerned with what is the most 
approprIA:'e model of the whole economy". One suspects more 
f undamt>nt .. l an .. lytIcal reasons tor rational exPectations and monetary 
grow:.h Rldels to give difterent policy conclUSions, than Simply the 
e)(ls:ence of real balance .ffects. 
We 6\1t!~elt:; that t.h ... f hst TMjor reason for neut.rality of money is 
tha:. the market cl ... arin~ eq'lllibr!um equation for output (y5 _ yd) Is 
mJlde indt!pendt'nt of the rate ot lot latlon, by suitable choIce of 
assumpt1ons. In every !lIngle model thAt claims to have neutrality. 
approprla:.e A~su~ltlon8 are made such tha~ the r~duced form for output 
(yS • yd • y) 18 not Influenced by expected lnflatIon rate n. Since 
~row:'h U:'e ot IfWI\t'y aflects n in the fIrst Ins:ance. and output Is 
Ind",p ... nd ... n~ ut n, antlC!Oftted chJln~e!i in money supply never feeds Into 
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~h,! d«!'~t'rmlnil~lon ot O\l~p\l~. Hence we have neutrality. 
Consider f!rs~ lh~ basIc RE model given by (1),(2),(3),(4). The 
..... sllmp~lon ot ra::lonAl1ly implies that p - pe + v where 'v' Is a white 
noIse term, ind~pendent ot anticipated monetary policy. Therefore 
th..- II)otrt>g,,:.e sllp~)ly ot output (after substituting for (p_pe) in 
equ.,:'ion (I» is no: intluenced by the rate of inflation. Similarly 
In equA:lon (2), the demand for output is made dependent on real rate 
of Interest x and is no: aftected by n or (pe - p ). 
+1 e 
However, when the real balance term is introduced in the 
a~gr~~8:'e demand equation as In (2') then 'ye is a function of Hip or 
(m-p). It can be shown that (m-o) is itself functionally related to 
(P:l- pe), the expected rate of inflation. Solving (1) (2') (3) in 
the three unknowns y. P.x, we get the follOWing reduced form 
expressIon for p: 
(8) 
where: 
J1 • -b2 C2/ D 
J2 - (b~C2 + b2)/D 
Takln~ expecta:,ions of (8), 8ssumlnR rationality and perfectly 
antlclpat~d money sllPply 
(9) 
f runt which 
(l0) 
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From (R) 
(11 ) 
Sub~tltute (10) In (11) and sImplIfy 
.. 
m-p - (P: I - pe)(-JI/J2) • R (12) 
(where R Is a function of R. E(R) and can be ignored for our puroose). 
H.-nee from (12), an index of real balance is uniquely related to 
tne rate of expected price intlatIon. 
Thus, real balance effects 1n (2') is one way of introducing an 
Intlatlon rate term In the function determining output. Its 
importance lles not dlrectly in the role that real money plays In 
4~~re~ate d~mAnd. Rather, 1t 1s a proxy for n which Is the maIn 
vehIcle thro\l~h whIch money growth affects output. This can be seen 
clearly in the tradl tlonal argument about the slope of the 
exoecta:lons 8\1~men:ed Phillips curve. Friedman (1968) sup:gested that 
the relatIonshIp between unemployment (u). expected and actual price 
1ntlatlon should b~ 
P/p-f(u)." ( 13) 
GIven perfect rore91~ht rIp - ". thus feu) - 0 is independent of 
expected prIce Int18tlon. In thIs model of the long run vertIcal 
rhlll1ps curvll, money is neutral. However, taking Solow's (1969) 
specLr lcaUon 
PIp - I (u) + An (14) 
f (\I) - (I-A) It 
1 q 1 
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-I 
u-t (l-A)n) Cl S) 
Chant~eS in perfectly anticipated money supply will influence IT and 
tt1t~reby "ffect unemployment u. Thus money will no~ in ~eneral be 
neutral. 
Finally, let us look at Sidrauski (1967), the most important 
eumple ot sllpern~\J:'rAl1ty in growth models with money. As mentioned 
earlier, real bal3nc~ ettects are present in this model. Assume for 
simplicity :,ha: labour force is constant and SIdrauski's equations 
containing per CAI)ila variables can be rewritten In absolute terms. 
Household!l mAximise an additive utility function over an infinite life 
span. 
-V • f u(ctzt)e-Pt dt 
o 
The production function 15 Yt • F(Kt ). There are three first order 
conditions for an optimal path of which only the households bud~et 
constraint need concern 115 here. We have 
• 
K + Z + C • F(K) + T - zn (16) 
The left hAnd sid~ of (16) ~ives the expenditure side of household's 
• • 
bud~e: wher~ net wealth Is W • K + Z and W • K + Z is the net change 
in wealth. C Is once ap-lIin total consumption. The right hand side 
gives the income which conslsts of output Y plus two other variables. 
T 18 the ra:'e of red money transt ers and -Zll is the capital loss due 
to int lA::lon. 
rht" cruciAl aSliump tlOIl that ensures superneutrallty is that 
T • OZ (17) 
i.e. trallsters are ~lde accordln~ to real cash balance held by 
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hOlI!O('h'lld'i. r\l)~e t.h .. ~ ~he r .. ~e of return by which transfers are 
c.tlculd~('d LA no~ 8n IIrbllrary number such that. T - qZ. Rather growth 
rA:'e of motley 0, de!erm!nes how much transfer households will receive. 
Sllh,,~Lt.ut.in~ (17) in (16) 
K + Z + C • F( K) + (8 -IT)Z (18) 
• 
S!nc~ Z/Z • o-n, We ~et fInally 
• 
K + C • F(K) (19) 
Thus the fInal form of the budget constrain: is indeoendent of nand 
money can ~ shown to be superneutral. ThIs Is In spite of real 
b~lance aff~ctlng ontimal consumotlon. 
It should he clear that models of neutrality invariably use 
assumptions to vet 011: the effects of Inf la::ion on output (or other 
real varIables) and thus stop the channel through whIch monetary 
po U ey can work. Patinkin's model (1965) does not need this 
mechanlAm 81nc~ it has no Intlation rate and IT does not appear in any 
functional form. Thus both Sldrauski (1967) and Patinkin (1965) can 
assume the exiAtence ot real balance effects and simultaneously get 
neutral m()ney. These two conditions coexist since real variables are 
Ind~penden:. of rlt.t! of inflation. 
The opposlte 11 tnlt! of almost all growth models with money as 
Tobin's (19~S) classIc case will show. Tobln does not explicitly 
USUITIl? r ... d blllance effect In expenditure functions. In his model, 
real w~Alth AnJ reAl net disposable income are defined by 
(20) 
• 
Y - F( K, L) - .. K + Z (21) 
• 
Clvt'n re le ,L) • C + ,K + K 
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y • C + K + Z 
• y • C + K + (0 -n ) z (22) 
ThuII ~qu111br1um output Is I!\Itde to depend on rate of inf lation n. 
l'!lln~ money m.uk«!t equlUbr!um conditions, it is shown that a change 
In the ~row~h r~t~ of mon~y 0 will affect output. Money is not 
8ur~rnrutral. Once ,.~~..tn let us stress that this non-neutrality does 
not r~qu1r~ any !:!,PliC' it assu""tion of real balance affect. 
It III safe to presume that real balance effects are neither 
n~c~R5~ry nor 8uttlclen:. by themselves to prove results on neutrality 
or non-neutrality. The tollowln~ table shows this clearly. 
Sar)tent & 
Wd lace 
Tobln 
Sldrauskl 
I{eal balance 
~ffect present 
Supernelltral 
Not superneutral 
Real balance 
eff ect absent 
Neutral 
Non-neutral 
In every .ln~le CAse, the exIstence or otherwise of rate of inflation 
!n the outPut ('qu4tlol1 determInes t.he nAture of policy conclusions. 
Th ... " ... cond Important respect 1n which RE and MC models differ is 
the way th('y tAckle porttoll0 choIce. ConsIder the standard case of 
non Intt"re!lt t>t;'.Hll1~ 1l1<.1l1l'Y dlstrlbured tree of charge. If x is the 
rul Interel'lt rllt" An<1 n the rate ot expected rate of inf laUon, the 
yl~ld on h(,ld!n~ c~p1tHl 18 x + n - r. G1ven total wealt.h, W - K + Z, 
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th(? rlem.1nd for caol:.a1 is a tunctlon of its yield, i.e. K .. K(x+fI), K' 
> O. Thus the d~sir~d ratio ot holding the two assets in a porttolio 
and the demand for real balance are both deoendent on x + rI. We have 
z • W - K(x + IT) • L(x + rI), Lt < o. 
With transactIon demand for money Included one ~ets a standard 
lIquidity preterence function Z - L(Y, x + n) where LZ < o. 
The active role of monetary policy on real variables (in MG 
models) can be seen clearly through the wealth constraint. An 
increase In the growth rate of money increases the rate of inflation 
fi. ThIs reduces the demand for real cash balance and alters the 
portfolio in favour ot capital stock. Alternatively, an increase in IT 
increases the yield and attractiveness of caoital and its demand (and 
supply in equUlbrium) increases. Thus expansionary monetary policy 
Is associated with hI~her steady state value at capital stock. 
The essentIal poInt to remember is that in HG models, the 
expected (and actud) rate of inf lation affects caoital accumulatIon. 
If we look at RE models, however, thIs mechanism Is absent. Equation 
(4) shows that capital stock Is not a function of total yield on 
capI tal (r • x + IT), but only on the real interest rate x. Thus IT is 
con~plcuous by Its absence In the functional torm for caoital stock. 
~ote that the wealth constraint W • K + Z which is an essential 
feature ot ~rowth models is violated too since demand for real balance 
Is a tunction of IT (equation (3» while demand for capital is not. 
Thus RE models deny An important channel through which monetary policy 
Clln b~ eft.ctive, whUe NG models stress Its impor:;ance. 
The portfoll,) choIce-wealth constraInt conduit of monetary ool1cy 
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will he shown to be even more crucIal In a result proved in :he next 
section. ....e show that even .it real balance eftec:s are absent and 
money Is slIperneutral, yet perfectly anticloated changes in money 
growth has real effects out of steady state equilibrium. This result 
crucially depends on L2 ~ 0, i.e. the proper functioning of the wealth 
constraint and porttolio behaviour. 
To sum up, changes in money growth, initially affect the rate of 
expected inflation. If output and caoital accumulation are made 
independent of the inflation rate by suitable assumptions, then money 
is neutral or superneutral. On the other hand, if disposable income 
is suitably detlned or porttolio choice is allowed its prooer role, 
the path of capital and output deoend crucially on rate of change of 
expected prices. Then we get standard non-neutrality conclusions. 
The role of real money balance is relatively perioheral in this 
respect and is just one of many alternative assumotions that gives 
money an l~)ortant role In the economy. 
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S~r~ion 1: Mon~~arv Grow~h Model 
-------~ -
!tu,' simple mon~~ary ~rowth Model tha:,: we prooose eschews the use 
ot real b.llanC'e et{ect~ in the ar,Rre~ate ('onsumo!;ion (demand) func~ion. 
We also impose conditions such tha:.: the model ooeys superneu~rality in 
long run equilibrium. Thus it is made to conform closely to ~he new 
classical s~ruc:ure; the s~ock of real money does no:.: ;ttfec:.: real 
expenditure directly; nor does the growth ra~e of money intluence steady 
or stationary state capital stock. However, in the light d our previous 
discllssion, the rAte of int 18tlon is introduced (1ndlrec~ly) in the 
ar,~rer,ate d~mand function and this, as we shall see. causes real effects 
of munet-sry ch8n~e. Thlls money i8 non-neutral outside of steady state. 
Since the labour torce plays no crucial role in the analysis we assume a 
constant supply ~ labour (which i8 never used uo fully) and i~nore the 
labour ~rket. All attention is tocussed on the behaviour of capital 
stock, investment and, of course, the rate d. inf 15tlon. We also assume 
perfect foresi~ht so tha:.: the actual and expected inflation rates are 
equal. 
The supply ot out.put is a tunction of the capital stock, F(K). 
There is no independent investment function; so net investment is the 
• 
time derivaUve of capital stock. K. Consumption is a function of 
disposable income as well as caoital stock (givIn~ the effect of 
wealth). Disposable income, followln~ Tobin, is defined as aR~re~a:':e 
• 
outPIlt. p1u" the chlln~e in the stock of real money balance (Z). In 
principle, deprecLa~J.on should be netted Oll~ trom dIsposable income but 
this make~ no dlffer~nce lo the fInal results (provided the ra:e of 
d~preclA~ion, ~, ls small, specifically FI(K».) and !s therefore lef~ 
out trom ~hl' conlillmotion function. The equilibrIum in the commodity 
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m~rket Is ~lv~n by, tollowing (5), 
• 
F(K) • K + C + ~K 
or 
• • 
K • F(K) - C(F(K) + Z. K) - ~K (23) 
~e stress the tact that C does no: depend on real balance directly; 
there 15 no real balance effect in ~he sense of Patinkin (1965). 
Honey market equilibrium is characteristed by the equality of the 
demand and sUPDly ot real balance. Thus. 
Z. HIP· L(F(K), x(K) + w) (24) 
where x(K) • F'(K) is the real rate ot interest or marRinal productivity 
ot cap 1 tal (x '<0); fl is both the expected and actual rate of inf lation; 
thus x + fl is th~ nominal interes~ rate. It should be noted that demand 
tor money (L) flhould also, in principle, be made a function of 
disposable Income; eq\Jlltlon (24) shows that L deoends only on F(K). 
This Is only a mAtter ot convenience and tractability; basic results 
remain unchlln~ed but the cost of alRebra becomes larRe. Since the 
central polntN of the chaoter are unconnected with the (income) 
specif iCAtion of the money demAnd function. we take the simpler function 
Stiven hy (24) rather than the following alternative: 
• 
Z • HIP • L (F(K) + Z, x(K) + rI) (24)' 
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finally, trom dptlnl:Lon, 
• 
z - (0 - n)Z (25) 
• 
where e - M/M is th~ ra:e ot ~row:h of money supply, given exo~enously. 
The si~ns of the par::!al derivatives of the func:1ons In (23) 
and (24) are conventional. 
Y' > 0, Cl > 0, C2 > 0, LI > 0, L2 < 0, x' < 0, (26) 
• • 
Long run equilibrium or Slationary state is ~lven by K • Z • O. It is 
* clear that the model has superneutrality since equilibrium K is 
!ndeoendent of 0 and 15 defined by 
(27 ) 
However, our main purpose is to show that the behaviour of K out of long 
run equil1brium 18 crucially int luenced by the money ~rowth parameter 0; 
• 
a fortiori, the rate ot investment (I -K) is also effected by chan~es In 
o on the transition path to stationery state. Thus if the economy Is not 
in full eQllilibrIum monetary policy does have an affect on real 
variaoles such as investm~nl, and hence ~rowth. 
To determine the t'lehaviollr of the vAriables consider first 
equation (24). Takin~ total dltteren:iais, 
(28) 
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wh~re 
(29 ) 
and 
(30) 
• • 
We now need lo analyse lhe two stationaries Z • 0 • K, at steady 
* * state ~quilibrlum Z - Z , K - K • From (25), usIng (29) 
• * 3Z/3K - - zan/az - - Z IL2 > 0 (31 ) 
(2) 
S 1 m 118 rl y, fr om (2 3), a nd 0 1 ) , 
• 
3K/aK • A - (C1BZ*'L2) (33) 
(34) 
where 
(5) 
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In eftec:' the llnc.Hised system, around the equiiihrium, 
• • ~lvrn k • K - K , Z • Z - Z , is the tollowin~: 
k k 
z 
• 
- (Z*/l/l) 
~ote tha:. all partial derivatives are evaluated at 0 - n where 0 Is an 
exoRenous parameter giving money growth. 
To ~et an idea of :he signs ot the characteristic roots 
we need to si~n the determinant ot the Jacobian, /J /. This is 
/JI • (37) 
The t race at the Jacobian mat rix, J, .Is 
trace J - (38) 
Suppose both rools are real. Consider first the case where A > O. 
Then, trom (37), IJ/ > o. Theretore, either both characteristic roots 
are po~iLive or both are ne~Btive. But we note from (38) that trace J 
Is also positive. Thus, at least one root is positive. Hence both 
roo:'~ mlls:' ~e posHive - a totally unstable case. We ne~lec:. the 
possibility of A > O. Consider now the alternative where A may be 
It In Addition [A - (C1BZ*/1/l)] > n. then the trace is 3~a1n 
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posi~lve. A'.. lens:. one charHc:.erisUc roo'.. mus'.. be posi:.ive. But note 
trom (37) '..h~:' '..he determin~nt ot J is n~~a'..!ve for this case. Thus one 
characteristic root is positive while the other is ne~ative. We have a 
saddle point equilibrium. On :he other hand, even If [A - CIBZ*/L21 <0 
and the trace is ne~ative, imolying at least one root to be ne~ative, we 
still have a saddle point equilibrium given IJI < O. The existence ot a 
unique pair ut paths leading to long run eQu!librium, a prooerty common 
to p~rtec:, toresi~h~ mod~ls, is now ~uaranteed. Remember, for 
• 
consistency and stability, A < 0; hence from (33), the sign of oK/oK is 
indet~rminate. 
We are now in a position to draw the phase diagrams. Using 
equations (ll) to (l4), 
(dZ/dK) 1 (39) 
• IK-O 
(dZ/dK)/ • B> 0 (40) 
• Iz-o 
• The slope of the Z • 0 line in the (K, Z) plane is always 
• po~itiv •• The slope ot K • 0 may he positive or ne~8tive. But ~iven that 
• A and 1.2 are both nt'~at.Lve, slope ot K - 0 18 always less than the slooe 
• ~ Z - 0 (fi~e (39) and (40». 
V8in~ (~.3) we no:.e lha'.. when [A - (CIBZ*/L2)] is positive then K 
_ 0 slotH'" upw .. rds. Tht'n the phlHie dla~ram is ~lvt>n by F1~ure 7.1 • 
• Altero",'..ively, K - 0 may slope downwards and we have the phase l1nes 
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shown In FI~ure 7.2. The saddl~ paths are denoted by SS. 
A~ dl~cussed e~rl1er, the model h~s been constraIned to obey 
superneutrallty in 10n~ run equilIbrium. The impact of a change in money 
* ~rowth, 0, falls totally on equilibrIum real balance Z and caoital 
stock in stendy (stationary) state remains unchan~ed. T~is is obvious 
from the definition of steady state: 
(41) 
* * * Z • L(r(K ), x(K » + 0 (42) 
* * (where dK /dO • 0 and (dZ /dO) < 0) 
Since the effect of the rate of in1'lation n has been removed from the 
market c1earin~ condition of output, at steady state (see(4», monetary 
growth has no effect on canita1 stock and a tortiori on outout in lon~ 
run equillbrillm. Chan~es in 0 work via It and this transmission 
mechAnism i8 effectively suppressed. 
" ConsIder now the effect of an unaticlpated chan~e in 0, tirst 
comparing only the two long run eQuil1bria. If the economy is initially 
in steady sta~e at El, (see fl~ures 1.3, 1.4), and 0 falls 
(contfactlonafY monetAry oollcy) then the new lon~ run equilIbrium is at 
E2. Cap!tAI stock Is a "backward looking" staLe variable whose current 
value is ~lv~n by past decisIons And whIch cannot respond to current 
information or parameter changes. The Instantaneous Intlation rate 
(6r/f') 1s, on the other h.1nd, II "t orew.ud lookIng" or "jumo" variable 
which can relipond ranidly to the movement of O. It falls rapidly at a 
fate f.~tef thAn the neW ~rowth rn~e at money. Thus the real value at 
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money hold~f1~~ (Z) rist's lInt.U t.he new equilibrium at. F.2 is reached. Note 
t.hat. the eld!i~t"n('e ot ~he saddle path, or unique trajectory to lon~ run 
t'quUlbrlllm. reQ\I!r~s t.hat. the economy moves raoidly to E2' If the full 
jump. from El to E2, is not made t.hen the new stationary state can never 
* be reached. All other points on the vertical throu~h K are unstable. 
The economic rationale behind the postulated movements should be 
clltritied. There are t.wo assets in this model --- real money balance and 
capital stock. The rational investor wishes to keep both assets in his 
"port.lolio"; capital stock Is required to produce output which gives 
consumption; money balance f aeili tates transactions and has its own 
ut.ility. The pr~)ortion and amounts of the two forms of wealth In his 
port.rolio will dt'pend, at the margin, on the relative rate of return. 
Capital has its own ~1r~inal productivity as well as caoital ~ains from 
inflation. A reduction In money ~rowth is exnected to reduce the rate of 
inf lation: thus the return. at the margIn, of caoital declines relative 
to real money; the holdin~ of the latter asset (real balance) increases 
In the porttolIo. 
Since there are positive returns from the two assets, it is 
expect.ed that positive quantities of both assets will be held by 
ratIonal Investors In their porttolio. GIven the nature of the saddle 
poInt equiHbrium, all paths eXCt!Dt the stable trajectory diverge away 
t rOOl long run equilibrium; t.he fInal outcome is either zero holding of 
c8Pl~81 or real money (unstable oaths always hit the axes in the limit). 
ThIs 18 undesirAble. Thus the 8~~nts in the economy wish to attain long 
* * run equIlIbrium ch~r.cterlsed by positive holdln~ ot K and Z • For an 
unant.1cLJ"Ia~l·d chltn~e in 0, leadin~ to 8 shH t in equilibrium t rom El to 
E2, ~he only way to reAch the new ~t8tionary state (equilibrium) is for 
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tile economy to jumo i.e. rapidly transter financial demand towards the 
hold!np, 01 money. UlIIS reducinR the lnf lation rate tor the a~grega::e 
commoally. 
It should be noted that the jump itself is a response to a 
alscontinu1t.y. The behavioural functions, In the market clearing 
~quilibrium relations tor commodIty and money, represent agents' 
optimIsation. At the point ot Darametric change these equilibrium 
condItions do not apply; hence behavioural demands are not satisfied and 
op:!mal1ty Is vIolated. Though the jUITD per se is not desirable it has 
to be made to attaIn the new equilIbrIum and concomitant optimum 
sItuatIon. Since the jump is not desired for its own sake, the fewer the 
number ot sllch movements and smaller the "length" or amount by which 
varIables have to adjuAt raoidly, the more preferable it is. Thus, in 
thIs case gIven by tI~ures 7.3 and 7.4, the economy will jump only once 
to attain the new long run equilibrium and bridge the discontinuity. 
The toregolng analysiS consIdered an unanticipated and permanent 
change in O. ~e can also analyse the various cases of (a) anticipated 
and permanent, Cb) unanticipated and temporary, as well as (c) 
anticlDllted and temporary parametric shifts. Figures 7.5,7.6,7.7 show 
the dynamIc movements of K and Z for these possibIlities. In each case, 
o falls and the equIlibrIum shitts from El to E2. The basIc points 
remaIn Lnvarianti multiple jumps are undesirablei a smaller jump 1s 
preferr~d to a lar~~r one. 
It the policy tihifl Is an~iclpated and Dermanent, the monetary 
at,thorI:;Lll's may "nnounce lh4lt 0 will chanlZe T1 periods hence, Fi~ure 
7.5 stlOW$ t.ha~ .. sm.1ller jump wIll occur instantaneously from El to F. 
At. r lhf' hw\'t of motion ot I( and Z pertain to the initial equilibrium 
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El. Thus cltPit.ll st(h:k will fAll and real balance rise. I~ will take 
:'h~ econ(~y Tl per'o~s Lo reach the new saddle path S'S' at the point C. 
The shit t in policy parameter now takes place (Tl time periods af ter t.he 
Ini:.lal announcement) and the relavant saddle path tor the new and 
permAnent long run equilibrium (at E2) is clearly S'S'. Capital and real 
balance traverse alon~ this path to move the economy ~owards E2. It is 
importan:' Lo note thA:' capital stock falls and then rises during the 
mov~men:' trom El :'0 E2. Thus We have a business cycle with negative 
investment as the initial response to monetary contraction. 
Similarly analysiS can be done for the two cases when the change 
in 0 is expected and believed to be temoorary. The main motivation of 
the dynamics lies in the efficient traverse of the economy when the 
equilibrium shifts to E2 only temporarily; it is known that the final 
stationary state will be at El. The time period when 0 is lower 
temporarily Is ~iven by T2 in the diagrams. Once again we observe the 
possibility of real business cycle In response to monetary shocks. 
Capital stock falls and rises; net investment is negative and positive; 
all of these OCC~Jr tor a change in the rate of growth of nominal money 
and the correspondIng dynamics of the lnf 18tion rate. 
It 18 cleAr that even under superneutrality. there are qui~e a few 
pO~8ibl11t1~s where monetary shocks have real effects particularly when 
the economy 1. out ot 10n~ run equilibrium. Markets always clear; 
expect.tions are held rationally; announced oolIcy changes are 
perfectly antlclpat~d; yet cyclical behaviour ot capital sto~k conot ~ 
ruled out COn8E'qllt'nt Lo actlvht monerary policy. Real balance effects 
play no direct role 1n the sense of lnt luenc1nji{ a~gr~~ate (consumption) 
dem.1nd. 
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I.t't \IS now return to the tirst and possibly the mos:' important 
case; here :'he ch.1n).~e in 0 is unantic.ioated and known lo be permanent. 
The analysill urtLl now has been confined to transition from one steady 
state to another (see fl~ures 7.3 and 7.4) We would now like to 
investi~ate tormally what happens if initially the economy is no: at 
steady state. Would :.t"le parameter shift in 0 have any effect on the 
transHion of the economy :'0 lu lon~ run equilibrium capital stock? 
Theretore, the economy is, suopose, on the saddle oath SS but not a: 
El' Ra:.e ot grow:.h ot monetary stock, 0, falls and the stock of real 
balance held jU~lS to the corresponding level given by SISt; canital 
stock of course behaves as a state variable given by its inItial level. 
Tt"le tormAl analysis, described below, tells us how investment and 
* capital stock behavlour changes as the economy attains K from the 
Inltial KO (see tigures 7.8) 
Consider the linearised system given by (36). Let the 
characteristic root be A. * Remember that Z is a function of the 
parameter 0 and that all partial derivatives are evaluated at o-n, then 
the characteristic eQuation can be written as a function of A and O. We 
have (see 36) 
We know there are two real and distinct values of A; concentrate 
hencetor:'h on the conver~ent caSe ~iven by A < O. Since 1 characterises 
the pa:'h uf K(L), \o'hf.?r~ L if.; Lime. we need to find how a change in 0 
atfecll A And h.nce K(t). Thus i: is necessary to siRn dA/dO. 
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Fl rs:. '-"! nt'cd t.o prove the followIng: 
Le 111 !'I it : (A - A) < 0 
The charact.erist.ic equa:'ion for the system is (see also (36» 
- 0 
(44) 
(45) 
Thus 
Then, after simpliflC4tion, we have 
< 0 (47) 
The derivation of the si~n of dA /dO proceeds in a number of 
star-es. First we note that 
This can be formally established. We have from the characteristic 
equation, (43), '(A, 0) • 0, 
(49) 
Ob';t.'rvln~ (43), tor 4 ~iven 0, '1'( ..... , 0) > 0 
Further, there is only one neRstive root since the other is positive 
by tUddle point propert!es. Therefore, 3'f/3A < 0, a:. the aporopriate 
(n~g3:'lve) roo:'. The diA~ram (Fi~ur@ 7.9) shows :'his clearly. Given 
3H3A < 0, trom (49) it h clear that 
(50) 
\t'e n('(Od noW Itn ,"xprCHI!'Iion for 3'f/30. 
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I:. is Lmllor:'an:' to rea Use tha:; due :'0 Unear isa~ion we are 
S:'II(fyi"~ the prllperUes ot :'he dynamic sys:.em in a close neighbourhood 
ot eqtdl1brium. Accordin~ly. it Is reasonable to assume that the 
par:.La1 derlv,:.lves of (23) to (25) are Invarian: to changes in 0. 
This Is hy vLr:.ue of linearisation. However 
• • • Z - L(F(K ). x(K ) + 0) 
is Obviously d~pendent on 0 and we get 
• • dZ /dO - B dK /dO + L2 ( 51) 
(where 8 is given by ( 29». 
We are n(~ In a position to derive the value of 3f/30. From 
( 43) 
Fur:'her. (43) can be wrItten 8S 
The f in:. term of tht! RIIS in (53) is negative since). < 0 (stable 
root) and (A - 1) < 0 (by lemma). Hence the second term must be 
oositive. Civen Z > D, 
Comparln~ (54) with (52) We observe 
* .L~n af/aO • .1~n dZ /dO 
VslnR (~O), (~l) and (5~), 
21 1 
(54) 
( 55) 
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Tnis expressIon In ( So) proves the assertIon made earlier in (48) • 
G~ven B) 0, • w need to have both (dK /dO) - o and L2 - 0 to get 
(d>'/dQ)· O. • Alternatively, if either dK /dO ~ 0 or LZ ~ 0, then 
d~ /dO !s not lero. 
t..'e t.herd ore t ind t.hat t.he rate of growth of money stock will 
affect. the stable characteristic root, and hence the dynamic path of 
cAPital st.ock as well 3S t.he economy, provided liquidity preference 
holds (l2 ' 0) or money is not superneutral (steady state caoital is 
attected by monetary ~row:'h and (dK·/dO) # 0). Since our model 
.. presuPpOSes superneuaal1ty, we do indeed have dK /dO - O. However, 
the negat.lvity of L2 allows money growth so atfect capital stock 
outsIde of steady stat.e. We now turn to formalising this relation. 
It. Is clear from (56), given dK·/dO - 0 and L2 < 0, that 
d~ /dO < 0 (57) 
GIven ~ < 0, an increase in 0 wIll raise the absolute value of the 
ne~atlve root ~. Solvln~ for the paths of K we have 
( 58) 
furt.her, 
Given, trom (~8). 
("(0) - K*) - (K(t) - K*)e~t (59) 
• 
K • (-~)(K· - K(t» (60) 
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(wh~re K(O) is An arbitrary Initial value ot capital stock) 
Consider the case where K(t) < K* for any given time period • 
• Thus. on the stable path. Investment I • K is posItive. An increase In 
O. usLn~ (S7), will Increase (-~) ) 0 and thus raise investment (from 
equatIon (fiO). Thus, if investment is positive, the ra::e of 
investment Is taster. hIgher Is the ~rowth rate of money. We have 
therefore d~monstra:ed that even though money growth cannot affect 
Kteady state capItal stock. It can increase investment on the 
tran"Ition ... l path. lIence the economy traverses faster to long run 
equilIbrium. 
We can also formally derive the behaviour of the time path of 
real bAlance Z from (36), 
• 
K • [A - (ClBZ*/L2)][K(t.) - K*] + 
(61 ) 
or usinlt (60). 
[Z(t) - z*) .( [>. - A + (ClBZ*/L2)][K(t) - K*]1I£[CIZ*L2]> 
(62) 
The chAracteristic equation for the system, and (46), tells us that 
[Z(t) - Z*) hag the same siltn 8S K(t) - K*. Thus Z{t) and K{t) move 
In the sa~ direction Rnd the saddle path Is positively sloping. This 
can be verItied by lookln~ at the phase dis~rams. 
Let me summarise. The model assumes superneutrality; thus a 
ch311J.!e in the J1!rowth rate ot money cannot sflect long run capital 
s:.ock, t.hollf!h 1t w111 ch"n~e the stock ot real money balance. However, 
monetltry ~row~h dl)t!1i hltve all t'ftf'ct out of long run equilibrIum even 
it 1t hi utll,ntlclIl4t.t'd. In p"rtiC'ulllr. an unexpected t>ut permanent. 
:2 1 ') 
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"hit ~ in ~ht~ ~row~h rll~e of money will change the rate at which 
inves~mE'nl lAkes pl.ace and th~ speed wi~h which curr~nt capital 
reAchc!i ~he Rta:lonary (steady) state value. If investment is oositive 
then contract.ionary monetary policy will reduce the amount of 
investment and thereby have real effects. The latter are strengthened 
wit.h anticipated and or temporary changes in money growth. These 
movemt·nts end lip in business cycles with capital stock rising and 
rall1n~. All this ha~ been proved without assuming. the presence of the 
8~andard real balanc~ eftect whereby the stock ot real money affects 
ag~re~4le demand. 
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!'f>C"tlon 4: A "1()nE'~ary nl~(>qIl111brlum Model: 
I: lit ot In~(>r('~t to note how the growth model analysed in the 
previous "eoc:ion would chan~e It we introduced disequilibrium 
behaviour -- lor example, by assuming that markets do not clear 
instantaneously and that demand and suoply in some a~gregate marketCs) 
may no: b~ always equal. Once a~ain, let us assume superneutrality and 
concen:rate attention on the transition path out of steady 
(sta:lonary) state. 
tn principle, both the money and the a~gregate commodity market 
m<ly have disequilibrium. Since this is a monetary growth model, we 
assume that 1: is possible for the money market to have 
dlsequillbr!um. Excess supply of money raises the inflation rate in 
monetarist fashion while excess demand for money lowers inflation. We 
also assume that intlation is equal to a "core" rate given by the 
grow:.h of money supply (see BuHer and Miller (1981». Thus 
n • 0 + y (Z - l(F(K), x(K) + n)] (63) 
The formulation has a number of advantages: in long run equilibrium, 
demand and supply of money are equal; so also is nand 0: thus we can 
contrast the behaviour of the economy on the transition path given 
th .. : the eqlJl11br1um and disequiUbrium models have the same 
~tation~ry state. the comparIsons then can focus on the short run, our 
m.dn 5ubjl"C: (If inter..-!:'. Wl~ Also keep close to the central concerns 
of the mone:..ul"ts i.e. superneutrallty and the ability of the money 
mllr).: ... :. to Cltll~f' Int hUon. ChAn~e" in structure are thus keot to a 
minimum. Yet. 1111 w sh .... ll see later. qult~ fundamental dHterences 
t"m.!rp,(! "nd CAI,Lt~l 'Hock ht'h:wiollf. inc1udlnll: the posslbilHy of 
b,"dne"" eycl .. M , 1Il.1Y tl~ dl"slmlhr to standard mone:.arist predictions. 
21S 
l'roc('t'<1 in~ as tH't ore, we need to t lnd the ef feel ot the two 
end<lt:en,)tls variahles (K, Z) on the rate ot lnt lation n. Totally 
differentIatIng (b), 
S 1 Olp lit Y 1 n ~ • 
Thus 
3J/3Z - Y/l+YL2 - 110 
where D • [(l/y) + L2] 
and 
3J/3K • - BID 
The monetary disequilibrium model is gIven now by 
• 
K • F(K) - C(F(K) + Z. K) - ~K 
Z-(O-Il)Z 
n • 0 + y [Z - L( F ( K), x ( K) + n»] 
wIth the part.Ials of the 11 derived from (66) and (67). 
( 64) 
(65) 
(66) 
(67) 
(68) 
( (9) 
(70) 
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~e ne~d t.o draw the phase dia~rams from this pair of differential 
equatlon~. Followln~ usual oraetiee, the equations are linearised in 
* * the nelp;bo\lrhood of f'qull1brlum (Z , K ). Remember the lon~ run 
equlUbrlum values have slime properties as those 1n the previous 
Bl"c~1o"s. 
UtLnjl! (70), (69) can be writlen u 
• 
7. • 'd lO'( K). x ( K) +11) - Z) (71 ) 
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So:e, 411 partIals Are eV81uated at Z • 0 - K) 
h./3Z • 12pn/3Z) • L2/D 
3 l.n K • B + L2 31113 K • B ( 1- ( l21 D» 
Therefore, from (72) to (75) we get 
• 
'JZ!dZ • - Z/D 
• 
3Z/3K • BllD 
dZldK/. • B 
Z·O 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
Turning to the equation for capital stock, (68), we get 
• • 
(79) 
• 
(80) 
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""here A !la defined 1n the previous section by equation (35). Note A 
1& n,"~,,~lve u auumed "'Ilrlier. Usln~ (76) and (77), we get from 
(79) and (80) the tol1owlnr.: 
• 
(81) 
(82) 
d 7.1 d K / • • 8 - All 1 C 1 Z (83) 
/K-O 
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Th.- compo~l:.e parameter D is crucial. Recall the expression 
(84) 
wh~r~ Y > 0 is th~ spe~d or adjus~men~. ot intlatlon to its core 
equllibr!ura rat~. con'H~Quent to dlsequllibr!um in the money market; L2 
1~ the standard par3meter for liquidity preference. It Is clear that 0 
CAn be po~Ltive or ne~~tlve dependln~ on the strength ot the 
Con5Ld~r tirst the case where Y is "small". thus 0 > O. From 
• (7R) and (82) we note that both K-O and z-o lines slope upwards 
(remember A<O. 0)0) and the tormer has a higher slope. Using this, 
plus the inforra .. Uon embodied In (76). (77). (79) and (80) we can draw 
the phase dLaRrams as shown In Figure 7.10. 
It can be easily demonstrated that the trace of the Jacobian is 
nep.~tLve and its determin .. nt positive. ~e can also prove that both 
roots are real. We have two ne~8tlve and real roots; the model Is 
stable (In the RothLan sense) with convergent movements towards long 
run eqllll1br!\lra. ThulI cycles. emanating from disequilibrium initial 
atart!n.t pCl1inta. can be ruled out. 
It now the rate ot Jotrowth ot money supoly. 0. 15 reduced then the 
• K-O and Z·O lines shitt to the position ~lven by the dotted lines 1n 
rL~ure 7.10. The ntow lonlt run equilibrium 15 at E2. If the economy was 
at Inltl.l .t.tlon~ry state El. then capital stock first falls and 
then rL.~. as .hown hy lh~ arrowed lines. We do observe a business 
cycle .Lne .. lh .. capilli! lAbour d~cl1nes ini:;ially but Increases 
eUrHI4"'1IIt.·n:.ly. ThLta unly occurs h~cause the InItIal situation was one 
01 t'qll!llbrll1l11 .nd 1Jt.llble h",haviollr precludes "jumps" 1n variable and 
C4lJl" .... It .tt>ady. h\lt !llow, mov('mc.·nt :'owards the new lon,;( run steady 
2J8 
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It wo· c()n~r"s~ this mo<1el with the previous one :.he fundamental 
d~ttt'rt'nl"t~ 1s In the s:.ahil1ty properties. It is seen that 
disequilihr!um, mon~y d~mAnd not equal to suoply, Is stabilisIn~ even 
under rational expectations. In a sense rapIdly changing expectational 
variablt's (as would happen under rational, as contrasted with 
adaptive, expectations) tends lo impart a degree of Instability Into 
the system. Thlls W\! have saddle point properties with actual (and 
expected) inflalion rate jumpin~ to catch the convergent paths. When 
markets do not clear and the speed ot adjustment is low (remember Y Is 
slII411) ttlt"1l the model becomes stable. Thus we have now :'1010 negative 
characterIstic root rather lhen one as in the last section's model. 
Ont" the other hAnd, if Y, the speed of adjustment In the face of 
market-clearing dIsequilIhrium, Is lar~e then it is possible for D 
(given by (84), mAy be negative. The limiting case is obviously that 
of y • • 50 th"t z-t and we are back to the equil1brium model. Even 
wIth diAequl11brium however a large enou~h Y will make D<O. Then the 
determinnnt ot the Jacohlan, which is (-AZ!O), is negative; thus we 
once A~~in ~t't saddle point equiiibra. Two cases, similar to those 
prevlo\lltly dhcusIlt'ed, are shown in figures, 7.11 and 7.12. 
Dl8~quillbrlum responges are not slow enou~h to compensate for raoidly 
chan~Ln~ expectations. The resultant Instability can only be 
Comp ... nM .... ~t!'t tly hnvinJt jump variables such as the rate of inf 1ation. 
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S .. c~lnn '): C.onclusion 
This ch.wter had two purposes. Firs:., we wished to analyse the 
condl:10ns under which superneutrality ~he invariance of capital 
stock (or output) lo chan~es In the rate of growth of money supply 
will hold. We conclude that if the dynamic equations for the real 
variable. of the IIlOdt!l CAn be IMde invariant to the rate of Inflation, 
then theNe real variables will not be affected by monetary growth. 
Th!s 111 becAIlse d!scre::lonary ronet.ary policy affects initially the 
rate uf int hUon. If int lation has real effects, in the short and 
long run, ~>ney (~rowt.h) will also have real effects. The role of 
infl"tion, and thus money, can be brought about in various ways. One 
method, pr~losed by TObin, (1965) and used here, is to use real 
disposable income as a determinant of the consumption function. This 
includes current output and chan~e in the real value of money stock; 
the latter is clearly affected by inflation; thus money growth and 
concomItant. price chan~e8 have real eftects. 
The second purpose ot the chapter was to study various non steady 
state an" d!sequll1brium behaviour of the economy under monetary 
growth, given lhAt. money was superneutral. We have found that monetary 
policy, ~)th anticipated and unanticipated, can cause real effects. In 
p.llr:.lcuhr ('''pHd st.ock and investment are affected by changes In 
mon4.'Y Jtrov:.h wht"n the economy is in disequilibrium or out of steady 
st.llte. Sr~clflcAlly, monetary policy can cause business cycles In the 
8(>ns,," :,h.1:' CAP HAl stock 11\1y f all (rise) lnlt 1ally and then rise 
(t 411) hter conllt.'qut'nt. to monetary contraction (expansion). Long run 
n(",.:.ral1t.y 11\.11 nl)t. lnon the real economy trom bein~ aftected in a 
m .. Jor W4Y f'y ch4n)tt'!'l In money j,trowth rAtes, particularly in the short 
run AIl(' Ufhh·r dl"t'qull1brium. 
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Sec-tion 1: Introdllction 
The important Rational Exppctations (hereafter called RE) 
liter~ture of the past decade has generated three fundamental 
contributions to the analysis and evaluation of macroeconomic theory 
and policy. Firstly, the important contribution originating from 
Lucas (1976), that structural (or reduced form) parameters of the 
modE'1 mi2ht not remliin invariant "Then policy regimes change. Thus 
20vernment policy rules, based on econometric evaluation of past 
performance, mi2ht alter the coefficients of the underlying economic 
model itself an~ make it difficult to anticipate possible effects. 
Added to this, there may be a further crucial issue not apparent to 
the prota20nists of eQllilibrium RE models, hut extremely important to 
theorists studying non-Walrasian or "diseauilibrium" models 
(Malinvaud, 1977). Even under very simplified assumptions, there may 
he differeont types of non-t~alrasian equilibria (for example, 
Keynesian, classical or repressed inflation). Thus there is no one 
sin2le model on which expectations are based and this might cause 
problems of formin2 any macro rational expectations for all agents 
taken t02ether (see Sen, 1978). EVE'n if one imposes 822regate RE, 
policy effectiveness may crucially depend on the structure of the 
re2imP concerned and no ~eneral conclusions are possible. 
However, these issues pose deep theoretical Questions regarding 
the rE'levancE' of macroeconomic policy and nE'ed much more intensive 
study of the sub1ec-t. Our analysis in this paper is limited 
to the other two aspects of RE theorv - nE'lltral1ty of perfE'ctly 
antidrated monetary policy; llniquenE'ss (or rrultiplic1ty) and 
converv'E'nce (or stability) of RE paths. From the early oapers of 
Sar'!ent and WnllaC'(:' (1975), nt>lItraltty or policy ineffectiveness of 
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systematic monetary policy has h~en an important topic for 
discussions. Similarly, Taylor (1978), Courieroux, Laffont, Hontfort 
(19RO) an~ others, have ~hown that RE paths may exhibit a very large 
numher of solutions. 
However, the economic models purporting to discuss these concepts 
have 2pnerally been ~ut in an equilihrium framework. Market clearin2 
~'alrasian eQuilihrium has become an article of faith among merr.bers of 
the new classical school and has been elevated to as important a 
position as the assumption of RE itself. But there seems to be no 
lo~ical interconnection between the two postulates. It is conceivable 
that agents may form expectations in a rational manner even if 
diseQuilihrium prevails and prices are sticky (see Burmeister (1980». 
It is possible that given rationing, transactors may form rational 
ouantity expectations in addition to expectations on price variables. 
However, this may be easily integrated into the theory. Thus, it is a 
natural extension to analyse solution paths and possible neutrality 
in RE morlels, with disequilibrium, and excess demand (supply) in 
markets as well as prices not reacting instantaneously to clear all 
markets. 
Disequilihrium analysis can he of two types. One can assume a 
tatonnement process hy which no transactions may take place unless the 
"auctioneer" has called the "correct" price. A better assumption Is 
to use the minimum condition such that actual transactions is equal to 
the minimllm of effective demand and supply in al!gr~l!ate. Coupled with 
thh we need a price adjustment rule (assuming sticky but not rigid 
prices) which states that the change in price is a function of excess 
dem.1nd In relevant markets. The sreed of adjustment will obviously he 
assumNI to bt~ finite (s1n('(> infinite speed implies that equilibrium 
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always prevails). 
Recently, I.ucas (1980) has attackf'd the use of so-called "free 
para~eters". Speed of adjustment of any variable in response to 
market disequilibrium is a "free parameter" in the sense that it is 
exo~enously specified (at a positive finite level). There is no 
microeconomic foundation which could determine its value as a function 
of other f'ndo~enous variables. Disequilibrillm theory postulates a 
speed of adjustment hut does not say why it should exist or what its 
value should be. On the other hand, in a defence of free parameters 
in adjustment eqUAtions, Burmeister (1980) has pointed out extremely 
important reasons why they can he utilised to achieve internal 
consistency of the dynamic models. The conver~ence, stability and 
uniqueness of RE models can he stren~thened hy judiciOUS use of 
adjustment variables and thus are essential if we are to ~et lo~ically 
satisfactory models. Further, there seems to be equal validity in 
assuminsz that speeds of adjustments are all equal to infinity 
(equilibrium) 8S in assuming that they are constants but less than 
infinity (disequilibrium). Finally, one can ideally construct a model 
with these spee~s 8S 8 function of prices (havin~ ~iven a preliminary 
story), and then study their properties. There seems to he 200d 
enoueh 1ustification for the use of dynamic adjustment equations in a 
dlsequllihrium framework. 
Some rec~nt work on disequilibrium RE models seems to claim that 
the poli~y ineffectiveness proposition fails when markets do not clear 
(sf'e particularly the paper by HonkaDoh1a (1979) and his comment: 
"Some dtfferen('(>s of opinion remain, hilt the results su~szest that the 
nf'lItrAl1ty pronosition in eE'neral fails to hold when markets do not 
continuollslv df'Ar"). This is ~ertainly true of work hy Fisc-her 
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(lq77) and Phelps and Taylor (1977). However, HcCallum (1978, 1979, 
1980) shows that money can still be proved to be neutral under 
suitahle assumptions relZarding disequilibrium. The position seems to 
be far from settled and needs more research. Secondly, there is no 
consen~u~ amon~ the rontestants of the debate about the proper 
specification of the dynamic adjustment rules. Given the ad hoc 
nature of macroeconomic policy analysis, this is to be expected. The 
Question therpfore remains as to how sensitive these results (of 
non-neutrality) are in Honkapo h.1a (1979) (and others mentioned In his 
paper) to specific adjustment rules. 
We propose to analyse a set of disequilibrium RE models with 
a~justment equations which may be termed "classical" (alternatively 
pre-Keyneslan). Evidence for the use of such adjustments may be found 
In Metzler (1950) and Patinkin (1965) (as well as the extensive 
literature summary ~iven there). The two price variables singled out 
for analysis are the aszgregate price level and the real rate of 
interest. We assume that the price level adjusts to disequilibrium in 
the money market such that excess supply of money raises price. This 
accords with the monetarists' interpretation of the effect of an 
increase in the supply of money in increasin~ the price level. If 
inflation Is a monetary phenomenon then sooner or later an increase In 
the supply of money over demand will lead to an increase in prices. 
The effect may not he direct. For example an increase In money stock 
~ilZht simply increase nominal income and purchasing power in the first 
in~tance. Rut ~lven supply, after a while prices must rise. We take 
the transmission ~chanism to be between money supply and price 
though there may he interme~iAte steps in between. 
On the other hand, interest rate reacts to conditions prevailinsz 
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in the hond Market. It can he shown that under classical transmission 
mechanism, the inter~st rate ad1usts positively to the excess demand 
for output. If a~~re~at~ demand for output exceeds supply, then 
investment is ~reater than savin~. In a classical world, invest~nt 
can he interpreted as the demand for loanable funds while saving may 
be interpreted as the supply of loanable funds. Thus investment minus 
savin~ is equal to excess demand for loanable funds. Given an excess 
demand for loanable funds, we have an equivalent excess supply of 
bonds. (Demand for bonds - supply of saved funds. Supply of bonds -
demand for investible funds). Thus the price of bonds falls and the 
inter~st rate (inversely related to bond price) rises. 
The quantity theory of money and the loanable funds theory of 
saving investment can he used to yield the type of adjustment 
equations we have proposed. These assumptions were commonly used to 
analyse the hehaviour of money, commodity and bond markets, in the 
writin~s of the old classical school. It is instructive to analyse 
their behavioural equations in the light of the workin~s of the new 
classical macroeconomics (Buiter (1980». 
Essentially, we wish to retain the spirit of classicism even 
within the diseQuilibrium framework. Thus our ag~regate price and 
interest rate adjustments follow theories proposed by classical 
(monetarist) authors (see Patinkin (1965». Quite often they arrived 
at conclusions re~arding the long run neutrality of money, even though 
on the transition path, money could have real effects. Qur purpose is 
to evaluate the C'oncludons reached by ~ classical macroeconomics 
(Lucas et al) in the 11~ht of Some of the assumptions made by old 
classical mJtcro~conomlcs. The Quantity theory of money and loanable 
funri th('ory were important ('ontrthlltions made hy the latter. How 
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would they affect RF. conclusions? 
Note that an important underlying proposition of classical theory 
was that real variahles clear real markets while nominal (monetary) 
variable~ clear nominal markets. In our model real rate of interest 
equilibrates the commodity/real bond markets while the money price 
level ~Quilibr8te~ the money market. 
The purpose of the chapter may therefore be briefly summarised. 
A diseouilibrium !!lode! of RE must postulate suitable adjustment rules 
for price level and interest rate, in the presence of excess demand 
(or supply). Since there is no rigorous foundation, the choice of 
rule is a matter of jud~ement. We wish to remain as close as possible 
to the central tenets of classical macro models and see whether 
standard RE conclusions hold or not. We invoke two basic theories 
the quantity theory of money and the loanable funds theory of bond 
financin~ - to specify the structural characteristics of the 
disequilihrium model. Given this classical framework we intend to 
analyse solution paths of models with RE and study the neutrality 
ouestion. 
In the next two sections, we construct models which have 
disequilibrium in hoth commodity and money markets. Adjustment rules 
follow classical tradition. Three types of models are used. Firstly, 
anticipatory price setting is postulated and prices depend on e~pected 
excess demand. Secondly, we assume that price~ change accordin~ to 
actual excess demands. In both these models real balance effects are 
---
i~nored. In the third type we assume that the stock of real balance 
affects a~iregate demand. In Section 2 these three types of models 
are discussed ~iven a simplifying assumption that expected price 
inflation Is equal to zero. In the next ~ection, we relax this 
2/; 0 
~imnlification and the expect~d inflation rate is taken to be 
non-zero. This is mPrely to focus attention on essentials in the 
first sta2e and then move on to more complicated strl)ctures. 
DAFAAI 
Our primary purpose in these models is to study the multiplicity 
(or uniqueness) of solution paths and then see whether anticipated 
money is neutral or not for some or all these paths. It is shown that 
diseouillbrium (of the classical type) per se does not necessarily 
~ive non-neutrality. Rather it is the structure of the model which 
produces relevant policy effectiveness conclusions. Models without 
real balance effects always show money is neutral. Models with real 
balance effects invariably ~ive non-neutral results. Thus, neither RE 
nor disequilihrium determine whether policy is effective or not. It 
is usually the assurnotions of the underlyin~ model that produce 
relevant policy conclusions. 
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$~ctfon 2: The R~sic Mod~ls 
As ~ntioned e~rlier, we first want to analyse basic models with 
expected rate of inflation assumed equal to zero. We would like to 
focus attention on the central causes in the policy ineffectiveness 
dehate, within a disequilihrium structure which is shorn of all 
unnec~ssary assumptions. As will be shown in the next section, this 
does not affeC't the final results and all conclusions follow throuszh 
in models with non-zero expected price inflation. 
The first model in this s~ction has anticipatory price settinsz 
rules. We have the followinsz system of equations: 
al(pt-t-l * Yt • Pt) + u It (1) 
e • blr + U2t (2) t t 
d + + c2 et + u3t (3) m - p clr t t t 
P -p • ~(mS- md*) + v (4 ) t t-l t t-l t t 
(5) 
(6) 
(where Yt' et' m~, m~ and Pt are logs of output supplied, output 
demand, money dpmand, money supply, and price level; r is the rate of 
t 
interest and no distinction is made hetween real and nominal rates 
since expected price inflation is zero. A star (*) indicates an 
exppcted value). 
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Ex~~ctAtfons for all variahles are formed rationally. Thus for 
any variahle x
t
' its expected value formed at period t-l is given as 
x; • E(x /information available at time t-l) 
t-l t 
(where E is the mathematical expectations operator). In our model 
rational exp~ctations are assumed for money demand, effective demand 
(e ), a~~re~ate supply (y ) and price level (p). To simplify the 
t t t 
notation, we shall write from now on, x~ instead of t-IX~ , for 
variables whose expectations are formed in t-l. Care will be taken to 
explicitly state the date of expectations formation, if it is not t-l. 
Eouation (1) is the LUC8S supply function expressed in deviatio~ 
form from the natural rate. Thus in all subsequent analysis we drop 
an extra term invokin~ factors which determine the natural rate of 
unemployment. Similarly, a~ll;regate demand (1n deviation form) is 
Il;iven hy ~Quation (2) as a function of the rate of interest (real or 
nominal). EQuati~n (3) Il;ives the demand function for money. (A model 
similar to (1) (2) (3), mlt only for an ~~ilibrium situation, has 
heen used hy W0210m (1979). It can be shown that if y • e and 
t t 
md • mS, mon~y is neutral). The supply of money in equation (6) is 
t t 
ke~t arbitrary to make the monetary rule as Il;eneral as possible. It 
is easy to use specific rules and conclusions remain invariant. ~Ioney 
supply Is perfectly anticipated at level m except for white noise 
t 
terms. 
F.qullt Ion (4) uSt'S the classical monetarist rule that prices 
respond positively to an increase in the supply of money. If the 
supply of monf'y (perfectly fort'cAst exc~pt for error u'+t) is ~reater 
thAn thf' ~xppctPd rlemand for m~ney then the price level will rise from 
its pr~violls vnlut'. Thus inflation d~pends on the expe_ct_ed excess 
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~urrl.v of monf'y. note that price settinp-' is anticiratory in the sense 
th8t Pt is fixed at the bepinninp of period t with information from 
d t-1 used to forecast rationally the expected value of mt • In exactly 
analofous fashion, the interest rate is determined at the start of 
* * period t and et and Yt are predicted rationally. It is assumed that 
expected excess demand for outrut (implying investment greater than 
savinp) will cause an expected excess supply of bonds. This will 
lower the price of bonds and raise the rate of interest. 
The error terms uit ' vt ' wt are white noise terms, mean zero, 
constant variance and serially uncorrelated. We may assume without 
loss of eenerality that uit = 0 and concentrate on the errors vt and 
wt in the price/interest rate formation equation. 
The semi reduced form of the equation with endofenous variables 
d Pt' Yt' et' mt and r t in terms of exogenous and expected variables 
can be written as: 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
( 11) 
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'.\e now invoke the minimum condi tion from disequi librium theory. 
Assume actual output (Y~) is the minimum of supply and derr:and. 
Thus 
Now taklnp expectations, from (7) .... e I!et 
= P t 
(12 ) 
Thus, uslnp. (1) it is clear that Yt is unaffected by money supply mt 
since Yt-U1t 
Similarly from (1) or (9), 
y* • 0 t 
From (11), "taking expectations of et .... e get 
or 
Subs tituting in (8), 
r t • r t _1 + O[bl/1- b lO]r t _1 + .... t 
From (2) therefore, 
+ .... 
t 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
It Is cleAr that r t is a function of its past values (from (15» and 
this is not influenced by money supply mt • Therefore, et dependent on 
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r t - 1 is not affected by anv mt - 1 (i=O, 1, 2, ••• ). We therefore see 
from (1), (12), (15), (16) that hoth Yt and et cannot be influenced by 
anticipated monetary policy. Actual output Y~ being independent of mt 
we have neutrality, and anticipated money rules are ineffective in 
affectinll output. 
We now turn to t~e other part of our enquiry - the analysis of 
solut10n paths. Fro~ (4) take expectations, suhstitute for e~ and 
v* and solve for md* to ~et 
. t t 
Given 
• p 1 + Am t- t 
m 
t 
+ ( 
(17) 
(18) 
Uslnll (15) and (18) we can express f
t 
and p~ as functions of f t - 1 
And Pt-I P.!_lI~ pxogenous and random variables. 
r t 
1 r 
(I-bIn) 0 t-l 
+ eXOlZenOllS 
c l+c 2b l and p* ). --- I r random t ( 1+). )(l="bl O) 1+).. t-I terms 
(19) 
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Call the Jacohian matrix 
1 )~-b 12-) 
1 
o 
1 
1+>' 
1 
• A 
We may now usp. a theorem due to Blanchard and Kahn (1980) 
OAFAAI 
regarding solution paths of the difference equation system (19). Note 
that in our model, the rate of interest in any period t, 
fully determined by information available at period t-I. 
i.e. r , is 
t 
Since r t 
depends on e~ and t~ which are expectations formed in t-I, the 
interest rate variable r is a predetermined variable. On the other 
t - -
hand Pt depends on current shocks at period t (through m~) and is 
therefore a "1ump" or non-predetermined variable. Therefore in our 
model, we have one predetermined variable and one jump variable. To 
analyse the possible solutions to (19) we have to find the number of 
unstable (or stable) characteristic roots of (19). 
Clearly the trace of the matrix Is ( ___ 1 __ )+ _1_) and the 
I-bin 1+A 
determinant of the matrix is (1 1. 
I-b 1n-)(1+X) 
Therefore it is obvious that the roots are (Ill-bIn) and (1/1+>'). 
Since A > 0, bI < 0, n > 0, both roots are less than unity (1). 
Therefore, the number of unstable roots (zero) is less than the number 
of jump or non predetermined variables (one). Under these conditions, 
there arf> an infinite numher of solution paths to the system. 
~Je m.1y summ.1rise our conclusions in the following proposition. 
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Propo~itfon 1 
Thf're are an infinite numher of possihle solutions to the model set 
out in elluations (l) to (6). However, all solution paths exhibit 
neutr~lity, i.e. perfectly anticipated monetary policy does not affect 
either aggre~ate demand or supply. 
We now turn to our next model (within the basic framework) and 
assume that price setting is no longer anticipatory. Now price 
changes depend on actual rat~er than expected excess demands in 
respective markets. Once a~ain we wish to analyse the neutrality 
proposition as well as study the existence (and possible multiplicity) 
of RE solution ~aths. 
\-Te have 
Yt - al(p -p*) t t (20) 
e 
- blr t (21) t 
md 
- Pt + cl r t + c2 e (22) t t 
mS t - m t 
(23) 
Pt -P t-l -).(m -md) + v (24 ) t t t 
r -r - nee -y ) + w (25) t t-l t t t 
Structurally, it is similar to the first model except that in 
price an~ interest ad1ustment equations (24) and (25), actual 
variables have replaced anticipated ones. Once again the dynamic 
ad1ustmpnts follow classical modes in that the price level responds to 
excess demand In the mon~y market and interest rate changes are a 
function of excess d~mand In the output (bond) m.1rket. 
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From (21) SIOti (?2) 
md 
- Pt + (cl + c 2bl )r t t 
From (24) anti (2'» 
Pt-l 
+ A A (c l+c 2b l '\ 0 • m -t IH m t ill 
From (25), (20) (21) and (27) we ~et 
where 
1+A 
ROe! J\ > 1 
Thus (2R) mav ~e rewritten as 
w~ere J 1 • l/R, J 2 • -rnal/R(l+A)l, J 3 • -[na 1A/R(1+A)l, 
J 4 • Qa1/R and J 1 > 0, J 2 ( 0, J 3 ( 0, J 4 > o. 
where 
~uhstituting (29) into (27) we ~et 
K3 • - ). (cl+c2h l)J 1 
1+A 
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(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
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Tald "Po f'Xf'p('tl'lt1on~ of 00 ) WE' ~E't 
1(1 1(2 1(3 
1"* 8--
''t-l + mt + r t - 1 t I-Kit 1-1(14 I-K It (31 ) 
~uhstttllttnp. in PQ) we ~et 
J lt K3 JI+Kl 
r 
-
(Jl + )r t - t + °2 + ) Pt-J t I-Kit I-I( 1+ 
JI+1(2 
+ (J 3 + )m + ranclom terms 
1-1(14 t 
Once ~~~1n eouatinn~ (32) ~n~ (11) mav be investi~ate~ to find 
the nSltuTE" of ~F. solution paths. The relevant Jacohian is now 
J lt K3 J ltKl 
J 1 + J2 + 
A2 - I-Kit l-K lt 
K3 Kl (33) 
l-K It l-K lt 
Oh~erve thl'lt the cletermlnant of A2 (~tving the product of the roots) 
~fn('e J 1 • I/R and ~ > 1, thereFore J 1 < 1 
(1+~) > 1 ~tnce ~ > 0 
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Thuc; pithf'r hot" root~ ;:Irf> 11"<:;<; than IInitv (hoth root!': 5t:'lhle) or one 
root: 1c; lpsc; t"~n ,'oftv (on~ root st:'lhlp). So thp nllmhpr of unstahle 
"owpver, not~ that unlike ollr nrevious c:'I<;e hoth vadahles are 
nnn PTe~ptpr~fneA tn thtc; mo~el p.iven hv (20) to (2~). This is 
hec;:Iuc;e hnth n anci T C:'In re<;nnnrt to current I'lhoc1<s an~ news anti are 
t t 
nll",hp" of nnn pre~p.tpT"1ifler! v.qr{;th]ec; (2) ~reateT.' thRn the nu",her of 
IInstRhle root"l (l). Thllc; thpTP "'list hI'> Rn i.nfinftp nUfTlher of 
To An~'vse nputralftv, ohc;erve that p is a function of r alone. 
f(a. n::e... t t 
"'hpreforp effect f)f l!1onev c;upn]v increase (m ) l!1ust ooerate t"ro\1~h 
t 
r . We have to E'Va'IIRte in (32) the coefff cf ents fJ3+J4K2!1-J<41 to 
t 
p.et thp (,1I"rent p.fff'ct of m 
t 
anrt the coefficient fJ 2+J .. K l!l-K 4 1 to ~et 
the J"aRt effE'cts of mt - i via its influencf' Ofl priC'e level. 
Tt C'lln he f'llstlv calclllated that 
J 4K2 J3+).J 3+J 4). 
.13 +- • • 0 (34 ) 
1-1(4 l-K4 
en" J 41<'1 J 2+J 2).+J 4 
.12 +-- • • 0 (35) 
1-1<'4 1-1<4 
Thu~ from (~2), (~4), (~~), 
or 
Of. ) 
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On~p ~r~fn ft f~ ~lpar that r d~ne~n~ on its oast history an~ is 
t 
not fnfJIIE'ncE'Jhv mOnf'tRrv shoc'<s. ~ince 
(7) 
thf'r"fore aep.rel'ate ciell'C'ln<i ie; uninfluencec! hV monptarv nolirv. It is 
ohvfollCl that v is also uoinf1uencerl hv anticinateci I'lonev, since 
t 
n - ("1* i~ eOI1"l to ran~/)m errors. Thus actl1al outPlIt 
t t 
VB • min(v , e ) t . t t 
is not affpcte~ hy svstel'latic monetary nlles. 
t..'e Slim up the results in the prooosition: 
Pro("loc;ition 2 
F.ven if price se~~inp. is not anticipatorY and all prices adjust 
to current events, there are PI' infinite nUll'her of RF. solution oaths 
in ollr classieRl model. HO\Olever, all these oaths exhihit nelltraHtv. 
Thf' two <ilseotdHhrilll'l m(lrlel~ I'ltu(He~ liP t11.1 now hi~hl1S!t,t an 
frnnort:Rnt. conclusi.on. ~el'tTaHtv (or non neutrality) does not 
ne~pssar{]v <'enpoc! on rlfsP('I\li lfhriul'l l-ehaviOllr. t'~e set classical 
oricp Rei iustmpnt rulps an'" founci that ~fvE'n RP. (of all nricE' pn~ 
oU8ntitv varfahlps', nprfectlv anticinated money stoc~ rloes not affect 
'Je 1'0\01 pro~ppd to a thin' I'lOriel which is essentially sil'lilar to 
thp first onp (2Iv~n hv eQuations (1) to (~) excent that a Teal 
hIlJ.1n~p pffe~t iq introC'hlcE'c'. Sin~e ollr ad.1ustl'lent rulE'S are 
clAssfC',,1 In !'In'rH, It is oultP anpro"rf"'te to assum~ thllt the qtocl{ 
P{C'o.\ pffpC"t h~q hppn IIqpA hv trtlrlftional nPlltralistCl to rOllnt"r 
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Y~vnp~fan o~ipctfonR to th~ PxfAtPpce of full employment eOlltllhrfum 
outnllt. Tt AeE'm~ loP.ic.t'll <'Inci valfci thereforp to an<'llvsp. the 
npl\tr~1ftv oronoAttfons within RE RARumptfons in a ",odel wl-]erp real 
tie thpreforp h.'lVP 
v • ~l(o -0*) (38) 
I: t t 
P • h1r + h2m - "'2" (39) t t t t 
m" • p + cl Tt + ('2 e t (40) t t 
(41) 
(42 ) 
(41) 
Actual 01ltPllt· minimum (v , e ) (44) 
. t t 
nncp R~~fn prfce Anci interest rate ~ettin~ f~ ~ntlcipt'ltorv. The new 
fnnovation f~ thAt nnAit(vp Teal hal~nce p.ffects are assumeci ~iven 
Fro"'! (17), OR) 
C1+C2"1 
l-C2h2
Tt 
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From (42), 
(47) 
EQu8tinp (46) and (47) and usin~ (43) we get 
(For simplicity we drop from n~ on all terms involving errors vt and 
This does not affect the final conclusions). 
From (:39) and (43), 
et • bi (r t-1 + ne~ - ny~) + b2mt - b2Pt_1 - b2Am t - b2Am~* 
Takinr, expectations of (48) and (49) we pet two equations for 
md* and e* which may be written as 
t t 
(50) 
(51) 
where 
(53 ) 
F,quations (50) and (51) can be used to solve for m~* and e~. 
When thpse value~ Are substituted into equation (42) we ~et the 
exrres~ion for Pt' Takinp. expectations of Pt we can derive r;. 
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S{",flATlv !'luhc:l:itllt:in(! thE> v<'llue of t'~ in p(JIl<'ll:ion (4)) we P.t't <'In 
E>CHIlItion in r (notE> v* - 0). Th!"!';e Rre extre~elv te"iolJ~ 1:0 solve 
t t 
hilt on(> can ...tt'rive In exactly ~na]o~o"s fashion RS in the fir~t !"Odel, 
a J~cohfan I'f'Iatrix A3 ~uc~ t~at 
n* t 
+ exo~eno"s IInd random terms 
UnJtke t~e f1r~t model, it is not poss!hle to predict the nature 
of th~ charActprf~tic root~ derfve~ from ~lItrfx A3. Howev~r, the 
roor::s ~eJ'lenl! crucial]v on thp vlllues of ). and 0, tl,e speed of 
acl1ustl'f'lE>nt tprms. Thu~ pxf~tt'n('e of ~olution, I'f'IIIItiplicitv or 
uniqueness, IIn~ converpence depen~s expl1.citly on values of ). and 0 
(simt lRr results hllvP h('t'n obt.dne~ hv l\ur'TIeister (l9~O». 
Tt is f'lossfhlE" h", .. t'ver to study the neutrality f'ropositfon 1n 
SOmE' detai 1. From the vahlE"~ of "'~* and e~ we can ~et the vahles of 
p anti r. Suhstituttn,p. these into the exorE"ssion fOT E" in (39) we 
t. t t 
can ~et the value of et liS A function of Tt-I' Pt - 1 
cOE"fffcfpnt of m Is ~iven hv the followinp,: 
---- ,-- t 
- (\p 
t 
3", 
t 
> 0 
anci m. The 
t 
fnC'TPIlSE"S. Tf IH't",,1 Olltf'lllt fs PC'Ju,"\l to ciE>"'Rn" , tht'n it will in('rea~e 
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ton. 'illf>rpfnre monf'V 1!'l non nputnll Rnci oerf('ctlv RntfciP"Itect ll10ney 
~R~ rpal effer.t.~. f\'otP thRt thl!'l coefffcipnt ~~ po~1tive- 2fven 
h2 > O. TF h2 • 0, 3Pt,3mt • 0 (h 2 ~fve!'l the re-al hRJRnce effect). 
Pe have nroveet: 
PrOl"o~ftinn 3 
If reRl hRlan~p eFfp~t!'l ~re present then thp existence and unioueness 
of RC: !':oJutfon Pllths ~enend'l exnl1.citly on thp sneed of arl.illstment; 
nothinp !'lnec1fic ('~n be pred{ctp~ unles~ the actual values of ). and n 
ere \nown. Powever, for Any solution path, money is non neutral and 
ant{cinatp~ monptarv policy is eFfective. 
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S(>('tion 1: TI,E' ComplE'te ModE'l!'; 
~le can now turn our at tent ion to the complete model where 
expected rate of inflation appears as an explanatory variable. It can 
be demonstrate~ that this does ~ change any of the essential 
conclusions. Once again if real halance effects are present and the 
stock of real money affects the aggregate demand function, then money 
is non neutral. On the other hand, without real balance effects, 
money iA neutral and perfectly anticipated money does not affect the 
structure of either aggregate demand or aggregate supply. 
S 
However, characterisation of solution paths become much more 
complex. It is no longer possible to use the Blanchard Kahn (1980) 
method to derive the existence or uniqueness of RE paths. In the 
absence of such methods we rely on the technique proposed by Muth 
(1960) originally and analysed by Taylor (1978). We check for non 
uniqueness of solution paths and analyse whether money is neutral or 
not on all such paths. 
It is possihle to repeat the exercise for all the three models 
analysed in Section 2 after adding terms containing the expected rate 
of inflation. However, the algebra is tedious and serves no 
analytical purpose. We shall therefore investigate the detailed 
solution for the first morlel and state the results for the other two. 
Since the methods of solution are Similar, it is easy to see how they 
may he applied to any other case. 
Th(> mode 1 is gi ven by 
( 54) 
e - hii t t ( SS) 
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(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
Further actual output - minimum of output demand (e ) and supply (y ). 
t t 
The model Is essentially similar to Sargent and Wallace (1975) 
except for the adjustment ~les for price level and Interest rate. 
This 8nticipato~ price setting behaviour has already heen iustifled 
In our first MOdel. Note that I Is the real rate of interest. Thus 
t 
the real variahle (it) responds to real market disequilibrium In 
equation (59) and nominal variable (Pt) responds to money market 
diseQullihrium. This is palpably classical. 
Since Y~ • 0 from (54) we can write equation (59) as 
and 
e - bll 1 + b1n( le*) + b1w t t- t- t t 
From (56), (60), {61} we get 
{where W fR A combination of error terms}. 
t 
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(61) 
(62) 
So: 
and 
Sllhstittlting for p from (58) we finally have 
t 
Taking expectations of e in (~l) and simplifying 
t 
e* • [b1/l-b10]i t _ 1 
t-l t 
e • hli t t 
(64 ) 
(65) 
(66) 
Similarly, takin~ expectations of m~ in (63) we can get an 
expr~sslon for m~*. This is substituted in (58) to give us 
(67) 
where 
A2 - 1/I+A, where 1 > A2 > 0 
A3 - -A > 0 
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The redlJcpd forfT' of thE> two equations for it and Pt are lZiven by 
i -Ali +w 
t t-l t (68) 
(where Al - l/l-bln > 0) and equation (67). 
To solve E>quations (67) and (68) we make use of the fact that the 
sy~tE>m is decomposdhle. Takin~ the value of i t - l from (67) we ~et 
t-l P~ 
+ errors (69) 
Leading this bV one period, 
Pc+1 AZ Aa. As A6 i 
* * 
a-
-- p 
- - r.'It+1 CPt+l t Pt+2 t 
A3 A t A3 A3 A3 3 
+ errors (70) 
Usin2 (69), (70) and suhRtituti02 io (68) we have 
Pt+l A2 A4 As A6 
----p--m tP~+l tP~+l A A t A t+l A3 A3 3 3 3 
Al AlAZ AlAa. AlAS AlA6 
a 
'\ -- Pt-I -- rn --- p* - t-lP~+l A3 A3 A3 t t-l t A3 A3 
+ errors (71 ) 
La2gin2 (71) hv one pE'riod and s1mp11fy102, 
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+ A p* - A A p* - A A p* + u (72) 6t -l t+l 1 5 t-2 t-l 1 6t -2 t t 
(where Ut i~ It random tprm; and t-1P~+i z E(pt+l information at t-1) 
(72). 
Wp ~an rewrite (72) as 
p* + J 7 t-2 t-l +u t (73) 
The solution path to the modpl can be derived by solving equation 
following Muth and Taylor, assume that p can be expressed as a 
t 
linear co~binat10n of current and la~ged values error term Ut. The 
contribution of exogenollS variables mt and mt - 1 is captured by a 
term p. Thus 
... 
Pt - P + L lT i ut - 1 1-0 
(74) 
SimilArly, 
... 
f'l t - 1 - P + L IT u i-O 1 t-1-1 
(75) 
... 
Pt-2 - p + ~ IT u ... 1 t -1-2 1-0 
(76) 
... 
Pt+l 
- P 
+ ~ lT 1ut -i+l .. 1-0 
(77) 
... 
Pt-1 - p + " IT 1I " f t-I-3 i-O 
(7R) 
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Takin~ appropriate expectations, 
CD 
t-l p\ - p + )' lT i l1 t _i .. i-O 
(79) 
CD 
t-lP~+l - P + L lT i ut -i+1 i-2 
(80) 
CD 
• - p + L IT u t-2 Pt-1 i-I i t-i-I 
(81) 
CD 
p* 
- p + L lT i l1 t _1 t-2 t i -2 
(82) 
Th~se expr~ssions ~Ist satisfy equation (72) for Pt. Thus multiplyin~ 
(74) to (RO) hy th~lr respective J i and equatin~ to the expression in 
(73) we have 
7 
p - (JOm t _ 1 + J1mtl /(1 -i1.2 J i) (83) 
Further eQuatln~ terms containin~ u t - i (for all i) we Eet 
lTo - I (84) 
"1 - J 2IT O + J 4"1 + J S"2 (85) 
and 
I-J4 -J7 J2+J 6 J 3 
rti+l - ( )"i - ( -- ) "i-l - - lT i - 2 Js Js Js 
( 86) 
(for 1 - 2, 1, 4, ••••• ) 
Thul'4 it Is cl('l1r thAt rtl m.1Y he cla~s1f:led as an unknown free 
param('tt>r which can tnK(' on ~!!y poss:lhlt> values. Once "1 is 
~r~cfff('d, "2 IR derlvrd from (R4) and suhseQuently all other IT fro~ 
1 
(8,,). IIOW(,V(,f, fOf t'ilch value of lip pt can take on a special value, 
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Usin~ the information in (83), (R4), (85) one can express Pt as 
an ARMA (3,2) prOCf>SS of the followin~ tyoe: 
(87) 
Note that the solution path is non uni~ue since it depends on IT} 
which can take on any value. Thu~ 1n ~eneral there will be an 
infinite numbf>r of solution paths for p and thus for the model. 
t 
Howevt>r, the crucial point carries over from the basic model of 
the previous Sf>ctlon. Observe from (66) and (65) that aggregate 
demand depends on thf> real rate of interest and is independent of 
money stock "\. Thus IT'oney is neutral. Obviously Yt is independent 
of anticipated monf>y, IZiving neutrality for supply. 
We claim the following: 
Propo!'l it f on 4 
nlstin~lfshlng between real anrl nominal interest rates, having an 
expf>cted rate of inflation in the morlel and assu~in2 classical 
ad1ustmf'nt f>QlIatlons for anticipatory price setting, we see that there 
are an infinite number of sollltion oaths to the model. However, on 
all thpse paths, MOnE'Y is neutral. 
This 1~ f>x.1ctly the same re!'ult as in aliI' basic model. Thus 
ext('nt11nl! nnd cOMPl1cAtin~ the model does not change the ba~ic 
cnnclu!'lfon~. In analn~ous fAshion thf> results of Propositions 2 
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anrl 1 fro~ th~ lA~t spction can he sho~ to he true in a model with 
exp~ctPd price inflation. The ~thod of analysis can be extended to 
charactf>rise solution paths and exhibit neutrality or otherwise. 
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Sec-tion 4 : Condu~ion 
Analy~is of classical ~~cropconomic transmission mechanisms has 
had ~ lon~ and distin2Uished history. Policy shocks were transmitted 
throll~h the economy and affected ma.10r macro variahles through two 
fundalTlE'ntal methods, pmhodied in the Quantity theory of money and the 
theory of loanahle funds. One of the ma10r purposes of this chapter 
was to study the i~nlications of rational expectations in a framework 
put forward by pre-Keynesian economists. We analysed the conclusions 
of new classical macroeconomic In the light of the principles of old 
classical macroeconomics. 
The other strand of the paper was to study alternative 
adju~lTlE'nt rules under non-clearln~ market disequilibrium. Since in 
szeneral, ad1ustment rules are ad hoc ("free parameters"), it is 
important to see how sensitive major conclusions are to different 
specifications. As mentioned earlier, our adjustment rules followed 
classical postulates, thus integrating disequilibrium methods with 
traditional c-oncepts. 
The general surpositlon that disequilibrium per se leads to 
non-nE'utnl! effE'cts with perfE'ctly anticipated money, is found to be 
incorrect. The structure of the model determines the nature of 
solution paths and aives suitahle results regarding policy 
E'ffectivE'nE'ss (or otherwise). Models with real halance effects show 
that ev('n undt"r RE, perfectly anticipated stock of money can influence 
effec-tlve d~mand, and thus under Keyneslan unemployment, can have real 
eftE'C'r!; In the short run. On thp other hand, without real halance 
effects 8ffectin~ 8~~relZate demand, money Is neutral for all possible 
solution raths. Assumptions re~ar~in~ the existence of non-zero 
pxpected rate of inflAtion do not fnflupncp the final results. These 
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dis~~uilihrium conclusions agrpe hroadly with those found for 
f'q 1111 i hr i 1111' lTl<)<ie Is. 
These results strengthen the policy issues discussed in Sen 
(19RO) (thou~h in a completely different context). Neither RE nor 
diseQuilibrium by itself is sufficient to ~ive neutral (or 
non-neutral) monetary policy. The structure of the model and 
underlyin~ behavioural assumptions are crucial in the debate as to 
whether anticipated money can influence output and employment. 
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Chapter IX 
Medium Term Dynamics and Disequilibrium. 
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Section 1. Introduction 
Dynamic models of the open macroeconomy have generally 
emphasised disequilibrium in the sense that certain aggregative 
markets fail to clear. in the short run. due to price rigidity or 
stickiness. It is generally assumed that financial markets 
equilibrate quickly given the flexibility of relevant variables such 
as exchange and interest rates. On the other hand the labour and/or 
commodity markets exhibit disequilibrium since the wage and price 
level do not adjust rapidly. Various forms of contracts. implicit or 
explicit. constrain the movement of wage rate and aggregate price; 
thus disequilibrium persists until long run equilibrium (stationary 
s ta te) is reached. 
The literature has handled these issues in two conceptually 
separate ways. though there are formal similarities in the method of 
solution. The first was initiated by Dornbusch (1976) who extended 
the Mundell-Fleming model by assuming a price adjustment mechanism 
whereby the aggregate price level rises (falls) in response to excess 
demand (supply) in the commodity market. Exchange rate dynamics obey 
covered interest parity. The speed of adjustment of price is finite; 
it is a "state" variable (in the language of control theory) and can 
not jump when new information or news is available in the current 
period; this defines a "backward-looking" variable. The exchange rate 
on the other hand is a "forward-looking" or jump variable and 
responds rapidly to current information. The exchange rate is also a 
major expectational variable and its expected appreciation (in the 
presence of interest rate differentials between the home country and 
the exogenous rest of the world) plays an important role in the 
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analysis. Under perfect foresight (rational expectations without 
uncertainty) the jump in the exchange rate allows the economy to 
achieve a stable trajectory when parametric changes disturb an 
initial long run equilibrium. The transition path from one 
equilibrium to another is characterised by disequilibrium in the 
product market. One can assume nominal wage rigidity, in Keynesian 
fashion, and unemployment in the labour market (perfecly elastic 
labour supply at the fixed money wage rate). But this is not strictly 
necessary as Dornbusch (1980) shows. Major extensions have been made 
of this basic model, see for example Buiter and Miller (1981); 
the fundamental structure however remains similar. 
The supply of output, in the foregoing models, is given by an 
exogenously determined full employment level and is assumed fixed at 
the "natural rate". The alternative way of analysing these issues is 
through an aggregate supply function dependent on the real wage rate 
via the labour demand curve. (Sachs 1980). The advantage of this 
method is that it can handle real wage resistance or rigidity more 
explicitly. But more important, it emphasises the supply side and 
relates wage-price dynamics to the behaviour of aggregate supply (and 
the firm); in principle, it gives as much importance to supply as to 
aggregate demand emanating from the traditional IS/LM structure. 
Unfortunately, this class of models assume aggregate supply equals 
demand so that there is no necessity for a price adjustment equation. 
The price level changes rapidly to equate demand and supply in the 
commodIty market. Thus, an essential tenet of disequilibrium 
analysis, the dIvergence of desired supply and demand, is removed. 
Essentially, the model therefore becomes an equilibrium one (except 
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for the labour market which remains implicit in any case). In what 
follows therefore we confine attention to the Dornbusch type model, 
assuming explicitly the possibility that aggregate demand and supply 
are not equal except in long run equilibrium. 
Two problems remain however. The assumption of fixed desired 
supply of output, at "full employment" level, is unreasonable since 
as prices changes the profit maximising firm would wish to change its 
output level. Fixed input-output coefficients, mark-up pricing and 
the aggregate firm supplying the amount demanded at the going price, 
do not seem to be consistent with the postulated price dynamics. We 
need to explicitly model the supply side; this is similiar to Sachs 
(1980) but with the fundamental difference that disequilibrium will 
be stressed. Of even greater importance however is that when desired 
demand and supply are not equal then the actual output should be the 
minimum of the two. TIlis requires some consideration of the dual 
decision hypothesis and recalculation of the parameters and responses 
of the system. 
Thus, the innovations of our model are the following: (a) 
analysis of an explicit supply function; (b) use of that supply 
function to determine price movements; (c) modelling disequilibrium 
formally by invoking the dual decision hypothesis. This is done 
within a Dornbusch framework by keeping nominal wage constant and 
assuming that the supply of labour is perfectly elastic at the 
current wage. The case of fixed real wage is easily handled and the 
method is pointed out where necessary though no explicit analysis is 
done. Labour supply, and modelling household behaviour constrained by 
unemployment, is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The fundamental assumption made here is that actual output is 
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constra1ned by the minimum of planned demand and supply. An 
alternative way of handling disequilibrium would be to assume 
inventory holding (so that demand can always be met) and analyse the 
firms supply behaviour in terms of inventory stocks held. This 
however needs a separate treatment due to its importance and we 
discuss it more fully in the next chapter. 
Section 2. The Basic Model 
The usual way of modelling the supply side, in the short run, is 
to assume fixed capital stock and determine profit maximising 
employment level of the firm; this in turn gives the optimum output. 
We use a non-standard, though realistic, procedure by taking a 
production process which requires an intermediate imported input 
(call it oil), together with capital and labour, to produce the 
aggregate domestic output. Following Findlay and Rodriguez (1977) we 
distinguish between gross output (Q) and net output (q). The former 
is a funct10n of (fixed) capital, labour and oil inputs. Net output 
however is gross output minus the real value of the intermediate 
1nput which is used up fully in the production process. The 
production function is of the mixed neoclassical Leontief type and is 
given by : 
Q • min [F(K,L), a R] (1) 
where F(.) is neo-classical 'a'" is a fixed input-output ratio 
(between gross output Q and the quantity of intermediate input oil, 
R); ch01ce of units makes a • 1. Since this is a small open economy, 
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it can buy any quantity of oil R in the world market at the fixed 
* price P (denominated in the world currency). The domestic factors of 
production are the limiting ones, thus F(K,L) < R. Efficiency demands 
that F(.) - R (remember Cl -1). 
Let P be the price of the domestic good; w is the nominal wage 
* rate; E is the nominal exchange rate; given P is the dollar pice of 
* oil, EP is the domestic currency price of the intermediate input 
imported from abroad. Firms profit is defined as 
T - PQ - wL - P*ER 
* - PQ - wL - P EQ 
- (P - EP*)F(K,L) - wL (2) 
Profit maxImIsation implies 
(P - EP*) FL - w - 0 (3) 
where FL - a Ft a L. Note also that FL >0; thus (P - EP*) > 0 
Taking total dIfferentials of (3), 
Noting that L is positively related to Q we have, from (4), 
and 
* Q - Q(E, P, P ) 
(the subscript gives the relevant partial derivative). 
(5) 
Net output, measured in terms of the domestic product, is defined as 
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* q • Q -(EP Ip)R 
Since Q • R by choice of units and technology we get 
* q • (l - EP /P)Q 
Using (5), it is clear that 
and 
* q - q(E,P,P ) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
The implicit assumption that has been made in the derivation of 
(3) to (9) is that nominal wage w is constant. Thus in (4), dw ·0 
* and we get the postulated relation between Q(or q) and (P,E,P ). It 
is easy to see what happens when real wage, in terms of the domestic 
price level, is constant. We have, instead of equation (3), the 
following: 
* (1 - EP /P)FL - w/p - 0 (3)' 
Total differentials will again give functional forms for Q and q. The 
only difference is that gross and net output will now be dependent on 
the real exchange rate (E/p), as well as the real wage, and there 
will be no independent price effect emanating from P. Thus we have, 
for example, 
* q • q(E/P, P) (8)'" 
With perfect wage indexation, the fundamental conclusions of the 
model remain unchanged. Henceforth, therefore, we shall work in 
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Keyneslan fashlon assuming money wage to be constant. 
Before turnlng to the demand side it is useful to find out the 
value of 011 imports, in terms of domestic product, since this is a 
constituent part of the trade balance. Define this variable as MR. 
Then 
MR • Q - q (10) 
Using (6), 
MR • (EP*/P)R • (EP*/P)Q (11) 
Substituting from (7), 
* MR • (EP /P-E)q (12) 
Equation (12) glves us the value of the intermediate input in 
physical units of the home good (Q or q), provided the net output 
produced in the economy is q. In other words, if it is necesary to 
produce an amount q then the amount of oil required is given by 
(12). If q is the unconstrained supply of output. as given by profit 
maxlmizatlon and equation (8), then q will itself depend on P and E 
in the manner postulated in (9). However, in a disequilibrium model 
there Is no reason to suppose that the firm will be able to sell its 
desired supply. Then q will be different from the above noted 
relation. To understand this problem more clearly we now turn to the 
specification of the demand side. 
Aggregate demand is determined within the IS/LM framework. Let 
realised or actual income be denoted by y. while planned demand. for 
income level y. is given by d. Trade balance, to be defined later. is 
denoted by B. Domestic absorption. of the private sector, is A. 
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Government spending G is all on the domestic output. Variables d, y, 
8, A, and G are all measured in terms of the home product. Commodity 
market equilibrium, or the IS relation, is given by 
d-A+G+8 
Specifying conventional functional forms, 
* d-A{y,r)+G+B{y, E, P, P) 
(13) 
(14) 
(where 0 < Al < 1, A2 < 0, r is the rate of interest). We can 
introduce the Laursen-Metzler effect in the absorption function (see 
Ford and Sen (1985» but this does not add to or change significant 
conclusions. 
Trade balance B is defined as 
* 8 - X{E/p) - MC{y, E/p) - MR(E, P, P ) (15) 
X is exports, MC is import of a consumption good whose price is set 
at unity, and MR is the value of oil imports; all these are measured 
in term of the domestic product. Exports and consumption imports are 
function of the real exchange rate while MR is already defined by 
(l2). Marshall- Lerner tells us that 
(16) 
Further, 
(17) 
The exchange rate Is perfectly flexible. 
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The money market equilibrium condition, LM relation, is kept 
simple: 
H • k(r)Py (18) 
where H is the given stock of money and kr < O. It should be noted 
that we use the same rate of interest, r, in both the IS and LM 
schedules; thus no distinction is made between real and nominal rates 
of interest. This is only a matter of convenience; suitable 
extensions can be made to incorporate the distinction between two 
interest rates; tractability induces us to stick to the simpler 
formulation; no essential conclusions are altered. 
Before introducing dynamics, we would like to solve for the 
equilibrium model. In this Mundell-Fleming world, domestic and world 
* interest rates are equalised so that r-r • Long run equilibrium also 
means that aggregate demands, net supply of output and realised 
income are equal; hence q • d • y. 
Thus we have 
q • q(E. p. p*) (19) 
* * q • A(q. r ) + G + B(q, E. p. P ) (20) 
* H • k(r )Pq (21) 
Substituting (19) into (20) and (21) we can solve for E and P for 
* given values of exogenously specified G, H, and P • The long run 
equilibrium levels of E and P then give us, from (19), the value of 
net output q. 
279 
Four types of comparative statics excercises are possible: 
monetary policy, fiscal policy, change in the world price of oil, 
shift in the nominal wage. We deal with the first two; simple 
extensions can accomodate the other changes. First let us discuss 
fiscal policy, more specifically an increase in G. 
Writing (20), (21), in excess demand form, and taking total 
differentials, we get 
• o 
where 
Solving (22), (23) we get 
d p/ a C • (kP/ 'J' )qE 
riE/ 3 C· -k(q + Pqp)/IJ I 
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(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
nle determinant of the Jacobian J cannot be signed a priori since 
(27) 
Differentiating (19) with respect to G and substituting (25), 
(26), we get 
(28) 
We know that qE < 0 (see (9». Thus government expenditure on the 
domestic product can increase aggregate output, Le. a q/a G ) 0 
provided IJI) O. Henceforth we assume that IJ I is indeed positive. 
TurnLng now to monetary policy, we find that 
'Jp/a H· a 11/IJ') 0 (29) 
a El a H • - a121 'J I )0 (30) 
Thus under the postulated conditions, expansionary monetary policy 
raises the price level and causes the exchange rate to depreciate. 
The upward movement, for long run equilibrium, of both P and E is as 
expected from monetary models of flexible exchange rate 
determinat ion. 
Since our main interest here lies in disequilibrium dynamics we 
shall consider in some detail the behaviour of the economy out of 
stationary state (given by (19) to (21». In what follows we assume 
that the economy is perturbed by a monetary shock, specifically that 
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H rises. The transition path of the economy towards a new long run 
equilibrium will be our major focus henceforth. 
Section ~ Dynamics and Disequilibrium 
The two endogenous variables of primary interest are the price 
level (P) and nominal exchange rate (E); all other variables are 
functionally dependent on these two. We therefore need to specify 
their dynamic behaviour in disequilibrium. 
Exchange rate dynamics depends on covered interest parity and 
rational expectations. Thus we have 
• E/E 
• 
* • r - r (31) 
(where E • dE/dt and t is time). The determination of the domestic 
interest rate is not clear-cut however and we need to specify it 
carefully; but thLs requires a prior consideration of the aggregate 
commodity market and the behaviour of prices over time. 
The standard form in which price dynamics is usually expressed 
is 
• p • [d - q] (32) 
(speed of adjustment is set equal to unity by choice of units) 
where d is aggregate demand from the IS/LM model and q is supply of 
net output from the postulated behaviour of the firm. But, with 
dIsequIlibrium, the definitions of d and q become complicated and 
need to b~ handled with care. Specifically, define realised income y 
282 
8S 
y - min [d.q) (33) 
We can now have two (or even three) sub-cases. 
Fi rat, Case !!. 
(34) 
• p < 0 
Secondly, Case ~ 
• 
P > 0 (35) 
• Figure 9.1 shows the configurations, with equilibrium (P • 0) price 
I">-level at P. The curves are drawn on the basis of a given exchange 
ra te E. 
The line AB shows the unconstrained supply function with q 
rising with P. The line CED is the downward sloping macroeconomic 
demand schedule derived from the IS/LM model. It is essential to 
stress that this curve is unconstrained in the sense that for each P 
it shows the level of aggregate demand that is always (elastically) 
supplied; demand creates its own supply. 
"-For P > P, actual income or output is given by points on CE. 
Realised income y - d; q is planned but not realised. The level of 
national income (product) is derived from the IS/LM equations (14) 
and (18); so also is rate of interest; MR is found from (12) given 
that actual output is y. Price dynamics is regulated by 
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• P • [y - q] (36) 
y • d(E,P) • y(E,P) 
Unconstrained supply (q) still affects price dynamics as in (32). The 
inability of the firm to sell its desired output has an effect on the 
labour market where a "dual decision" needs to be taken. However, 
since we do not consider explicitly the labour market, this behaviour 
is not modelled here. Prices therefore change as a response to the 
difference between unconstrained demand and supply as in the 
Dornbusch model. A major difference however is in the calculation of 
the oil inputj there is an implicit dual decision in the 
intermediate input market where the firm re-calculates the value of 
oil imports on the basis of its constraint i.e. net output produced 
must equal demand. 
'" For the second case, P(P, the position is diametrically 
reversed. Output is now given by qj this must therefore be the 
realised income, y • q. The unconstrained IS/LM analysis loses its 
significance. Aggregate demand must be re-calculated as a constrained 
demand, d, given actual income is q. The constrained demand curve is 
drawn as EF and price movements depends on the level of d on this 
curve. We have therefore, 
• P • 
• (y • q(E,P,P » 
[d - y] 
Price dynamics therefore depends on the difference between 
constrained demand and actual supply of output. 
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(37) 
In this phase, income or output is given by the supply function. 
We assume that the money market clears rapidly so that from (18), 
putting y - q, we can derive the actual interest rate which 
equilibrates the money market. This value of r, as well as the fact 
that y - q, helps us to derive the level of constrained demand d in 
equation (14), the IS relation. Given the values of d and y (or q), 
price dynamics is generated according to (37). We now derive these 
relations formally. 
Case 1 gives, from (34), (14), and (18), 
* A(y,r) + G + B(y,E,P,P ) - y - 0 (14)' 
k(r)Py - H (18)' 
(noting aggregate demand d is equal to realised income y). 
Taking total differentials of (14)' and (18)' we can solve for 
• 
y - y(E, P) and r - r(E, P) in the region P < O. 
Thls gives 
> 0 (38) 
< 0 (39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
The sIgns of (38) to (40) are obvious. The sign of rp is ambiguous, 
but we follow the standard usage in the literature and assume 
posltlvlty. It is quite simple to derive the analytics of the case 
285 
where rp < 0 (see for example Ford and Sen (1985». 
The dynamic equations for E and P are now 
• 
* (El E) • r(E, P) - r 
• P • * [y(E,P) - q(E,P,P )] 
(43) 
(44) 
It is clear, using (9), (38), (39) that the P- stationary is upward 
• 
sloping. Similiarly, from (40), (41) we note that E/E - 0 line slopes 
downwards. Further, 
• 
d pI ap • [ YP - qp ] < 0 (45) 
• 
d (E/E)/o E· rE > 0 (46) 
All this information help us to draw the phase diagram (Figure 9.2) 
• ~ the ran~ P < O. If long run equilibrium is given by Z, then SZ 
denotes a saddle path -- the only path in this region that is 
convergent. 
Consider now Case 2 where the supply constraint is binding. Thus 
• 
y • q < d and P > 0 (47) 
The standard ls/LM relations, based on perfectly elastic supply at 
any glven aggregate demand, now lose their significance. We assume 
that the interest rate is determined by the instantaneously 
equlllbratlng money market, so that from (18), 
(48) 
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It is clear that since kr < 0, qE < 0, qp > 0, 
> 0 (49) 
We distinguish this case by writing the interest rate as r a (actual 
rate of interest required to make demand and supply of money equal). 
We now need to analyse the constrained demand function (see 
* figure 9.1, curve EF). From (14), noting y - q(E. P, P ) we get 
* a * * d • A(q(E,P,P ),r ) + G + B(q(E,P,P ), E,P,P ) (50) 
Taking total differentials, 
It is not possible, a priori, to sign the partials dd/ dE and dd/ 
a P. Al is the propensity to spend (absorb) by the private sector on 
both domestic and imported goods; Bl is the propensity to import: 
thus (A 1 + B1) is the propensity to spend, by domestic residents, on 
the home product, q. If we assume that this propensity, (AI + Bl ), is 
sma U, then we get 
(52) 
The signs of the derivatives in (52) seem reasonable and we maintain 
them for subsequent analysis. 
The dynamics in this region of excess demand is given by 
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• p • • [d(E,P) - q(E, P,P)] (53) 
• (E/E) (54) 
where d is constrained aggregate demand whose form is given by (52); 
r a is actual interest rate dependent on E and P with partial 
derivatives signed by (49). 
It is clear that 
• a pI a p - < 0 (55) 
• Further, excess demand implies that P ) o . 
• 
Using (49), the E-stationary, or E - 0 line, is upward sloping. 
Also, 
• 3(E/£)/3 E • r aE < 0 (56) 
Figure 9.3 uses the relevant information to draw the phase lines for 
• • 
the esse P ) O. It should be noted that E - 0 has a positive slope 
• greater than that of P • O. This can be formally proved. The 
equilibrium Z is a saddle point and s~ is the only convergent path 
that leads to long run equilibrium. 
Figure 9.4 shows the complete picture with both cases 
• 
superimposed on the same diagram. The E - 0 line is kinked at the 
• pOint of equilibrium Z. the usual models would have E • 0 sloping 
downwards in both regions of excess demand and supply. The saddle 
path S~ will have a higher absolute slope than SZ. Thus we have a 
kinked saddle path S~S -- a specific innovation of the 
disequilibrium model. 
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We make the usual assumption that P is a backward looking 
variable associated with the stable root while E is a jump variable 
related to the unstable root. 
It Is interesing to note the effect of expansionary monetary 
policy, In figure 9.5, the new equilibrium with a higher money stock, 
is given by Z2' Compared to traditional models, monetary expansion 
causes an even lar~er overshooting of the exchange rate since the 
convergent path S~ has a higher absolute slope. This will increase 
aggregate demand even further, over and above that caused by 
increased money stock. However output is constrained by supply which 
does not respond to demand per se, except through price changes. In 
this specific case, the presence of the intermediate input will 
actually make output to fall on impact. Thus excess demand will be 
even greater than initially conceived. We should thus expect 
inflation to be much higher than forecast by traditional 
·overshootlng" models. However, with a rise in P, ultimately net 
output q responds to expansion and its increase will be rapid since P 
is rising and E falling. Monetary expansion therefore causes high 
Initial inflation with little output effect on impact. But, if wage 
claims are moderated, then the final movements of output and income 
can be rapid, motivated by rising prices and appreciating currency 
(leading to cheaper oil). Demand expansion has no direct effect since 
realised income or output is constrained by supply alone. All effects 
arc indirect via price and exchange rate movements. This again is an 
Interesting, and peculiar, conclusion of the disequilibrium analysis. 
289 
Section ~ Concluding Remarks. 
Unlike the standard short run macro models of the open economy, 
we explicitly incorporate disequilibrium, assuming that the market 
clears on the short side. This gives rise to a dual decision on the 
part of agents which In turn has implications for the dynamics of the 
system. In particular, consequent to monetary expansion, the 
overshooting of the exchange rate is higher. This causes further 
excess demand and consequently more inflation. A feature of 
significant interest is the asymmetric behaviour of the model and a 
klnked saddle path. 
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<'pc-tfnn 1: Tntrorlllrtfnn 
Tt fe; now well '<nown tl)lIt a contrRctionary oolicv, for examole in 
thp form of an unllrHiciolltt'd rpc:iucti.on in the r~te of monetarv prowth, 
1'1;)1 CAue;~ a rllscontinUOtJs ".1umr>" In thp. real exchange rate an~ 
con~pt')uent overshootfn~ of its 10nR run eouiHhriu", value (Dornbusch 
(1976», Bulter aod Miller (1981». A suc:iden appreciation of the 
pxchange rAte addq to t"e outout depressin~ effects of monetary 
contract Illn anli is a 1M.1or CAuse of business cycles in the open 
economv. However, thl~ analysis of policy-induct'c:i economic downturn 
i~nores completely the role of inventory fluctuations in adjustin~ 
to tflst'oullthrillm and In the propa~Ation of short run chan~es in 
aClllrt'p,ate outrut. Tht' puroo~e of our chapter is to Shol~ within a 
tht'orf"tfcal model, how the hehaviollt' of inventorv dynamics may be one 
of thp. mo~t lI'Ioortant CAU!'It'S of output fluctuRtions in a small open 
economY. 
r.urrent reqeRrrh on Inventorlt's in mAcro models (see Blinder 
(19RO), ~llnder and Ftscher (lq~I). Ackley (1983» has succeeded in 
restorfnv. this relatlvp.lv ne~lected topic to its ri1htful position as 
a m.1.1or f>xplanatorv vAriahlE> In the analysis of output chan~ps 
consE'ouent to ~overnment roticy shocks. UnfortunRtelv, macro 
Invpntorv mnrlels to date have predol'linantlv concerned themselves with 
A clo~prl economY. Thp opt'n character of the macro economy exacerbates 
the fnvp.ntorv effects of chAnges In policy part'lmeters. Thus it is 
~xtr~m~ly int~reAtfnp. to study t"e simultaneous movement of output. 
fnv~ntorfps An~ exrhAn~e ratt's. This chanter attempts to analyse 
r:hf'!lP cfurfAl relatfonships and inte'!rate a~~regate inventory analysis 
wfth m~cro thportpR of the on~n economy. 
\Jp wf:qh to 'H"~V th,. m.1('ro~vna",f C~ of tnventories and output in 
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An o~~n ~conomv ~fth f]e~lb]p pxchanp.e rates. In particular, the 
focus of our AnAtY!'11s ~ill hE' the po~sihle tiiscontinuOIls behaviour of 
fnvpntorv Anti rPA\ exch"n~e rAtE' conSE"Otlent to monetarv shocks, when 
the domestic price level is sticky. It wIll be demonstrated that if 
thp. p.ro~th rRte of money is decrea~ed, the real exchan~e rate 
anoreciates rapirllv ("instantaneously"), while the stock of 
fnventories held, rap{c:4tv fall s. There mav thus he "overshooting" in 
hoth exc~"n~p rate And inventory as they fall helow their eouilihrium 
levels tn the short run, after which they hoth slowly move un to 
attain the nE"J f"otltUhrium. The transition oath from one equilibrium 
to another is chAractprlsed hv lower than desired inventorY and an 
aporeclate~ domestic currency followin~ a monetary contraction. Both 
effects tenli to depresR a~~re~ate output causin~ a recession and 
tiownward movement in the business cycle. 
The stylised facts of the rpcent recessionarv experience of the 
U.K. deBcrlb~d hy Bulter and Miller (1981) are consistent with our 
analvtfcal Il1O de I. Thus the chapter thouRh theoretical, also has an 
a~~fttonAl interest In explainin2 some facets of the current movements 
0' U.K. ~lCchAn2e ratt'R and manufactur1n~ outrut in the li~ht of 
Inventorv dynAmics. 
A key relation In thf" mo~els that follow is the functional 
relatfon!'1hlp hE'tween Initial inventory holdin~ (the indenendent 
vAriahlp) "nd lE-vel of nro~lIcti(\n or output (the depencient variable). 
More tlPtoct Hcat1v, loIo"lc4 an fncrea~e 1n initial stock of inventory 
h~l~ hv ffrm~ lpac4 to Rn increase or decrease 1n the level of output. 
An~lvtfcal snli em~frtrat model~ at the firm level Riv~ no definite 
Anqwt>rB. "olt, Mocfl~1l8nt, Muth and Simon (1960) consirler the 
f"'~rovC'~ flro~lI('tf(ln l'I(,~E'~ulfn~ morlE'l where additionAl inventories 
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m.1!(p", mllltfnrol'i"C"r: firm more efficfent an~ thus contribute positively 
to Ollttlllt. lIow("vpr, Arrow, '<arUn anci Scarf (195R) an~ Mills (1962) 
claim the otltloqlt(" and show that ht~her inventories lead to lower 
outPllt. f\lfn<it"r (1Q80) ~("nerally tends to agree with the latter view. 
t..'e have ~hown t"lsewhert- (see Deper and Sen (1983» that usin~ an 
optimAl control frAmework and stressin2 intertempora] optimisation, 
analvtlcal mo~elq can ~tv~ hoth types of conclusions depending on 
paramet~r vallleq. EmpiriCAl evidence is also not clear cut. Mills 
(19~2) provides econo~("tric results for the firm while Deger and Sen 
(lqR3) ft'tlOrts re~ressioM usin~ IT.K. 8R~re~ate data - but no definite 
concluqlon~ CAn he reached. Given this ambi~uity. we choose to work 
with hoth the alternative hypotheses an~ demonstrate the rather 
startlfn2lv dffferent transition paths that follow in a macro model of 
the open economY. 
The plan of the cha~ter is as follows. The next section 
SlImmArifle!l the model, Section '3 analyses transition oaths consequent 
to pollcv 8hoc~9 and the last section draws some oolicy conclusions. 
~pctfon 2: The ~ociel 
The haslc ~~el reflects our interest in analysing the role of 
Invpntorv flllctuAtion!'! M~ A C':8use of husiness cycles within the 
framework of an open ~1Cro economy. We concentrate on monetary shocks 
incitlceci tw It chAn~e In poveTnment policy parameters. The interested 
rPAtier CAn work Ollt the impltcations for fiscal policy and/or other 
Tt'.11 shock!!!. 
The moc4el h rlt>scrlhE'~ hv the following E'Quat{ons: 
• X • -Y(T-O) + 6(e-o) + Co (1) 
~ • k'< - ).r + Il (2) 
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"-
• 
0 • 11 +H + G (N-N) (3) 
, 
11 
• U • m (4 ) 
• ~ . y - ~ ('5) 
Y • -a + h~ (6) 
,.. 
(7) fit • r - r 
fA',' ovpr a vRriRhlp reore~e~t~ ~ time derivative). 
~ l~ AR~re~Rte ~emAnd (sales) while Y is aggregate output 
(pro~uctlon). r is the nominal rate of interest. p is the log of 
• • pr! ct" leve lP, thus p • pIp Is the rate of inflation. e is the lo~ of 
• the nominal exchanp.e rate, so that e is the rate of currency 
8opreclAtlon. The exchan~e rate is defined as the domestic currency 
per unit of forelpn currency, so that its increase signifies a 
dprrp~fAtfon of the domestic currency. m is lo~ of nominal money 
, . 
stock (~), And m • MIM Is the p.rowth rate of money, here assumed to be 
I) policY o ... rampter u. IT 1R c1efine~ as the "core" or u..f'\..I~rl~i"J rate of 
fnflatlon. N fA stock of inventory and N is t~e o~timal or desire~ 
... 
levpl of inventory dpmand. r is the forei~n (international) rate of 
fntprpst pxo~eno\l91v ~iven. G shows the effect of autonol'lous demand, 
for eX.1mple ~overnmpnt exoenciittlres. y, 6, ~,~, 6, k are behavioural 
r~rampterA, constAnt and all rositive. 
FQU3tton (1) fs the IS relation where a~~re~ate demand is a 
• funet fon of the rPAl fnterest rate (r-p) and the 10R of the real 
exchan~e rate (c:-o). F.QlI.1t fon (2) ~lve9 the LM relation demand (equal 
to flunotv) (or money fA ... function of a~llre~ate demand for output 
(trAnq~~tlons mottvp), nominAl rate of interest (speculative motive) 
Anti orfe-I" If'vf'l. This f'(JIIAtfon h In semi-lo!l linear form. The index 
of reA' ~.11.1n~p fA thtl!l m-po F.QII,'ltfon (3) is a Phll11rs curve 
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• ~ate of inflation p is the sum of 
"cnrpM rate of Inflation n. a variahle reflectin2 
ap.~rpp.Atp Olltflllt (rrotillctfon) Y. anci the difference between actual and 
tie~frp~ (nvpntory. When the desired demanti for inventory is greater 
th~n Actu.,1 ho)citnp.. then I'lricE's are increaseci to reduce demand and 
stimulatp Rto~k crpation. ~QuRtlon (4) assumes that the core rate of 
• inflAtion 1~ Pl'lual to thp. ~rowth rate of money (m=u). w,ere u is fixed 
hv monetRrv ,,"thori t le~. Choice of units makes full employment output 
"OllRt~ zero. 
~QuAtlon (5) is dpfinitionAI where inventory accumulation is the 
dlfferE'n~e t.etwf'en product'on Y 8n<l demand x. l~e assul1le that no 
stock-outs occur ~o that if demand is ~reater than curreflt production, 
the fot'm4'r h met by recluc1n~ stocks. 'F,quation (6) is crucial given 
the previously mentioned relation between output and inventory. As 
«1lsC'lIs!IIel'! In ~('ctlon 1. the si~ of oarameter b is controversial. It 
h~~ hE'en c1afmpd that increase in initial inventory held. may add to 
the ef'(cfE'ncv of a firm lpadin~ to a higher output. thus b > O. 
AlternAtivplv. increA~ln~ mAr~inal costs to inventory holding may make 
h < O. Wp I'Ih",t1 th\l~ lPAVP the siJm of h unspecified. dealing with 
hoth rositfve And nE'RAtfve caqes. ~ote if b > O. a > 0, alternatively 
If h < O. a < O. 
FQu.1t inn (7) Ap!H'rfheq the ooen E'conomy"s capital accounts and 
reorp .. pnt~ covprp..t (ntprpst pnritv. 'NE' assume rational expectations 
whf~" In the "''''I'It"n~t" of uncerta{ntv is tantamount to perfE'ct 
fon,,,,t~ht. Thllq thf" f'lCI'H"CtE'<i An'" actual f>lCchan$.!e rRtE' aporeciations 
... rf> ~QUAl to ~A~~ other An~ df'fI~nd~ on thE' difference hetween ciomestic 
... n~ forpir." r~tf'''' of fntE'rp~t (r-r). 
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,.. ... ('ro"lO~~h l'~ wpll ~~ m;t('ro1nve-ntorv analvsis (see 'R"iter anli Miller 
(lqRI) for th~ former an~ Slinli~r (lQ80) for the latter). However, as 
f"r /Iq we know, th~v have nt>vt>r he-en hrolll?ht together, and tlrus the 
primAry purpoqe hpre i~ to study the interrelationships between e, N, 
Y. 'C anti u. 
<;fnce Otlr lM,ior inte-re!'lt i!'l in transition paths anc' 
ril!lt>Quf l1hrftlm nh('nol"t'non, we a!'lsume 10n~ run neutrality. Thus the 
100$1 run E'Qulllhrfum vllllle of inventory held (the optimal or desired 
l('v('l) is 118!'lUm~<1 to he a constant N. unaffected bv monetary growth 
rate u. It is 11 simple extension to the results that follow, to 
,. 
aSRUmP thllt N is 8 function of nominal variables, thus allowing for 
non-neutrality. The disE'Quilibrium behaviour of the economy remaIns 
si,..ill1r and nothtn~ of substance is altered. We shall also assume 
from now on for notational simplification that GwO. The case for G>O 
will he obvloulI. 
To solve the model for its lon~ run eauIIIhrium, ~efine two new 
varfshIes, An intipx (loq) of real balance 
(8) 
Rnti IIn tn~px (lOR) of rp ... l pxchlln~e rate 
(9) 
• • 
t • c • 0 (10) 
thus relll hAl~n('e 8n<1 relll exchan~e rates are constants. Further, the 
core rAtE' of inflation ill eQulII to the actual rate of inflation. We 
(11) 
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FOlltlthrfum h aho chArActpri!':eli I--v inventory attainin~ its clesirec:' 
1 E'VE' 1 
N -~ (12) 
an<i • 
N 
-
0 (13) 
npnotfnv. f"outlfhdllm hv starrec:' (*) vatue~ and using (1) to (13) 
y* • x* - 0 (14) 
N* 
• N • s/h (15) 
• 
p - u (16) 
r* • r + U (l7) 
.. 
t* - -Hr + u) (18) 
.. 
c* • 0./6 )r (l9) 
let UA now conAi~er dynAmic oaths. lnventory hehaviour, exchange 
ratE' moVE'mpnts 8n~ monetAry policy are central issues here so dynamics 
will he anAIY8~A In terms of three variables - inventory (N), real 
fll'llrllt E'ouAtfons (1) to (4) an<i (6) ' .. e first ~et 
x - (l/~)ryt + ~(y~h - yf)N + 6c + ~q) (20) 
.. 
(whf"rp ~ • (~y + ~) > 0; q • (YU - Y~A + yfN» and 
r - (l/~)fky(~h - f)N + k6c - t + kQ) (21) 
t~E' rplatfonl'lhln hptwPf"n IIp.RrPRAte demand or sales (X) anrl stock of 
fnvpntorv (N). From (20) we have 
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(22) 
A~ 'N"nt lof'lf'~ f".1rlff"T, th~ ~ip.n of h I!'; Amhf~uous. 'h' ~lves the 
hphAVlolJrAl rt>lAtton hptwE'E'n output an" inventory (h - aV/':!N fro", 
(~»). Tf h I~ npPAtlve AS ~urppstE'rl hv ~ome of the micro literature 
on lnvpntorif's (fnchl(Hn~ Rlfrl<it>T (1980), then it i~ cleFfnitelv true 
thAt 3~ ta" < O. 'IowPver, this contradict!'; the rpcent m<lcro 11 terature 
(~tfn~pr And Ft~cht>r elq~l» which claf~ thAt an increase in initial 
Inventorv will fnCTPA~p total sales, thus under eouilihrium, aX/aN > 
o. A positive relAtion ht>twpt>n X and N is consistent with b > 0 but 
not otherwf~e. As wC' shall st>e later, the sign of (~h-f) (which 
in turn slr-ns ax/av from (22» will be t>xtremely i~portant in studying 
transitionAl PAths. Given that past literature is controversial, to 
circumvent this prohlem WP shall therefore deal with two alternatives, 
Assumln~ first thAt (tb-f) > 0 and noting its implications and then 
doln~ thp oonoslte. To slmolifv the notation from hereon we define 
Q - (f - .h) 
Not I ocr from (~) thAt 
• • 
t - m 
• 
- n 
we ~f't After so~e simplification 
• 
t - etA - fN) + nN 
~Imflarlv from (9) 
• • • 
C - E' - P 
• C • (~/6)~~ - (l/h)! + (k~/h)c 
.. .. 
+ r(~o/6) - r - U + ~A - fN)l 
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Fin<tlly. \ls~n~ ~he dd lnr~ion ut ~ trom (5) and suhs:;i::u~ing from (1) 
~o (h). 
~ • Ib + (Ay/6)n)N - (y/6)t - (A6/6)c - la + (Aq/6)] 
(28) 
The comllle~e model consists then ot the three diff erential 
• 1 • 11 ~ + Z 1 (29) 
c • (-1/6)1 + {k6/6)c + (An/6)N + Z2 (30) 
~ • (-A/6)1 + (-A5/6)c + (b + (Ayn)/6]N + Z3 (31) 
where Z1' Z2' Z3 are functions ot exogenous variables defined as 
Z1 • ("8 - tN) 
.. 
Z2 • (kq/6) - r - \.I + ~a - tN») 
Z3 • -(a + (Aq/6»). 
The ~olution ot these difterenLial equations (29), (30), (31), 
g!Vt·g us eXAct time paths of cCt), Mt). l{t) and thus all other 
endo~~n~ls v~riables in particular yet), X(t). r(t). The qualitative 
characteristics of solution paths and the etfect ot policy shocks are 
dealt with in Lhe next section. 
DAEMB 
Tht> dynamir. hehav 10\1 r of the economy is well analysed by looking 
at t ht> 1"~1 t r 1)( 0 f th(' first derivatives (Jacobian) of the system and 
studylnll the propertlt>N of characteristic roots. We have from (29) to 
(31) , 
0 0 n 
A • (-l/~) (H/f.) ('An/~) (32) 
(-y/~) (-A6/~) [b+(A yrl) / ~) 
The d~t~rmlnAnt of this matrix 
IAI • n[('A6+yk6)/f. 2 ) 
• n 6/6 (33) 
dYes the product of the characteristic roots. As can be seen from 
(l), the sl~n of IAI d~pends crucially on that of O. Since this Is 
20lnll to play a mAjor role in the analysis and, as discussed 
previously, theory a priori dOt>s not allow us to si~n unambiguously, 
we havt" to delll with a nllmher of possibilities. In essence there are 
three altprnAtlve CAses: 
(11) h > 0, n < ° 
(h) h < 0, n > 0 
(c) C > 0, 0 > 0 
~e shAll delll tn Romp detllll with the first two. As will be clear to 
the r .... der, thr sllllltlon TIl('thod for case (c) 15 an amalgamation of (a) 
Anti Ch) an(i thprefort' np('d not he analysed extensively. 
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lI('re an Incrp3sP In inventory stock at the beginning of the 
p .. rioli 11'.1kt'li thE' multiorociuct firm more efficient in planning 
oroductlon and thus increases output. Inventory has a direct 
productivity .. Hpct (see f"C'!uation (6». Further b is not too SlT\all, 
so we also h.lve n • f...pb < O. 
5incp thp d('terminant 'A' is negative from (33), there are two 
possibilities for the si~ns of the characteristic roots, if they are 
distinct and real (we nlle out complex roots). Either, all three 
roots Are nep.8tive, or one of them is ne~ative and two positive. In 
the for~r CAse stability is ~aranteed and the analysis is 
strah:htforward. However, the Ro ... n:; Hurwicz conditions cannot be 
verifl~d since the trace of the matrix A (equation (32» need not be 
ne~ative. Be that as it may, this possibility gives rise to standard 
results and nef"d not detain us lon~. 
The more interrstlng case is when one characteristic root is 
npgatlve while the other two are positive. In such cases the stable 
root (negative) needs to he associated with a predetermined variable 
while the unstahle roots (positive) need to he related to 
~on-rrt'dp~~r~fnE'd variables. In terms of economic intuition, the 
prf'determlnrd v.'lriablt's are "backward look!n'!:" in the sense that they 
\ 
cannot IOOve discontinuously (or ".1ump" a la Sargent) and their current 
value is 1l1vrn by past history. The non-predetermined variables on 
the othpr hAnd arf' forward lookin~ and may change rapidly 
(discontinIlO\llllly) wh('n the E')(O~enOllS variables (such as money growth 
rate t n ollr IIkHf~ 1) jump. If we can ident Hy the number of stable 
roots with prrdetC'rmlnrd varlahles and thf> numher of unstable roots 
with non-prrd~tC'rmln~d v~rtAhlrs then a saddle path exists. Initial 
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V.11111"'''I of thl"' non-nrf'r't'tPJ"1nfneti v~ri ... n]es ~iven the reouirement that 
t~p lAttf'r 111"' on the ~tAhle mRnlfolti (nlane) (see ni~ft (1980». 
Trlpntifv{ng vnrlAhtes as hRcKwllrd or forward loo~fn~ j~ a matter 
of p("I'H,nmfc '!'tuitlon. Followfn~ Rufter line' ~1Jler (l<}81) we assume 
thAt thl' ~rfce lrvel Is slu~glsh, thus the stoc~ of rea] halance (i) 
1"1 rrpriPtpr",fnl'ci. Thf!'l "CCO\lnt~ for thp unioue nep-RtiVf~ root. On the 
othl'r .... Ilnd, t.he reAl exchanRe rRte followfnll Dornhusch (l97~) is 
ot-violl",lv " C'An<'lc'",te f('lr 8 forw,Qr(1 looking varfahle which c~n chanp,e 
rlloftilv (".1111110") In the flres(>ncp. of npw information or policy shock!':. 
~e ctltf~ "'" the innovAtion of this paner th~t the level of inventory 
~emllnr'e(1 hv the re~resent8tlve firm fn the Onen economy is also a 
forwllrti ) 001( f nQ non-ort·(1et ermt ned VB rishle. Prodllcers loll th rat i ona 1 
exnf"ct,lltion"l foresee the future on the basis of current information 
Itft .. r th .. noHev ehAn",., ane:' Ati.111St their l.nventory stoc~ very 
r""fcilv, flI""'''Ifhtv ~,vln~ (sellin~) from ahroad, thus ma~in~ inventory 
non-prp(1 .. r:erl"ln('d. Pnl1Kp. the traditional literature which deals with 
Inventorv "'" " re"lltiIlAl, loll' IIn,qly!'!€' it in thp. context of a fuller 
~pcl",lon-mAl(fn~ Itnci control vRriAhlp. The economy hehaves like a 
Am~lt firm In th~ ~omp~ttttve worlrl; thu~ stocKS can chan~e rapidly. 
To (l('riv,," the f'1'1,,~tfon for the- Rtahle- tra~€'ctorv anti the values 
of non-prf'J~t~~[nf'~ c Anti ~ fn termR of oredetprminerl I" we utilise 
It ", .. t~oJ ~\lfI' to nhft (19IHH. Assume th<H: the three c-haracteristfc 
root'" ,IIr~ el, 02, 03, where 
o 
1 < 0, 02 > 0, 03 '> 0 
t.pt 
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h<.> thp. row vC'ctor of <if'viations of variables from their (new) 
('Quill ~r turn valu('s. Th~n system (29), (30) , (31 ) can be written as 
• )( 
- Ax (36) 
IfMh thp 0'1.3) m.1lt rix (with elements mi1 ) whose rows are the 
corr~spondfn~ left ~ t ~('n vectors of A then 
~IA • R~ (37) 
wh~rp 
°1 0 0 
8 • 0 °2 0 (38) 
0 0 6 3 
Let 
y • ~!lC (39) 
CI~Ilr1y 
• y • By (40) 
80 that for ~o~-prpd~!~r~inpd variahles correspondln~ to the unstable 
roots, the corr~spondtn~ y(t)'s must be zero. In other words, Y2(t) -
From (39) we have 
• 
t(t) 
~(t ) 
N(t) 
(41) 
where hArred valu('~ denote deviations from equilibrium. Given the 
r ('(') lit r (' ITW' n t 8 for fI,. d d 1 (' P 3 t h s t 8 btU t Y , 
-
Y2(t) • m21 1(t) + mZ2 c(t) + m33 N(t) - 0 (42) 
(43) 
El1l1.Hfono; (42), (43) CAn he solved to get 
-cCt) • (C~2i~33+m23m3i)/Cm22m33-m23~32»)t(t) (44) 
r:(t)· (-m22m31+m21m32)/(m22m33-m23m32»)t(t) (45) 
~htch 1~ wrttt~n In slmolified form as 
eCt) - c* • v1Ct(t) - t*) 
~(t) - N* • v2(t(t)-t*) 
wh~re vi and v2 ar~ functions of mij • 
(46) 
(47) 
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For Initial valu~s of t(O), these two equations then ~ive us the 
values of eCO) and N(O). Thus (46), (47) are the equations for the 
saddlp path that leads the economy to its ultimate lon~ run 
equl11 brlum. 
We now n~~d to find the characteristic vectors or elements of M. 
Take the second row of H initially and note that it corresponds to the 
root 02. Thus 
(48) 
Cwh~re I 18 the Identity matrix and (C.» denotes a matrix). 
~:orm.'lltsln~ 11122 • 1 "nd after some al~ebra we get 
(49) 
(50) 
Cnotp thp el~mcnts of A from (32». 
lTqtnll thp !I.11T11' I!I(>thod for the third row of M and the other 
(51) 
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To ~nn~~l1trAtp ~tt~ntfnn on th~ rel~ti~n~hi" ~etween inventory 
(~) ~~A th~ "r~~~tpr~fn~~ vAriahle t, con~i~er (47) an~ write it as 
(53) 
('55) 
"'33 ~ (56) 
Tt,f .. f"'"1ft'''! thAt ),nth thf' numerAtor 8f1~ den~mtnAtor of v2 (see 
PlluJltf('ln (V.» h ... v(' thE" ~AmP ~trn. Tt is i!'lport~mt to note that hoth 
(57) 
T t ~l'In hp fIIhown fn prpcflllE'lV th~ !';Ame w:w that v l > 0 so that the 
"nf",I-' 11 •• th ,hltt If''''~!'& tn thf' lnnl! rlln E'olltlft-rf"",. Tl,e lAtter 
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th"" ~ cf",lblr "hl"noml'non o(,C"lIr~ in An fnvf>ntorv au~mentec' open 
T"'~ hc-hAvlour of I nv('ntorv (non-oTPtietPrmi npif) anet rea1 balance 
P'111 ... tfon" In N ,.n~ t. Thf!'l ~b;o he)os In ~rawln2 a phase c11a2ram for 
th(" I'Y)cf('l. ron-.'(iprfflP only thf' homol"pnous part of (29) to (31), 
• ~ • -(A6vl+Y'I/~ + rh+(~yn)/~lN (58) 
• 
1 • r.~ (59) 
• • 3'l/H < n, ~'J nN RI gn 8mh. ~UOtlS, 
a~nt • 0, • HnS < 0 
'!M'" now th~ fntprpstinv. pffpctlll of ,. C'ontracttonarv monetary 
ro1fC"v. Th,. 'nl,f ... l f'ollllfhrtllm is 2tvf'n at ~l*. t\' anti t*· tt. 
T~~ cttA~ll" rArh f~ ~~notf'A hv ~l~l' A etp(,TPa~p In the ~rowth rate of 
I"f)nl'V rrotl'I('i''' ... nl"w l('\n~ rlln rOllflfhrfum 1* • .t~ anti ?-"* • N. Since 
"' .. It"""""'" n ... "trAlttv, rh,. ('ollilfhrillm lnvpntorv Is at Ho; constant 
(API'drrA) 11""1'1 '1 :In" thlloCl t'Qutl1hrfu," output is the same as bpfore 
,hp rnntr~(rfnnArv ~n"rt~rv C"hAnpf'. PowevPT, from (18), the stock of 
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T .... tr"n"ltlol'l 1'\,1t" f~ (,TuC'ial. ,.~ the CTowth rate of money 
()n .'H' 1I., .. t~hl .. tr:t1,..C'toTV. Th~ pr1C'~ ]pVE'l is sticky Rn~ the stocl( of 
t"" "",~,.nr .. 0' tlt1('prt ... fntv ImllliE'S perfE'ct foresi~ht. Foreseeing the 
Ol"W 8tAht .. I'\~t~ ~2~2' t~~v rE'ciuce Inventory stocks dis('ontinuously and 
thf~ f~ ro .... fht,. .. fnr,. fnvrntorv f .. a non-pre~etermined variahle. A 
r"'l'\l~ h1 t In tTw('ntorv enSlles, which !liven that b > 0 (see equation 
fnvt'ntorv "n,4 rf"!41 hAhnct" hoth move upwards continuously (note from 
(4)7) tt, ... t '12 > C') And finAllY re"ches the new eQuUihriu1'll ~2. 
Th,. AflfprpnC'1' with ~tAn~"rrl ¥evnE'sian inventory analysis 
ClndllA'f'\1l t"" v,.rv rl'C'f''''' on~ hv Rlindt"r (l9RO» is fundamentally 
SfPf'(\rtAnt. Th,. I'ItAn,brti Iltt"rAturt" assumes that II demand shock (here 
fr I .. In th .. 'or'" <,f ... ('~ntr"C'ti('\n) w111 c"uSt:' output to exceed !':a)es. 
T..,,,4 "":t,,r f('It'.,tC'~ Inv,.ntorv Acr\lmnlAtE's !':o that the actual amount of 
Ilfnr"" III hlc~ th..-n d .... frf'ti. This proml"ts oToduC'ers to reduce 
OtltPllt whP .. .,J.flt'nn:tl Invt'ntorv h run clown UT'tfl the new 
f'o.dllhrtu'1l. Ifow.-v,.r, thl .. tTAciftlonal analysts f"sct,ew~ the effects 
('If (r~t lon:\') t'l«N"('tAt Inn... rroclucE'rs "re passive, non forward 
IlfM'\(" "0 rh.-., rC'''l'(In.4• Th\l" tnv~ntortps first rise since they are 
r,. .. lrt"",l". "ft .. r w'd(,h <ltOrN"' form of stocl{ adi\lstl'lt'nt~ take place. 
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Invpntorv. Thf'v IIntfdJ)atl' that dplT!anci will fall after a decrease in 
PIOnt>[ary ",rowth utt'. Thus ~tvE"n the current rate of prociuction they 
will hav,. In rh(' "(,3r futurp. surplu!; or I!:reater than desired stocks. 
To fort"stAll thAt possihility they reduce current inventories rapidly 
so thAt whpn thp lower sAlt's materialise, producers have new 
lnvt'ntorit's to rt'~lild stocks to desired levels. "Overshootin~" of 
lnvt>ntorlp~ tllkp~ plare hecause the price level is sluggish and cannot 
t-e ac1lustco<i In antlciratlon of dE.>mand chane:es. The shadow price of 
inv('ntory, on th .. other hAntf, is a "1ump" variable whose change makes 
It latorthwhll ... for producers to re-duct' stocks at the time of 
cont rAn Ion. 
This Is once A.tlltn an example of thE.> "Hahn problem". Producers 
~ake two decisionA at the mAr~ln; one is to produce for inventories, 
th~ oth{'r Is to satisfy d('mand from inventories. Thus inventory takes 
on the form of " CApitAl good or durable asset. In a multiple asset 
world (A" here), saddlE" path properties and discontinuous changes in 
tl~ paths of VAriAbles hecomp important. 
tower invpntory leAds to inefficiency and contributes to a fall 
In output, flv.-n thollL'h the decrease in the latter may not be by as 
much (h will \18\1ally hI:" 1(,9s than 1). Simultaneously, the 
, 
"overshootln~" of thp reAl f'xchanl!:e Tate a la Dornbusch and the 
IncreAflt" In the real intert'st rate all contribute to a faU in demand 
wHeh Itplc>1( wt 11 IIffpct outpllt aftf'l" a time. The combination of the 
two ""'\Y ('All"" An importAnt rE"c('!';sion 8S the current conditions in the 
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CAS" (tl): h ( 11, U > (\ 
In ~hls case, An increase In ~he amoun~ of inven~ory held leads 
to It <1t-('1!n" In pro,111('tion (OIl~P\l: V). The analysis nolo1 is more in 
Un,,· wl~h tr ... ,tltiond ideas of inven~()ry cycles and as Io1e demonstrate 
below inven~ory holdin~ chAn~es continuously after policy changes. 
The t,ull~.,ction !M:.rb A (see equation (32» remains similar. 
lIoweve r, tht! dt"te rminAnt ot A has a dif f eren: sign from the previous 
c"'~t! and W\' nllw havt' IAI > O. Sinct! ~he oroduct of the characteristic 
roo~~ 1~ positive it 1s possible to have all roots positive. We rule 
out, tohL" unst"ble model. Assume that at least one characteristic root 
is ne~atlve. Then since IAI > 0, we must have tlo10 roots negative and 
one posit,ive (all roots are assumed to be real and distinct). 
[k-not,lnlot roo~!I by 01, °2 , °3 , we have say 
01 ( (1,02 > 0, 03 < 0 (60) 
In the li~ht ot the earlier discussion we need two variables to 
be predt!terminrd (correspondin~ to el, 63) and one to be 
non-oredetermined (corresponding to 6 2 ). Once again it is plausible 
:0 assur.l\! red f'xchange rate is a "jumo" or forward looking variable. 
ThlJ~ the.' mod"'l dictAtes thlSt inventory and real balance are 
prt'de~"rmint'.t, And are ~iven at any point of time by "history". The 
economy 8t11l l'xhibits sAd.lle point equilibrium but only the real 
e)(ChAIW" rlt~t" "JU~l8" to rellch the stable manitold ~iven the ini:.:ial 
v"luc-" (ll t And~. The dynAmics 01 the state variable (l,N) dictate 
tht> 1IlC)V('m~n~" of tht" systt'm while the equation of the saddle path 
~1vt''' ~h .. v .. ll1e ot c which mllst be attained at every point of time on 
tr ... ,,,4Lt.loll p.1thll for till' economy to reach equilibrium. 
t.,,~ UlI' Id t ch;irltctt'rist!c vector associated with the unstable 
llh 
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h8l'l h .. rn n,lfl1l.1lt!i;l·d to \lnfty. Tht"n using Dixit's metho~ (1980) we 
h.1vP 
(wl,-I,w2> °2 0 -\I 
lIt:. 62-k61t:. -)..\1/6 - (0, 0, 0) (61) 
y/A ),6/6 92-% 
(whttre z • !'IHy!"l/h). (Note this is similar to equation (48». 
$olvin~ (61) qtv~8 uS 
(62) 
w2 • f-O).n/h"'1/hJ/fO(a-z)+~/t:.J (63) 
It lA clt"~r thAt qiv~n b < 0, \I > 0, the si£n of % is unknown and 
we cannot d~termine the 8i~n of w.and '"'2 a priori. Assume then that z 
< 0, tn other ""ord~ b is lltr~e enou~h to dominatt" this terlr. Then we 
w1 > 0 
hut w2 c~n 8tl11 !'le either positive or ne~ative. 
Th~ r~lAtton bptwt"~n predetermined and non-predetermined 
vArtA~l~~ ~~n now be written 8S (in deviation form from equilibrium) 
(64 ) 
$incp w1 > 0 on thp ~8ddle path real halan~e and real exchange rate 
I!lOVP tO~(lth(lr. Thus our rpslllt conforl'l.~ to the Oornhusch prediction 
(rrovirlpd r. < 0). With 8 monetAry contraction, tht> real exchange rate 
will (.1tt ("'flrrf'dAtf') or "lump" down\olards, then move up\Jards to its 
f'<Jutlthrluftl "Alu ... Simultllot"ollsly tht> levf'l of rf'al balance \oIi1l 
fncrfOM'p, ... In(' .. '' (t('dinp in money qrowth raft> incrt>ases tht> 
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nnC',. ,h'.1fn }('t Uq fO('lls attf'ntion on the relationship between 
fnvt'ntnrv :111.1 rr:\) ),:\) ... ,,("t' noting that hoth are predetermined here. 
C;ut-,ttturfnl1 (f.t') In thp cHfff'fE'nt1a1 ("Quation for N, (31), and usinll 
( 2?) w... h .'t v,. 
• (65) 
• 
, • r.-.: (66) 
• 0 • 
It ill c1~ltr th ... t ~N/a < 0, 3Nf;lN sbn indeterminate, 3t/(lN - n > 0, 
• 
3r./H • o. 
• 
ThE' two rh~se dla~r8ms (derendln~ on the signs of aN/aN) are 
shown In Fl~ur~9'O.3 And/O.4. In both cases there are invt>ntory 
c~c1('s arollnd ('<1I1I11brium E) (detE"rmined on the basis of an 
("xov. .. nous}y f 1 xt"d IIIon("y ~rowth fate \.11). A decrease in money growth 
shifts th(' orw ('<1ullibrillm to E2 • The dotted line shows a possible 
~ot~ OIN (h(' fundamental difference with case (a). A 
contractlonAry d(,~1nd shock (as shown in the fi~ure) will inevitably 
l(" ... d to Inv('ntory sto("ks rlsio~ initially. This is because inventory 
hol~ .. r~ Ar~ pnA~lvp ~nd not beh~vin~ in a forward looking way, Simply 
accpptfnll N "" a r('sldllAl. As df'mand falls, dven output, inventory 
rl~p~. An In('r"A~" in N abOVE" its dpsired level causes out~ut to fall 
an.-t thco ('('onOlY'Y IY'OV~8 Into" rl"cpqsion. However, the trend is 
rpvprArd after " ll~ and" cycle takE'S place around the new 
(''1 l1 ll1hr(um. tnvf'ntorlE'8 start decl1nin~ from Fl and thE.' destockinlZ 
If';1ri .. tn It tI(~n.11 for mort' rrodllctfon. The behaviour of the model Is 
": .. yn(,fltAn "".! .ifAftlt'tric:-"lly 0Pfloll1te to the forward lookinll attributes 
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The' rl'rf'nf thf"I'\ff!'t IrAl litpratllrf!' on op<>n econo,.,y macro models 
h~v~ ~tr('~~rd f!'~chnn~~ rate oVf!'rshootin~ when there is an 
un.1ntldr.l\tf'ri ('han~f' In thE" ~rnwth rate of lOOney. Specifically, a 
('ontrAC'tlon In mon('t.1rv ~rowth If!'ads to a sudden appreciation of the 
real f!'.rhan~,. rAt~ ~lv('n an inflE"xihle (sticky) price level. Here 
wC' h~vf' trlC'd to Intf!'~rAtP an inventory model with exchan~e rate 
(luC'tuatlons to ~how hnw an analysis of inventory behaviour can £ive 
11"1'" ",u("h ch".1rE"r In!tlll:ht of the hE"haviour of output on transition 
~ath .. out of 10nl% run f!'Qull1hrium. 
nt'r .. ndln~ on th(O v .. hlE"s of paramett"rs, a number of alternative 
~nssthtlltlp" ~'nlfpst thpm~plvps. In particular, when there is a 
posittvp (tprhnolo~l(' .. l) rplationship between output and inventory (b 
> 0) Anti thp nlllN'rl ('A 1 v.11uE"s of parameters are such that P. < 0, then 
th .. Amollnt of lnvt'ntory thp allllrt'llate firm wishes to hold becomes a 
forv.1rti looklnll non-prpdt'ter~lned variahle under rational 
t'xpertAtlnn-. FArC'd with a contra('tionary demand shock and knowin~ 
thAt (utur.- ,ulfOlII will ~ low, the 81lllre~ate firm runs down current 
lnv('ntory vrry rAoldly. Prl('p Inflexibility does not allow the firm 
to A<ft\).t to th .. n('\l lonlt run pqull1brium Quickly. Thus £iven 
rr.,dt'tt'1"1Pln ptt rt'AI ha1anc'p, the level of inventory falls below its 
df'!llrf!'..t (f'Qutllhrlum) If'vf'l ev~n hefore the fall in sales has taken 
plAcf'. Th~ rol~ of .nticln~tton~ then is crucial here. Inventory 
hnldl"~ III not .. rt'~tdll .. l in this model as in a standard Keynesian 
on .. , rAth .. r Invt'ntory Ad ,lIstmf.'nt takes place fS!olter than other 
\·"rI ... ~l(" •• 
CI .. "rly, rh .. rApid fAll In inventory as analysed In the model 
vUh n(lt t,,\e .. rlACI" "'n"tl\ntAn4"ollsly". A dlstrihuted lae: mechanism 
I\I\f.AA R 
\lfll (lnf'r.1r". ""t our ffret rIO~pl "Ul'l'p<;ts thAt fnvpntorv rec'uctf.on~ 
\/flt hI' ~tr~ (~~t~r th~n th~ rh~nre" fn orlrE" Ipvel or Teal h~lance 
(rr,.Apt,.r~f"p~ v~rlAhl~~). If w~ ~rp ~ske~ to (f~pllc(tly) Tan~ these 
thr,.,. v~rI ... hl,." In t,.nn~ 1"'1' snprti!; of Aci.1usttnents, then ca"e (a) of 
'''''' "r~vfnll" ",prt 'on 11""1 fl'!' th~t the Tan\(ln9 wOI\I~ he rE"<ll. exchan~e 
r~r,.. I~v~nfnrv ~nd rPAl h",l~nre chAnpes. It is in this sense that we 
(' lA 1"1 th.,t .. nth rf'.' 1 "l(rh,qn~p rAtp Itnli I nventory Are non-predetertninecl 
vnrf,.",t,." lfAhl,. to A.~.1u"t In thp fAC'p of nf"W information quitP 
rnnlrilv. " .. C"UT IIn.,lv"ls shnw .. A monptarv (ciemsn"') contraction then 
"'('1\11<1 l"'olv ~ r"nlri IInprf'("flltinn of thE" exch8n~e rate an ... a fast fall 
In 'nv~ntorv "tor~ .. hnth nf whIch wtll "nvershoot" their respective 
,..,,,lllhrf,, AnA (,nntrlhutp to III rE'(,psston. A contractionarv demand 
"hor~ A~ hpr,. wfll tE'A~ to Ill' Inl~tAt fa1) In Inventory An~ then 
rl.lrp to ftA ~l'~lr ... ~ t,.v,.l. 
Th,. orhf'r ro,,~lhl1 Itv (rASE' (h) of the previous section) gives us 
th,. 1(,.vn~.',qn vI .. ", ... h ... r(l> Invf"ntorv hnl(Hn~ is initiAllv a residual. 
Th'l" fnUnwfno " r~.hl("tlnn in mon("v vrowth anti a contractionary demand 
flhorlc. rroA"(' .. r,, hltv .. "n.1!'ttcff' ... t("~ Inventory anti onlv after that do 
th .. v try to A,HlIlCt It to thp til'Rtrf'~ Ipvel. Tnitiallv thprE" is a rise 
In ~foe~!C An~ th .. n , .. llton tow~r~~ ttR desired level. Inventorv 
~~o~,.!C A rT,.A,.t~r~ln"~ v~r'~hlp. At any point 0' time ~{ven hy past 
"p~Avtnltr IIn.t h"l.' .. r!C of Invf'ntorv pxhlhtt hAckwarli looi(ing behaviour • 
. ~rotln ... f'()l11 I fhrllll'l Wl' h.1"~ lnvt'ntorv ("v('leR. 
Th,. 1"'t'.HtAn('t' of Invl'ntorv nll('tllatlonq ItS a stvlise~ fact of 
"'I",tr .. ," ("vel .... , .. "n.'('nl"h1,.. ()ur chlll'tf"r dvf's a theoretical 
'or ... "lI'lIArlt'n or rh,. rr,,('I ... l Intf'rrc-latfon!':hff'lc; thAt may exf~t hetwepn 
In\,,,"rnrv ... v(' ... Jt., .... r.1r .. Ant4 rl',11 h."l1nnre (th\lR t"p mnnE'v !'ltock and 
f'r'~" l .. v .. n fn r .... "'''ort rltn ror ~ m~(,TO modc.>t of thp <'f'PO p("onomy. 
1:20 
In vl.'w or th" .-dlt'rn.I( IVl' I'"s,dhllitles that exist and the rich 
v.Hi .. ty of r",,"it$ th.H (.111 he .~l·'wratcd theoretically, more empirical 
r('~eJrch ~holllJ tl(' condllC'll·d to glv(' us an idea of the signs of values 
of p.tr.ll11cters Involved. In p.Htl('u1.1r, as we have seen, the sign of the 
coefficient 'b' pIdyS a crucial role in the conclusions that follow 
(ro~ rollcy an~lysis. TIlls comes from equation (6), a quasi production 
function, which rcl~t~~ inventories (as the independent variable) to 
aggrf'y'.1tf! O\ltp\Jt. The difficult)' of estimating this function. in its 
speclfled forGl, llf'!I in the close co-relationship betwen the two 
vAriables. It is not possible therefore to establish causality since 
froGl inventory theory it can be claimed that causal relations of 
influence can work either way. TIle problem is particularly acute with 
macroeconomic datA given the n~tlonal income identities. 
Oeger and Sen (1983) do some Cranger-Sims causality tests with UK 
quarttrly m.1cro~conomlc data and find that the production relation 
dlscu.s~d in thl~ chapter could be justified empirically; inventory may 
Cranger-CAUSf' output. However, one should be very careful about such 
tests slvrn the recent scepticism regarding atheoretical 
m~crorconometrlc •• There can be many expla-nations for pure data based 
'c~l\J!utlon'; without Ad('q\lAtc theoretical foundations, it is not easy 
to clAim th~t It 1. lnv~ntory th~t Influences output and not the other 
way around. 
Th ... rro(f\lctlon "chcdllltng model for the aggregate firm gives us a 
good f('.1I(0n why hlr,h«>r lnvl'ntory-stock could, in principle. contribute 
to eorc errlcll'ncy .1nd thrrrby r~lse 0utPUt. An alternative (see Deger 
.In.t ~C"n (l(}~)) ,,, to \I~(' .10 opttm;,l control model to solve the firms 
lnt~r-trmror~l optlmlslng problem ~nd in the process get a relation 
whereby lnv~ntory ~rr.ctM output. Using these theoretical 
(~lcrorconomlc) results AS ~ starting point. Oeger and Sen (1983) 
estloJte ~ slnglr ~qu~tlon output-inventory relationship from UK 
qu~t.rly d~t~. Th~ Appropriate lag structure is chosen through 
diagnost Ic du'cks And the n('ed to be parsimonious. The long run (steady 
state) p~r~mett'r turns out to be positive. in accordance with the 
an~ly91. :U prt'lIt'ntcd In case (a) above. Our model. in this chapter, 
would predict for thl. case that inventory would need to move 
relatively fast for the economy to attain the saddle path and thus 
achieve equilibrium. Monetary contraction may lead to inventory 
d~cu~~latlon I result which ls the opposite of standard 
analysis. Thus !lome empirical evidence can be given for the policy 
impllcatlons of the analysls. though more econometric research 
requlr •• to be don~. 
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Chapter Xl. 
C~neral Conclusions 
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The thesis covers a wide area but emphasises specific aspects 
of disequilibrium market behaviour in an aggregative framework. The 
focus is on macroeconomic models of growth and medium-term dynamics. 
Since the concepts are essentially diverse we cannot gain substantial 
leverage by trying to formulate a general theory which will encompass 
all the various models and relevant issues. Rather, the cost of 
generalisation may mean that stylised facts and policy problems are 
not sharply focussed. The chapters are therefore relatively 
independent and have their own conclusions which summarise their 
findings. It is however necessary to have an overall concluding 
perspective; this will be given here briefly. 
It will be useful, in this context, to discuss some of the 
recent research that have appeared over the last few years and see 
how the work reported here fits in with the broad framework of 
disequilibrium growth and macroeconomics. The overall conclusions of 
the thesis therefore will be presented in the context of the wider 
literature. In Chapter I, the Introduction, we have already discussed 
the underlying concepts of disequilibrium dynamics and the 
interrelationships of the models presented here with the earlier 
literature. I will therefore focus attention now on recent analysis 
and results in the field. In the process, it will also be instructive 
to review some of the directions in which future research in 
disequilibrium macroeconomic and growth theories can proceed. In 
addition to being an agenda for further research, we will also get an 
additional general perspective on the contents of my thesis. 
I will proceed in two stages. First, comes the literature review 
with the description of future research possibilities. This is, of 
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course, over and above the various analyses cited earlier for the 
individual chapters. Secondly, I shall present the overall 
conclusions of the thesis, summing up the unifying concepts that link 
the different chapters and sections. In a sense, this will be a meta 
view which may give us a wider perspective. 
Part A of the thesis concentrates on growth and capital 
accumulation, with excess capacity and unemployment. The major 
assumptions are related to disequilbrium adjustment and proper 
dynamic specifications. Traditionally, dynamic models have either 
assumed pure price adjustments (of the Walrasian type) or pure 
quantity adjustments (of the Marshallian type). By its very nature, 
disequilibrium growth models must have both types of adjustments 
over time. Growth, per se, requires capital formation; hence quantity 
variables change over time. On the other hand, disequilibrium and non 
market clearing induces price changes over time to bring about stable 
equilibrium. We therefore have "mixed adjustments". Mas-Colel1 (1986) 
uses a general equilibrium tatonnement model to analyse 'simultaneous 
price and quantity dynamics' which combines the two methodologies 
mentioned earlier. He demonstrates the enormous difficulties of 
proving global stability even when there is only one good, one factor 
input and one price. The demands made on the system by nontatonnement 
dynamics, as analysed by Fisher (1983) for example, are even higher. 
The basic model in Chapter 11 of this thesis is a good example of 
this simultaneous operation of both quantity (capital stock) and 
price (rate of interest) dynamics in a nontatonnement framework. As 
we demonstrated in that chapter even this simplest disequilibrium 
growth model requires quite a few restrictions and specifications 
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before one can be assured of existence and stability of temporary and 
steady state equllibria. 
The second point relates to the nature of the saving function, an 
important ingredient of long run growth. We have assumed (for example 
in Chapters IV and V) a fixed saving (consumption) propensity given 
exogenous1y. Ginsburg, Henin and Michel (1985) construct an 
intertempora1 optimising model using the dual decision hypothesis and 
allow for capital accumulation with unemployment. The aggregate 
household, maximising a functional of utility (integral), chooses an 
optimum path for the saving rate. It assumes employment as given. The 
aggregate firm, on the other hand, assumes the saving propensity as 
an exogenous parameter and tries to maximize an integral of profits, 
net of savings. Its control variable is labour demand for each point 
of time. Four disequilibrium regimes can be constructed: 
unemployment, over (full) employment, underconsumption, and under 
saving (excess consumption demand). Though the model is elegant, it 
suffers from a number of shortcomings. The formal derivation of the 
phase diagram is not always rigorous; the use of an intertemporal 
Nash equilibrium, with agents not taking into account the effect of 
their decisions on the behaviour of others, is difficult to justify 
under rational expectations; the problem of time consistency for this 
class of models remain; the firm's optimising function can be 
questioned as ad hoc. Some of these issues, as well as a formal 
model, are analysed in Sen (1987). The general consensus is that it 
is exceedingly difficult to construct a fully specified optimum 
savings model taking into account all the varIous facets of 
disequilibrium discussed earlier in the thesis. 
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The work of Ginsberg et al (1985) as well as that Ito (1980) and 
Ito (1982, referred to by Ginsburg et al) lies firmly in the 
tradition of neoclassical (So low type) growth theory. They correspond 
to what is often termed in the thesis as the 'Classical regime'. A 
more Keynesian perspective is to be found in Malinvaud (1981, 1984) 
and Picard (1983). These are related to the 'Keynesian regime' models 
discussed in earlier chapters. The essential characteristics are the 
following: specification of an investment function; an assumption 
that actual capital accumulation is given by investment, rather than 
saving; allowing for unemployment of labour and/or excess capacity of 
capital stock. 
This type of models explain a considerable amount in the fields 
of capital formation under unemployment, policy effectiveness, the 
existence and propagation of business cycles, as well as the trade-
offs implicit between unemployment and inflation. However, lack of an 
optimising behaviour by firms (as well as more general optimal growth 
theory) constitutes a shortcoming. The integration of disequilibrium 
growth and intertempora1 optimisation must remain a subject of 
considerable, and exciting, future research. 
Most of the growth models, discussed in the thesis, concentrate 
either on a classical or Keynesian regime. But regime switching 
remains a distinct possibility. Stability analysis then becomes 
relatively intractable since the standard restrictions on the 
Jacobians, as well as the signs of the partial derivatives of the 
differential equations, may not hold at the border of adjacent 
regimes. In effect, the differential equations are discontinuous at 
the boundary of adjacent regimes. Global stability for each set of 
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differential equations (for a given regime) does not necessarily 
imply global stability of the "patched-up" system (Ito (1980» of all 
regimes taken together. Ito (1980) and Honkapohja and Ito (1983) use 
the Fi1ippov solution to demonstrate for some specific disequilibrium 
systems how global stability can be achieved. For more complex 
models, particularly with asymmetric adjustment mechanisms as 
postulated here, it is yet not possible to get general stability 
results for "mixed" regimes or regime switching. 
Another interesting development in the theory of equilibrium 
growth, but with disequilibrium features, is the application of 
dynamic (differential) games to study the possible conflict between 
distribution and growth. Using the basic two class model (workers and 
capitalists), a number of papers analyse the various noncooperative 
solutions (Nash, Stackelberg) under open loop or feedback information 
structures. Pohjo1a (1986) gives an insightful survey on the various 
possibilities that exist here. Of particular interest is the 
Keynesian flavour to many of these models. For example, workers can 
affect distributional parameters by choosing the propensity to save 
(consume); capitalists, on the other hand, decide on accumulation by 
choosing the share of investment in the national product. Thus the 
fundamental distinction between decisions to save and invest open up 
the possibility of a Keynesian regime. Though some of these models 
assume a labour surplus economy (the reserve army of labour a la' 
Marx), they do not generally tackle wage adjustment in response to 
either unemployment or the discrepancy between desired saving and 
investment. 
The incorporation of money, and monetary issues, in 
disequilibrium models create additional complexities. The fundamental 
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reason lies with the long standing problem of integrating general 
equilibrium theory with monetary theory (see the various essays on 
this issue in Hahn (1984». There has been a recent upsurge in 
interest in such integrative models from the point of view of the 
micro foundations of the theory. The attempt is now on to construct 
"monetary general equilibrium asset-pricing models" (Svensson 
(1986». The essential idea is that money should be treated in 
symmetric fashion with other assets. Two methods are proposed to do 
this: either, real balance enters directly into the utility function 
together with other goods and assets; or, money is introduced in the 
model through a cash-in-advance constraint, its utility depending on 
its liquidity rather than dividends (as for other assets). The value 
of money is the reciprocal of the aggregate price level and is given 
by a standard asset pricing equation (Lucas and Stokey (1985». Most 
of the models in this genre assume perfect flexibility of all asset 
prices including the price of money. Implicitly this gives market 
clearing equilibrium even when there are shocks to the system 
following from new information or parameter changes. A major 
exception is the paper by Svensson (1986) which incorporates 
monopolistic competition and sticky prices thus ensuring that markets 
may not clear and resources remain underutilised. The emergence of 
unemployment therefore gives a disequilibrium flavour to this 
important area of current research --- integrating monetary, 
financial and real sectors of the economy. 
The models discussed above are microeconomic in nature and are 
based on well specified general equilibrium theory. However the basic 
insight, of treating money as symmetric with other assets, has been 
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present in monetary growth models for a considerable period of time. 
These are discussed. in some detail. in the first section of Chapter 
VII. I have surveyed the various strands of monetary growth 
theory. in the context of superneutrality. and emphasised the 
symmetry of real money and capital stock within the asset 
portfolio. Money in the utility function gives rise to "real balance 
effects". the consequences of which are extensively discussed in that 
chapter. The alternative. where cash-in-advance money is part of the 
wealth constraint. is essentially Tobinian. As mentioned earlier. the 
central point of monetary growth models should be that wealth must 
consist of both (real) money and capital stock and their demands must 
depend on the same set of (price) variables. The symmetric treatment 
of physical capital and real balance in output/disposable income. as 
well as in total wealth holding. can now be justified by the recent 
microtheoretic literature. 
Explicit disequilibrium analysis in monetary growth models. with 
sticky prices. inflexible wages. and unemployment. is rare. The model 
in Section 4 of chapter VII gives a flavour of the type of issues 
that can be raised here. Another example is a paper by Azam (1983) 
which uses an IS/LM framework to deal with disequilibrium concepts in 
a Keynes-Tobin monetary growth model. In terms of our earlier 
discussion. it may be fruitful for future research to consider an 
optimum growth model with money and capital accumulation. as well as 
incorporating disequilibrium features such as unemployment. 
Discussions on monetary growth theory is never complete without 
a reference to the question of policy effectiveness and monetary 
(super) neutrality. A related question is whether real business 
cycles can be caused by anticipated discretionary monetary policy. If 
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the role of money (growth) is neutral or super neutral, then can it 
cause temporary fluctuations leading to business cycles? Within the 
new classical framework the answer must be no. The only reason that 
Lucasians can provide for the existence of cycles are random or 
unanticipated shocks produced through government policies under 
uncertainty. We have shown, in the chapter on monetary growth 
models, Chapter VII, that even under perfect foresight (absence 
of uncertainty) the transition path for capital accumulaton can 
be affected by monetary policy. 
In a different context, Grandmont (1986) tackles these issues 
squarely by constructing a model of endogenous business cycles, which 
occur even without random shocks. The competitive monetary economy 
with a stationary environment can produce cyclical fluctuations. 
Further, government monetary policy, even when fully anticipated, 
does have real effects in stabilising the economy. Of particular 
interest are the mathematical tools employed: "the techniques 
employed to study the occurrence and the stability of such business 
cycles are partly borrowed from recent mathematical theories that 
have been constructed by using the notion of a 'bifurcation' of a 
dynamical system in order to explain the emergence of cycles and the 
transition of turbulent ('chaotic') behavior in physical, biological 
or ecological systems" (Grandmont (1986». The basic Grandmont model 
does assume Walraslan equilibrium since it is in part an answer to 
the Lucasian objection to disequilibrium modelling. But the use 
of bifurcation theory, for disequilibrium growth models, must 
also open up exciting research possibilities. 
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When we turn to medium term dynamics, the subject matter of Part 
B of the thesis, we find that basic concepts of disequilibrium are 
integrated into the analysis right from the beginning. In particular, 
open economy macroeconomics assumes sticky prices (wages) and 
unemployment within its basic framework. Most of the open economy 
literature now try to incorporate features of the monetary, Keynesian 
and portfolio models (A11en and Kenen (1983), Gyalfason and Hel1iwell 
(1983». This gives rise to models with interesting and empirically 
relevant characteristics: full equilibrium in the long run; the short 
rurt characterised by disequilibrium; sticky prices and contractually 
fixed wages; perfectly flexible exchange rates; assets markets clear 
rapidly while unemployment persists in the labour market. The 
Dornbusch model, which we have extensively used, is a classic example 
of these various issues. (See Obstfe1d and Rogoff (1984) for recent 
extensions). Its particular strength lies in medium term dynamics 
which can be exploited, as in chapters IX and X , to achieve 
interesting results. 
Unfortunately, one of the shortcomings of the Dornbusch 
type model is the failure to assimilate the dual decision hypothesis; 
rationing in one market has spill-overs elsewhere and this needs to 
be incorporated formally. Cuddington, Johansson and Lofgren (1984) do 
precisely that and their·innovative approach demonstrates how 
macroeconomic models can usefully integrate the fundamental 
microeconomic tenets of disequilibrium. However, their analysis 
(except in an Appendix) is essentially short run and an extension of 
the fix price approach to include the foreign sector. It is really 
not possible to incorporate dynamic concepts such as "overshooting" 
in their model. In general they tend to ignore dynamics. 
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1 have shown, in chapter IX, that the dynamics of the Dornbusch 
type models can be integrated with elements of the dual decision 
hypothesis and regime switching. Assuming perfect foresight for 
variables and regimes, we have formulated the concept of the kinked 
saddle path. This is clearly a combination of the central tenets of 
the two types of models mentioned earlier: saddle point equilibrium 
under perfect foresight and kinked boundaries between regimes, due to 
rationing. The existence of kinked saddle paths has also major 
implications for policies since the effects of government action is 
bound to be asymmetric. 
Another advantage of having (kinked) saddle paths, in 
models which combine rationing with rational expectations, is that 
the earlier mentioned problems of global stability disappear. Since 
there is only one and unique path, in each regime, which leads to 
equilibrium we need not concern ourselves with the discontinuities 
inherent in a "patched-up system. If the basic tenet of this 
analysis, the existence of "jump" variables, is acceptable then there 
should be no analytical problems with demonstrating that the 
equilibrium is stable. 
The recent upsurge of interest in macroeconomic (monetary) 
policy coordination (see the papers in Buiter and Marston (ed) 
(1985), particularly Miller and Salmon (1985a), as well as Miller and 
Salmon (1985b» has produced a large literature on how small open 
economies can conduct co-operative games to increase their joint 
welfare. It would be of considerable research interest to analyse 
policy coordination using the tools of disequilibrium analysis, 
specifically the recognition of asymmetric responses and kinks in the 
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dynamic paths. More formally, what would policy co-ordination look 
like for two economies of the type discussed in Chapter IX, 
particularly if one is characterised by excess supply and the other 
by excess demand? 
There can be little doubt that dynamic analysis per se, under 
disequilibrium, is exceedingly complex. The demands of growth theory 
i.e. capital accumulation, coupled with the existence of unemployment 
and the presence of excess capacity, create many additional problems. 
The presence of price and quantity dynamics within the same 
framework, the asymmetric adjustments that can take place, as well as 
nontatonnement and the dual decision hypothesis all contribute to the 
complexity. As Mas-Colell (1986) points out " ••• except in (some) 
cases there is nothing simple about the global dynamics of even the 
simplest demand and supply model". 
Let us now turn specifically to the general conclusions that can 
be derived from the many models studied in the thesis. As we have 
seen, through various examples, the nature of disequilibrium, the 
causes of market failure, the adjustment rules, the dynamic behaviour 
of the economy on the transition path, stable or unstable movements, 
policy prescriptions if any, are all heavily dependent on the sort of 
regime the economy is in. For example, Keynesian unemployment may 
need the wage rate to go up while Classical unemployment would claim 
the opposite. Similarly, whether capital formation is governed by 
investment or saving will have crucial implications for the 
subsequent bahaviour of the economy. It has generally been assumed 
that steady (stationary) state is exogenously determined, 
independent of the dynamic behaviour of the economy in 
disequilibrium. However, even this result may not be sacrosant, 
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particularly with increasing returns to scale. 
Models of disequilibrium behaviour generally acknowledge regime 
specific behaviour; but the emphasis does not go far enough. In 
particular, adjustment equations tend to be similar, independent of 
the sort of disequilibrium state the economy is in. A classic example 
of this is the assumption that wage adjusts to clear the labour 
market; thus unemployment induces a fall in real wages. Yet, if 
unemployment is caused by a lack of effective demand, then a fall in 
wages is potentially destabilising since it can cause a further fall 
in aggregate demand. As we have seen in Chapter V, a Keynesian regime 
may require wage to adjust in response to disequilibrium in the goods 
market rather than in the labour market. One of the important 
conclusions of the thesis is that dynamic behaviour and adjustment 
must be related to the specific nature of disequilibrium. 
Regime specification and concomitant adjustment rules have been 
major issues in the research reported here. This is particularly true 
for the growth chapters. Though the properties of these regimes, 
specifically Keynesian or Classical, may seem ad hoc they are 
nevertheless similar to the quantity rationing models, which are 
based on optimisation. In similar fashion, the adjustment equations 
of macrodynamics under disequilibrium are often attainable from 
inter-temporal optimisation models, where the Hamiltonian conditions 
could deliver the relevant dynamic equations. The distinction between 
control and state variables (when using the Maximum Principle) are 
essentially similar to that between backward-looking and foreward-
looking variables, with similar interpretations possible for 
discontinuous behaviour. The problem of free parameters may remain. 
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However, institutions and structure can tell us about stylised facts 
which can be used to determine the values of such parameters. There 
is also the possibility of empirical testing and econometric 
verification which can give a data-based specification, supporting or 
contradicting the assumptions made in the theoretical model. 
Macroeconomics must remain eclectic in its choice of method and 
support. 
The central methodological conclusion seems to be that dynamic 
beh~viour under disequilibrium is asymmetric across regimes. This 
means that generalised predictions will be less meaningful compared 
to more specific forecasts of economic behaviour which rely on the 
characteristics of the regime. 
Consider for example the usual "overshooting" models where a 
shift in a parameter causes the jump variable to move beyond its new 
long run equilibrium value. Inevitably, the literature shows a 
symmetric movement. Thus a rise or fall in the relevant variable is 
treated in exactly the same way. For a given positive or negative 
shock (say expansionary or contractionary policy) the rise or fall in 
the price variable is quantitatively the same. There are no 
discontinuities in the saddle path. Yet our analysis shows that this 
cannot be true. The saddle path may be kinked. Hence the quantitative 
jump may be quite different depending on which direction the jump Is 
being made. The implications for the transition path, as well as the 
time taken to reach the new equilibrium, can be quite different. 
The implications for policy are equally important. Policy rules, 
even if useful temporarily, may become counterproductive if there is 
regime switching. Even discretionary policy has to be more carefully 
scrutinised dependent on the regime the economy is in. In a sense we 
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may have here a variant of the Lucas critique. As the regime shifts, 
so does stable dynamic behaviour; previous parameters and policies 
may be irrelevant or even destabi1ising. The current literature on 
neo-Keynesian policy effectiveness has not really grappled with this 
issue. For example, in a policy co-ordination model, if one country 
has excess demand (high inflation) and another country has excess 
supply (high unemployment) then policy rules need to be more 
carefully constructed since their effect will be qualitatively 
different. In a sense the disequilibrium models analysed here pose 
important questions for policy formulation and require a more 
specific study of the macroeconomy. 
Disequilibrium economics and dynamics still lack an unifying 
framework since it is difficult to bring all the competing (and 
sometimes conflicting) hypotheses together. On the other hand, the 
heterogeneity and variety of concepts adds to its attractions and 
allows us to get a richer menu of results which have much wider 
relevance. Future research must aim to capture the diverse elements 
that constitute disequilibrium regimes; but the search for a common 
conceptual framework also has to continue. 
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